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ABSTRACT

THE ETHJCS OF HUMAN GENETIC ENHANCEMENT EXTENDING THE PUBLIC
POLICY DEBATE
By John J. Baumann, Ph.D
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University Virginia Commonwealth
University, 1999.
Major Director David R Hiley, Ph D , Vice Provost for Academic Affairs

Mammalian one-cell embryos can be genetically altered, implanted into the
female's uterus, and subsequently develop into biologically mature organisms in the
usual manner. If the resultant adult organisms reproduce, the genetic change may be
passed on to future generations. In humans, the procedure is known alternatively as
"human genetic engineering" or "human germline gene therapy." Bioethicists distinguish
between genetic engineering intended for the prevention or treatment of disease
("treatment germline gene therapy") and genetic engineering intended for non-medical
enhancement of certain characteristics ("enhancement germline gene therapy"). Human
genetic engineering has the potential to effectively replace deleterious genes

such as the

gene for cystic fibrosis or sickle cell disease - with a normal gene. Thus, not only is
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disease avoided in the next generation, but all future generations are spared the effects of
the disease-causing gene as well.
The current public policy consensus is that human genetic engineering, whether
intended for treatment or enhancement, is ethically impermissible. The primary reason is
that present genetic engineering technology carries an unacceptable level of risk for use
in humans. There is, however, good reason to believe that genetic engineering will
become acceptably safe for use in humans, thereby eliminating the major ethical barrier
to the technology. In fact, several policy statements already have suggested that, once
safe, treatment genetic engineering ought to be permitted while enhancement genetic
engineering ought not to be permitted.
Part of the concern surrounding genetic enhancement is that bad consequences such as morally objectionable eugenics practices - might ensue. But another objection is
that human genetic enhancement is intrinsically problematic. In other words, at least
very radical genetic enhancements violate what it is that makes human beings
intrinsically valuable Drawing on a Wittgensteinian view of human beings, the present
work proposes a conception of ethically significant humanness - "human beingness" that is potentially threatened by certain kinds or degrees of human genetic enhancement
The impact of human beingness on the future direction of human gene therapy policy,
and in other policy areas, is discussed

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

That the growing power of molecular genetics confronts us with future prospects of being
able to change the nature of our species is a fact that seldom appears to be addressed in
depth.I
Since the 1960s, when the prospect of technically feasible human genetic
engineering (GE) first came into view, it has been met with a variety of ethical
objections. At the forefront have been concerns that human GE would lead to unintended
harms or other bad consequences. In particular, there has been the fear that things will go
horribly awry and monstrous subhumans will be created (see also President's
Commission, excerpted in Jonsen, Veatch, & Walters, 1998, p. 300; Rollin, 1995).
In addition to fear of harm, there have been other objections. For example, some
have argued that human GE for any purpose would put us on the slippery slope towards
ethically objectionable eugenics - that is, towards efforts to improve the human race
through genetic means. Such efforts in the past have been based on racial and other
prejudices, and have involved such means as forced sterilization of certain
"undesirables." Others have argued that human GE is morally wrong because it would
involve the destruction of embryos along the way. Since current human GE technology
involves the introduction of genes into one-cell embryos in a process that is not one
hundred percent efficient, many one-cell embryos would be lost both in preliminary
research and in clinical application. Still others have argued that human GE is wrong

1 Editors of the journal Nature, March 7, 19% (quoted in Silver, 1997, p. IO).
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because it violates the rights of future generations to have a genetic inheritance that has
not been tampered with. And still other objections have been made as well.
We will be concerned with a different sort of objection, namely, that human GE
has the potential to violate what is intrinsically valuable, or "sacred" (where that can be
understood in a secular sense; see Chapter 4 on Dworkin), in human beings While not
all alterations to the human genome are ethically objectionable, certain kinds or degrees
of genetic alteration in humans are intrinsically morally regrettable - that is, regrettable
regardless of whether the consequences are good or bad.
Investigating this ethical objection to human GE is important for two interrelated
reasons - the first having to do with public policy, and the second with bioethics
generally

With respect to public policy, it will be argued that the current ethical basis

for restricting certain kinds of human GE is unstable. The ethical objections that
collectively compose that basis are either time-bound, or not likely to carry sufficient
weight to justify restricting human GE. Most important of these is the objection that
human GE is morally impermissible because it is unsafe. This objection is at present not
a matter of serious dispute, and is central to the justification for restricting even medically
beneficial human GE. But there are good reasons for believing that human GE will
become safe in the foreseeable future (see Chapter 2). Once safe, we will need to rely on
other ethical objections to support the imposition of limits on the kinds of genetic
alterations that may be made to human beings. The other possibilities, as just noted, are
not particularly compelling. These arguments related to the tenuous foundation for our
current ethical consensus on human GE will be taken up in Chapter 3.
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With respect to bioethics generally, the question is whether the ethical issues are
exhausted by the list of objections that we will be considering. Perhaps even after one
accounts for the possibility of harmful consequences, and the moral status of embryos,
and the possibility of eugenics-related abuses, and so on, there is at the heart of our moral
intuitions about human GE, an ethical "remainder," so to speak. Put differently, even in
an idealized case in which human GE could be done safely and the other ethical
objections did not apply, many would intuitively feel that some limit on the genetic
alteration of humans still ought to apply - that something of ethical significance remains
that ought not be violated. (We already have used the terms "intrinsic human value" and
"sacredness" to refer to this hypothesized ethical remainder. Others have spoken of
"human dignity" or "humanity" or "human beingness", which seem in certain contexts to
be related concepts. For the time being we will use the term humanness as a
placeholder.) To the extent that there are rational underpinnings to our intuitions about
humanness - intuitions that may be illuminated by considering the case of human GE an understanding of those underpinnings will broaden the base of ethical concerns that
can legitimately be raised in bioethics.
Thus, the present inquiry addresses the following central questions:
I) What is the current ethical basis for public policy restrictions on certain kinds of
human GE, and is that basis stable ?
2) Can a rational basis be found to support the intuition that certain kinds or degrees
of non-harmful human genetic enhancement violate what is intrinsically valuable
in human beings?
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The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the nature of this motivating
intuition. Novel genetic and biomedical technologies are often accused of violating"who
we are." But some technologies seem to evoke stronger reactions of this sort than others.
We will focus on these more troubling cases and ask what it is that seems to be
jeopardized in these cases in contrast to the others. Having narrowed the scope in this
way, two senses of"who we are" will emerge. Of these two senses of"who we are" only
one will appear to be threatened by certain kinds or degrees of human genetic
enhancement - namely, what we are provisionally calling"humanness " But is
"humanness" merely biological humanness, i e., membership in the species Homo
sapiens ? If so, how can this be of ethical significance? If"humanness" is something
other than species membership, then what is it ? Finally, a thought experiment is
introduced to assist in our consideration of these questions in subsequent chapters.
The scientific background to human GE will be introduced in Chapter 2 Aside
from serving as an introduction to GE technology, Chapter 2 also gives reasons in
support of the claim that GE is likely to become technically feasible and acceptably safe
for use in humans, thus eliminating the main ethical objection to human GE. Chapter 3
introduces the current"orthodox" position on human GE, and argues that - once GE
becomes acceptably safe for use in humans the other ethical objections to human GE
are not likely to justify a restrictive policy Chapter 4 considers the view that, given the
arguments of Chapters 2 and 3, restrictions on human GE are not justifiable. That is, if
human GE becomes acceptably safe and other common objections are not compelling,
perhaps we are not justified in our intuition that altering humankind is ethically
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regrettable. Chapter 5 offers a conception of humanness that, arguably, could serve as a
basis for restricting at least certain kinds or degrees of (non-harmful) human genetic
enhancements. Finally, Chapter 6 considers some of the implications of this conception
of humanness

not only for human GE policy, but for other policy areas as well

The Essence of Humanness

The idea that human beings have an essence or distinctive nature has been a
prominent part of our Western philosophical heritage. Aristotle held that all things in the
world have a function, or te/os, that is peculiar to them. The good life, or eudaimonia, is
achieved through the successful performance of that function But only things which
possess the relevant arete (usually translated as "virtue" or "excellence") will be capable
of successfully performing their peculiar function (Rowe, 1991, p. 124). Thus, for
example, only good acorns (those possessing the relevant arete) will successfully fulfill
their peculiar function, namely, becoming a strong, well shaped oak tree (Magill, 1990)
The function of human beings, according to Aristotle, is "an active life of that which
possesses reason" (quoted in Rowe, 1991, p 124) The successful performance of this
function requires the relevant aretai, the most important of which is "the intellect
functioning in isolation," although the practical or "moral" virtues (such as justice,
courage and wittiness) have a role to play as well (ibid , p. 124). St Thomas Aquinas
drew on Aristotle's work, which had recently become available in the Christian West
On Aquinas' view,
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right action is conduct that either tends to promote or actually realizes human
flourishing. On this view there is a distinctive and essential human nature, and
associated with it a set ofvalues constituting excellence in the conduct oflife.
Hence, virtues are those habits ofaction which are conducive to the fulfillment of
an agent's rational nature. (Haldane, 1991, p. 141)
Kant rejects both the conception ofa human nature that transcends our
experience, and the accounts ofthe virtues held by his predecessors. Kant does, however,
tie the moral worth ofhuman beings to their possession ofthe faculty ofreason It is
reason that permits the development ofa good will, for "only a rational being has the
power of acting according to the idea ofa law, i e , by Will" (Russell, 1945, p. 710). The
good will, in turn, is a sort ofmoral fountainhead from which all properly motivated
moral actions spring. Kant claims that "Nothing in the world - indeed nothing even
beyond the world - can possibly be conceived which could be called good without
qualification except a goodwilf' (quoted in Magill, 1990, p. 336) The intellectual and
"moral" virtues of Aristotle and Aquinas are not good in themselves. Intelligence,
courage, moderation, and so on, can be put to ill purposes as well as good From this
notion ofthe rational man's good will, Kant derives an ethics centered on moral duty.
The repudiation oftranscendental understandings ofhuman nature seen in Kant is
sympathetically received in an increasingly scientific world. The tools ofscience have
allowed us to probe "human nature" in ways that Aristotle could not have imagined, and
the descriptions ofthis nature are in the language ofbiology and chemistry, not
metaphysics. We don't see souls or essences; we see organs, cells and chromosomes. As
the Nobel Prize-winning geneticist Joshua Lederberg once noted, "Humanistic culture
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rests on a definition of man which we already know to be biologically vulnerable" (1966,
p 530)
Nevertheless, "human nature" need not imply the existence of mysterious
metaphysical entities In our everyday world there is no problem in distinguishing human
beings from other things. Although it may not be easy to identify with certainty the one
or more defining characteristics of human beings, the sense that there are such
characteristics is not easily abandoned. As we have seen, the conception of human
beings as essentially rational creatures has been prominent in our thought about
ourselves. But whether our humanness inheres just in rationality or in something else (or
something more), we tend to think that the notion of human nature, or essential
humanness, is meaningful And we think not only that it is meaningful semantically, but
that it is meaningful morally as well
To say that a particular philosophical view - essentialism - has been prominent in
Western thought is merely to make an historical point. It remains to be seen whether
some notion of ethically significant humanness is defensible (see Chapters 4 and 5). Let
us turn first to our intuitive moral aversion to certain genetic and other biomedical
technologies. What is the nature of this aversion? Which technologies seem most
problematic? And what exactly appears to be threatened by these technologies?
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Moral Aversion to Biological Novelties

With many biotechnological breakthroughs - certainly those directly involving
humans - there have been public outcries of alarm and dismay ofvariable duration and
vociferousness. The offending technologies are typically accused of being "unnatural,"
or of threatening "who we are," our "identity" Joseph Fletcher, writing almost three
decades ago, captured this sense of alarm at a time when organ transplantation and
kidney dialysis machines were new technologies, the use ofpsychotropic medicines had
become common, and molecular genetics was just getting under way (Fletcher, 1970, pp
122-123)
Take the notion of' identity,' a notion so prominent in the current rhetoric of
psychology.. Given the present and future trends in cyborg medicine, one may
well ask Who is it that functions physiologically with borrowed or artificial veins
and arteries (whether synthetic or plastic), bone structures, prosthetic devices,
cardiac implants - including even donated aortas or whole hearts - audio and
visual aids, manipulators and pedipulators, donated kidneys, or artificial dialysis
for kidney function, artificial kidneys and hearts powered by isotopic energy, and
many other technological devices, logically ending in a sort of ultima ratio with
transplanted brains? Who is the child born as a result ofpredetermined sex,
germinal selection, genetic control, and artificial mutations - and after birth
modified not only by cyborg technology but by chemical and electronic means,
for example, by effective appetite controls and weight controls, electric brain
stimulation by electrodes and surgical subcuts, endocrine alterations, and the like?
For just as we once reached the point at which diabetics could regulate the sugar
in their blood systems, so we will have autocontrol of mood and intelligence.
Who, then, is who? How will we think of it when theoretical brain transplants
become operational? As they say, today's 'science fiction' is tomorrow's science
Who is the recipient patient - is he the preoperative person or the donor? This
kind of basic conceptual question, like the one about when and what is death, will
inevitably change not only the language but also the mental constructs with which
we think about moral values, ethical responsibility, and even the very notion of
the moral agent himself
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Fletcher covers the gamut of biological novelties of the time, citing bodily
alterations ( e.g., transplantation, prosthetics, dialysis), psychological alterations ( e.g.,
psychotropic medications, brain surgery), and genetic or reproductive alterations. Similar
reactions have also been seen, to greater or lesser extents, in response to in vitro
fertilization (IVF), somatic cell gene therapy, and human cloning. (Somatic cell gene
therapy involves the correction of a genetic defect in the non-reproductive cells of a
patient - e g, the introduction of normally functioning genes into the lung cells of
persons with cystic fibrosis These genetic corrections cannot be passed on to offspring
See Chapter 2.)
But it is relatively easy to chip away at this sort of sweeping objection. Certainly
no one regards the recipient of a transplanted heart, liver or kidney as a person whose
identity has become indefinite as a result of that transplant If it was Aunt Mary who
entered the operating room, it is the same Aunt Mary who comes out Whatever it is that
is essential to Aunt Mary is not changed by having exchanged a diseased kidney for a
healthy one Similarly, in the case ofIVF, how can the fact that fertilization is
extrauterine make any moral difference ? The same child would have resulted from a
given union of sperm and egg if that union had occurred in the Fallopian tube of the
prospective mother rather than in a laboratory dish. In the case of somatic cell gene
therapy, if we can restore normal lung cell function in a patient suffering from cystic
fibrosis, what does it matter that this is accomplished through the introduction to lung
cells of "normal" genes that won't be passed on to that patient's offspring ? Somatic cell
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gene therapy seems to raise no new ethical issues over and above those that attend non
genetic therapies - expected beneft-to-risk ratio, informed consent, and so on.
Although the popular verdict is still out on human cloning, some see it as no more
morally troublesome than IVF or somatic cell gene therapy (see Kluger, 1997, p. 70). An
objection that some have made is that, by creating a genetic duplicate, the "identity" (in
the sense of self-image or self-conception) of that clone would be compromised. As
Annas ( 1998, p. 123) says, "The danger is that through human cloning we will lose
something vital to our humanity, the uniqueness (and therefore the value and dignity) of
every human " The underlying premise seems to be that genetic uniqueness is necessary
for an uncompromised "identity" of this sort. But clones are essentially later-born
identical twins - that is, the cloned offspring is identical to the "original" (the donor of
the cell nucleus used to create the embryo) in the same way that identical twins are
identical. And the latter we do not typically view as lacking in uniqueness as individual
persons, nor as victims of morally regrettable reproductive circumstances
These brief comments on cloning, somatic cell gene therapy, IVF, and
transplantation are not intended to substitute for a full ethical debate. They are
mentioned here merely to point out what they have in common. In each of these cases,
the result is either a normal human offspring, or a medically improved (closer to normal)
patient. When the result of biomedical intervention is a relatively healthy, normal human
being who has not undergone a significant transformation of the personality or "self," the
initial sense of revulsion about the intervention seems not to have much staying power.
The charge of"changing who we are" seems implausible

II

For many controversial biotechnologies, perhaps there is nothing more to be said.
Upon reflection, we may agree that the novel technique in question does not change "who
we are." Our initial reaction, we may conclude, was nothing more than a "revulsion
against anomalies," as Glover puts it ( 1984, p. 40), or maybe a concern about the
potential for harm or abuse, or a bit of both

Threats to "Identity"

Yet there are other technologies that cannot be so easily dismissed, that do seem
to have the potential to threaten who we are, in some sense of that phrase. Let's briefly
consider three that Fletcher alluded to - "cosmetic psychopharmacology" (Kramer, 1993,
p xvi), brain surgery, and genetic engineering. In doing so, we will gain a better
purchase on what might be meant by the phrase "who we are." That is, we will see which
kinds of identity are potentially placed in jeopardy by human GE, and which kinds are
not Since we wish to consider the ethical ramifications of potential threats to identity in
isolation from other ethical issues, we will concern ourselves only with non-harmful
interventions, i e., with enhancements

Cosmetic Psychopharmacofogy
Psychiatrist Peter Kramer, in his book Listening to Prozac (1993) describes
several patients who were treated with Prozac at a time when that drug was new on the
market Prozac was used in patients who were having difficulties that could, in a very
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broad sense of the term, be classified as compulsions In one case, a patient's
compulsions had to do with remaining committed to close personal relationships. In the
past, these compulsions had had favorable effects The patient managed at a young age
to fill a parental role in her family after her parents failed to do so, seeing to it that her
siblings completed their education and generally turned out well. She herself managed
against all odds to succeed professionally Later, however, her compulsive tendencies led
her to remain committed to a relationship with an abusive man, and then emotionally
attached to him after the relationship ended.
On Prozac, this patient was able to shed her emotional ties to her former
boyfriend. In addition, on the job she was able to handle difficult and very stressful labor
negotiations with an improved degree of conf dence and skill Her social life picked up.
She began dating much more frequently, and enjoying these occasions
This transformation of the self was typical of Kramer's patients on Prozac
Kramer noted with some alarm that patients tended to characterize themselves as being
"better than well" when on the drug Some, when taken off Prozac, reverted to that set of
behaviors and dispositions that had been typical of their life prior to medication, at which
they would lament that they no longer felt themselves. This complaint caused Kramer to
wonder, naturally, who they had been all those years before Prozac if not themselves?
One patient was so taken with the drug that she ebulliently announced that she now
referred to herself as "Ms Prozac" - an appellation that had never in the author's
experience been constructed using the name of any other drug.
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In the case of Prozac, we might be inclined to say that the effect is more on the
order of "enhancement of mood" rather than "transformation of self" But then it is not
difficult to imagine another drug - a "Super Prozac" - the effects of which are even more
pronounced, though still considered enhancements, at least from the perspective of the
patient. With Super Prozac, whatever we have gained in the form of the enhanced
person, we are tempted to say that there has been a loss in the form of the pre-treatment
person.

Brain Surgery
The second technology that has been viewed as a potential threat to identity is
brain surgery. In brain surgery, a distinction is made between surgery intended to correct
or alleviate psychiatric disorders and surgery intended to correct or alleviate non
psychiatric disorders. The former was until recently known as psychosurge,y, and is now
commonly known as psychiatric surge,y (The term "psychosurgery" fell into disfavor
owing to the crude nature of early psychosurgical techniques - most notoriously the
frontal lobotomy - which eventually drew vehement protest (see, e g , Valenstein, 1986))
The latter category is known simply as brain surgery
Kleinig (1985, p. 73) speaks of a "rigid moral dichotomisation of brain surgery
and psychosurgery." Brain surgery tends to be seen as morally unobjectionable because
the intent is to restore brain function, often by removing damaged or diseased tissue.
Psychiatric surgery, on the other hand, usually involves the destruction of histologically
normal brain tissue and is, by definition, intended to alter personality.
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A morally troubling feature of psychiatric surgery is the potential for a substantial
transformation

rather than moderate alteration - of the personality The concern is that

"[ t]he patient enters the [ operating] theatre as one person and emerges as another" (ibid ,
p. 77). The procedure is justified, of course, by viewing the transformation as restorative,
rather than destructive, of the self
An example of (non-psychiatric) brain surgery is the use of grafts of neural tissue
for the treatment of Parkinson's disease, a relatively common neurodegenerative disorder
named for the physician who first described it as the "shaking palsy" (Youdim &
Riederer, 1997, p 52) Northoff (1996) reviews the standard arguments for and against
the claim that brain tissue transplantation alters personal identity over time Opponents
tend to rely on"' strict identity' between brain and person so that even inserting a small
number of new cells within the brain necessarily affects personal identity" (ibid , p 175;
emphasis added) Some argue that alterations to the brain necessarily affect the mind as
well (ibid , p 177) Some argue that the distinction between motor functions and
psychological functions is blurry, and that tissue transplantations designed to restore the
former necessarily affect the latter (ibid., p 166) Proponents, on the other hand, say that
when relatively small amounts of tissue are transplanted, the effect is one of restoring
normal function, not altering personal identity (ibid , p. 174). Brain function - its
restoration, loss, or alteration - is emphasized by proponents as being critical to personal
identity. There has been no evidence that tissue transplantation (i.e., small amounts)
alters the psychological functions or phenomenal experiences of Parkinsonic patients
(ibid , pp 176 177) Thus far, these brain tissue grafts have not provoked much in the
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way of controversy because the amounts of tissue have been small, the goal has been the
restoration of normal brain function, and evidently the strict identity arguments of
opponents have not been persuasive. 2
For our purposes, it is not necessary to resolve the dispute over whether
transplantation of small amounts of brain tissue jeopardizes personal identity. The
underlying philosophical views on personal identity over time are complicated, and are
somewhat tangential to our main concerns. Instead we can work from the common
ground between the camps. Both proponents and opponents of tissue transplantation
agree that the transplantation of a substantial amount of brain tissue (e.g., whole lobes)
would threaten personal identity. Of course, one is not at liberty to test this hypothesis in
humans, but an example in birds makes the point. A recent experiment showed that, by
transplanting portions of the brain of a Japanese quail into chickens, one can transfer to
chickens the crowing and associated head movements typical of the quail (Balaban,
1997)
At the extreme end of the spectrum, whole brain transplants, if surgically
successful, would presumably result in a radical change in (or relocation ofi) the self the transfer of one (psychological) person to another body The prospect of human brain
transplants might seem annoyingly fantastic and so far out of moral bounds as not to
warrant serious discussion. While the subject of brain transplants will not be pursued
herein, a few brief observations may suffice to show that the possibility of human brain
transplants is not as far-fetched as one might suspect, either as a technical or a moral
2 What controversy there is has to do wid1 die source of the graft tissue aboned fetuses (Hoffer &
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matter. Whole-brain transplants have been done in monkeys (White et al, 1996),
suggesting that they could well be technically feasible in humans. Although in monkeys,
the post-operative animal was paralyzed from the neck down, it is not difficult to imagine
at least one scenario in which we might want-indeed, be ethically compelled-to
exercise this option. Let us imagine that A suffers from disease Z that leaves him
paralyzed from the neck down and is characterized further by a progressive, inevitably
fatal, deterioration of the body excluding the brain (The plight of world-renowned
physicist Stephen Hawking comes to mind here.) B is an accident victim who, as a result
of his head injuries, is declared "brain dead," but who retains normal function in all other
organs including the brain stem. Assuming B's loved ones give permission, etc , it is by
no means obvious why the transplantation of A's brain into B's body should be deemed
morally impermissible. The outcome for B is no worse B is dead in either case. The
outcome for A is better-while still paralyzed from the neck down, B's body is free from
disease Z which, it will be recalled, is fatal By proceeding with the transplant, we will
have saved A's life. Obviously, we have for simplicity just ignored a long list of social
and philosophical complications, the pursuit of which is beyond the scope of the present
inquiry. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that, at the very least, a justification for
denying A the operation is called for.
The main point for our purposes is simply that certain kinds of brain surgery may
compromise our identity even though they otherwise relieve certain diseases or
disabilities and are generally beneficial

Olson, 1991).

17

Genetic Engineering
The third biotechnology that has the potential to threaten our "identity" is genetic
engineering. GE involves the introduction ofexogenous genes into the chromosomes of
either the recently fertilized egg, or the sperm or egg prior to fertilization. When
successful, this procedure results in offspring that possess, in addition to their own genes,
the artificially introduced genes as well. Since genes are made ofthe same chemical stuff
in all organisms, genes from human or non-human sources may be used The technical
details ofhuman GE will be presented in Chapter 2. For now, it is sufficient to note that
the prospect ofcrossing species boundaries has elicited expressions ofmoral dismay from
various quarters, and is generally viewed as morally impermissible, at least where the
human species is involved. Recently, for example, President Clinton reacted to news that
a human cell had been fused with a cow egg cell, reportedly giving rise to an embryonic
stem cell, i e , a cell that has the capacity to develop into a fully formed organism.
Writing to the Chair ofthe National Bioethics Advisory Commission, the President
expressed the nature ofhis ethical misgivings concisely (Clinton, 1998)
This week's report ofthe creation ofan embryonic stem cell that is part human
and part cow raises the most serious ofethical, medical, and legal concerns. I am
deeply troubled by this news ofexperiments involving the mingling ofhuman and
non-human species.
We will have more to say on the subject ofcrossing species boundaries shortly. Now,
however, it will be useful to contrast the threat to our "identity" posed by human genetic
engineering with that posed by psychopharmacology or brain surgery.
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Human GE Does Not Threaten Particular Personhood (Personal Identity over Time)

In genetically altering recently fertilized eggs, one might conceivably alter

general personhood or humanness - i.e., one's very status as a person or a human - but
not particular personhood or humanness That is, assuming that the recently fertilized
egg (a.k.a, the one-cell embryo, or zygote) is not a person or human being, genetically
altering it might give rise to an organism that is not a person or not a human being
However, such an alteration will not result in a loss of (or threat to) personal identity over
time, as was illustrated in the cases of brain surgery and (arguably) cosmetic
psychopharmacology What is threatened in those latter cases is the continued existence
of a particular, essentially psychological, person Where there was, prior to treatment
with Prozac (or a "Super Prozac"), Jane, there is now some other individual who is not
(or is only partially) Jane. And intentionally bringing about the loss of part or all of this
unique individual person is ethically regrettable. The same might be said of certain types
of brain surgery that similarly result in significant differences and psychological
discontinuities between the pre-operative and post-operative patient The relevant
examples considered above were the transplantation of whole lobes or whole brains
But particular personhood - or personal identity over time - cannot be what is
lost in the case of human GE because the thing that is altered (the zygote) is not a person
There is no Jane that exists in the first place, and thus no particular person who could be
lost through some radical pharmaceutical, surgical or other alteration. It has just been
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asserted without argument that the zygote, or one cell embryo, is not a person. Those
who find this assertion implausible might insist that some justification -some account of
personhood -is required here While a justification could well be articulated, we can
instead concede the point and make an alternative claim. Even if we allow that the
zygote is a person -and thus that personal identity over time is potentially threatened by
genetic alterations of the zygote -we can stipulate instead that the gamete (i.e., the sperm
or egg) is the object of genetic manipulation (see Chapter 2 for technical details). It is
difficult to imagine an account of personhood on which gametes qualify as persons At a
minimum, we may say that the burden has now shifted to those who would make such a
claim

Isolating the Ethical Variable of Interest - Humanness

We have been searching for what we intuitively feel is potentially intrinsically
wrong with human GE. This search is important, we have said, for two interconnected
reasons. First, our policy statements reflect the popular sentiment that, while some
medically beneficial human GE ought to be permitted, there are some moral lines that
should not be crossed with the technology. Thus far a restrictive policy has been able to
rely on the risk of harm and other common ethical objections as the basis for the ethical
consensus against human GE. However, there is reason to believe that the technology
will become safe, and other common objections, we will argue, are not likely to stop the
momentum that favors a permissive policy on human GE
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Second, as an ethical issue, the current debate over human GE seems incomplete.
The concerns about harm, the moral status of the embryo, eugenics, and so on, do not
capture the deeper ethical misgivings - the sense that at least certain kinds or degrees of
genetic intervention threaten "who we are>' We have noted that this intuitive sense that
human GE threatens our sense of identity or "who we are" cannot be understood to mean
particular personhood (personal identity over time) However, GE can, in principle,

threaten general personhood or humanness That is, assuming that it became technically
feasible, substantial alterations of the human genome could give rise to a novel organism
that would not be recognizably human. The hypothesis, then, is that it is the potential of
human GE to threaten our humanness that is at the heart of our intuitive moral aversion.
At this juncture, a point should be made regarding the selection of human genetic
enhancement from among several controversial biotechnologies that have evoked similar
moral reactions This selection was made not only because human genetic enhancement
is an important and timely public policy issue in its own right. There was a strategic
reason as well. As might already be obvious, the motivation had to do with isolating the
ethical variable of interest. By focusing on enhancement, as opposed to genetic
engineering generally, we are by definition ruling out moral objections based on bad
consequences. By choosing germline genetic alterations, we eliminate moral objections
having to do with a loss of personal identity over time. (Per above, we are starting with a
one-cell embryo or gamete - a non-person and so loss of personal identity is
impossible.) Thus, in attempting to make sense of the intuitive moral aversion to GE, it
is being suggested that even when human GE leads to good consequences and does not
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threaten personal identity over time, something (the isolated ethical variablehumanness) of ethical significance remains
We will have more to say about the notion of humanness shortly. For now we
will continue to rely on a common-sense understanding of what it means to be human.
What sort of human genetic enhancement might threaten humanness?

Silver's Futuristic Scenario: The GenRich

Silver, in Remaking Eden ( 1997, pp 240-249), describes a scenario that will serve
us well in our ethical thought-experiments In Silver's future world, genetic engineering
technology has become routine by the year 2350 and is used for purposes of
enhancement What H G. Wells had predicted at the end of the nineteenth century- the
splitting of the human species -is gradually coming to pass But Wells was speaking of
the natural course of evolution and a time scale of 800,000 years Scientists now are
predicting species divergence via GE-accelerated evolution by the year 3000. Early on,
enhancements were largely related to physical and mental health Before long, however,
non-health related traits- such as cognitive and athletic abilities - were fair game.
"Genetic enhancement clinics" are widespread and privately financed, owing to a long
standing ban on funding research on human embryos. Immense profits are at stake in the
industry, and consumer demand is strong, making a belated attempt at regulation
politically improbable. Aside from all this, all wielders of political and corporate power
are themselves genetically enriched. Although not yet a distinct species, this "GenRich"
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class has an extra pair of chromosomes - 48 instead of the 46 in the unenhanced, or
"Natural" class - designed to hold additional "gene packs" as necessary.
By the 26th century, Homo sapiens has evolved into four species. One is the
unenhanced Naturals. The other three are GenRich species made distinct from each other
as a consequence of corporate competition: The three mega-corporations that dominate
the industry use mutually incompatible gene-pack "platforms." Massive overpopulation
has made Earth inhospitable, hence the GenRich have been modified to live in extreme
conditions, such as in the polar regions and even on Mars where "lung-modified thick
skinned dark green human descendants" live quite comfortably "within enormous bubble
enclosed biospheres" (ibid., p. 247) By the 2ih century, there are at least a dozen
human-derived species each with 46 to 54 chromosomes. One gene-pack - called
AGEBUSTER - has opened up new possibilities for distant space travel by dramatically
slowing the aging process
For present purposes, these few details will suffice The purpose of the thought
experiment is to provide an extreme case so that what (if anything) is ethically
objectionable about a loss of humanness through radical genetic enhancement will be
more apparent. By the term radical genetic enhancement of humans we have in mind,
roughly, a genetic change that is generally beneficial but which produces an organism
that is no longer recognizably human and can no longer interbreed with unenhanced
humans.
Now it seems clear that many aspects of our present-day humanness (at least,
biological humanness) would be altered in our GenRich descendants But for the sake of
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starting the discussion, let us first consider the charge that Silver's scenario is morally
objectionable because we have crossed the biological line that separates one species from
another

Crossing Species Boundaries

Several challenges have been made to the claim that crossing species boundaries
has special ethical significance 3 First of all, it cannot be the transfer of"foreign" DNA
in transgenics (GE) that is morally problematic, for such transfer happens in nature
without human intervention. Second, the claim that the creation of tangelos or mules bred from tangerines and grapefruits, and horses and donkeys, respectively - is morally
wrong seems highly implausible Third, if the concern is that GE can be used to create
non-sterile hybrids (unlike mules), then it seems that the fear has to do with a "self
perpetuating mistake," rather than crossing species boundaries per se. Fourth, the
concern may be about human-animal hybrids - specifically, that some horrible
Frankenstein-like outcome will result. But if this is the "rational kernel" of the objection,
then the rightness or wrongness of creating such a hybrid depends on the consequences
That is, once again, the objection is not against crossing species boundaries in itself, but
about some anticipated harm. (It has been consequentialist concerns that have dominated
in the debate over the ethics of xenotransplantation - transplantation of organs from one
species to another The only significant ethical hurdle has centered on the probability
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that xenotransplants will contain latent viruses harmful to humans (Le Tissier, Stoye,
Takeuchi, Patience, & Weiss, 1997; Vogel, 1998).)
Fifth, one might claim, instead, that the creation of human-animal hybrids is
intrinsically wrong. In response, two questions are posed by the President's Commission
in Splicing Life (ibid , p. 59)
First, what characteristics are uniquely human, setting humanity apart from all
other species? And second, does the wrong lie in bestowing some but not all of
these characteristics on the new creation or does it stem from depriving the being
that might otherwise have arisen from the human genetic material of the
opportunity to have a totally human makeup?
Surprisingly, the report makes no attempt to answer these questions, instead stating that
"the information available to the Commission [in 1982] suggests that the ability to create
interspecific hybrids of the sort that would present intrinsic moral and religious concerns
will not be available in the foreseeable future" (ibid , p. 59). What is expected, according
to the report, is the use of single human genes, or research that does not result in mature
organisms (ibid , pp 59-60)
Splicing Life was one of the frst statements of the "orthodox view" of the ethics
of gene therapy The orthodox view can be summarized as follows:
1 Alterations to the genes of somatic cells (any cell except the sperm or egg or
their precursors) for the purpose of medical treatment is morally permissible
2. Genetic alterations in the germline (e.g., in sperm, egg, or zygote) are morally
impermissible, even if intended for medical treatment - at least as long as the
technology carries an unacceptable level of risk
3. Genetic alterations for the purpose of (non-medical) enhancement are morally
impermissible, whether carried out in somatic or germline cells.

3 The following discussion is based on the report Splicing Life (U.S. President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982, pp. 56-58).
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More will be said about the development and current status of the orthodox view in a
later chapter For now we can make the following observations about the moral
prohibitions against germline or enhancement GE. While some have argued that
germline GE is intrinsically wrong, the primary reason for this prohibition seems to be a
prudential concern about risk of unintended harm With respect to the impermissibility of
enhancement, again some have attempted to argue that enhancement, genetic or
otherwise, is intrinsically wrong As we shall see, these arguments are implausible given
the fact that we enhance ourselves in many other ways - e.g., through exercise,
education, plastic surgery, and ingestion of caffeine Others argue that enhancement
amounts to eugenics, and we should learn from having been on the slippery slope of
eugenics before (more on this later)
A lot has happened in the fifteen years between the publication of Splicing Life
and the publication of Silver's book Silver and others argue that, owing to unexpectedly
rapid technological progress, we can no longer rest on the assumption that the kind of
genetic interventions generally taken to be morally troubling will "not be available in the
foreseeable future " The orthodox view may have been sufficient justification for a
restrictive public policy when human GE was not safe and technically feasible But,
there is good reason to believe that the technology will become safe and available This
forces us back to the very questions that Splicing Life considered moot What is it about
human beings that distinguishes us from non-humans? And what exactly is ethically
objectionable about creating human-derived, genetically engineered non-human
organisms?

CHAPTER TWO: THE SCIENCE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING

The following four assertions have already been made with respect to human
genetic engineering:
I)
2)
3)
4)

Human GE is or soon will become technically feasible
Human GE is likely to become acceptably safe for use in humans.
Human GE promises tremendous benefits
Human GE has the potential to give rise to human-derived non-human
creatures.

The purpose ofthe present chapter is to give a briefintroduction to the biomedical
aspects ofhuman GE, and thereby to lend support to each ofthe above-mentioned claims.
Although human eugenics - or the genetic improvement ofhumankind - did not
have its beginning with genetic engineering, the advent ofhuman GE changed the nature
ofthe ethical concerns. We will compare human eugenics in the pre- and post-GE era to
see what new ethical issues arose in the latter Having placed human GE in the context of
eugenics, an overview ofthe technology will be given. The aim here is to describe genes,
chromosomes, embryonic development, and so on, in just enough detail so that a
conceptual picture ofthe creation ofa genetically engineered organism emerges. The
relevance ofsome topics - such as human cloning and embryonic stem cells - may be
unclear initially. But the question ofrelevance should disappear near the end ofthe
chapter when the various pieces ofthe puzzle are assembled into what may resemble a
scientific recipe for human beings.
The resemblance to a recipe may be what makes human GE seem so amazing on
the one hand, yet disturbing on the other It is as if human beings had always been
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dropped from the sky, like manna from heaven, wholly formed and immutable. And
then, in one cataclysmic moment, the secrets of our creation were revealed to us, no
longer shrouded in divine mystery, but exposed for all the mundane biochemistry that
they are. However that may be, let us forge ahead in hopes that a better understanding of
our biological nature will enlighten our subsequent discussion of what, if anything, is
"sacred" about human beings, and how human GE might pose a threat to that sacredness

Altering Evolution: From Improving Humankind to Improving On Humankind

The eugenics movement, in two waves

Altering the course of human evolution is not a new idea. Especially since the
end of the 191h century, scientists and others have taken up the cause of genetic
improvement of the human race. The heyday of eugenics in the United States and
western Europe was from the 1880s through 1932 (Carlson, 1981; Kevles, 1992),
although a eugenics revival of sorts occurred primarily in the years following World War
II. Kevles (1992) refers to the earlier and later movements as "prejudicial eugenics" and
"reform eugenics," respectively.
The original Eugenics Movement was founded by Francis Gatton, a cousin of
Charles Darwin Gatton promoted a plan of "human betterment" through controlled
breeding. This entailed both positive eugenics (genetic improvement through promoting
the propagation of desirable traits) and negative eugenics (genetic improvement through
preventing the propagation of undesirable traits). Gatton himself was a respected
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scientist in his day. His emphasis was on positive eugenics as much as negative
eugenics. Others

such as Charles Davenport of the Eugenics Record Office (US )

emphasized negative eugenics Under the influence of Davenport and his ilk, eugenics
was popularized. Immigration policies of the day were informed by eugenicists, called as
experts to testify on, for example, the relative "fitness" of immigrants from southeastern
Europe as compared with those from northwestern Europe. State fairs awarded prizes to
families judged the most eugenic, as opposed to "dysgenic." And the US Supreme
Court, in Buck v. Bell ( 1927), upheld the forcible sterilization of the (allegedly) mentally
ill, ruling that "three generations of imbeciles are enough" (Kevles & Hood, 1992, p. 10).
Eugenicists of this era were increasingly being criticized for their simplistic
treatment of human "traits" such as "pauperism," and "shiftlessness " By what criteria
were these categories judged? And even putting aside the definitional problems, did
these so-called traits follow Mendelian rules of inheritance ? The criticism was increasing
in direct proportion to the growing scientific understanding of the physical nature of the
genetic material. For example, geneticists working with the fruit fly, Drosophila,
established that chromosomes in the nucleus of biological cells were the sites of the (still
mysterious) genes Experimental work using X-irradiation of chromosomes showed that
physically detectable changes in chromosomes were associated with the appearance or
disappearance of genetic traits, such as eye color or wing morphology These causal
links suggested that casting genetic change in the global language of behavior rather than
the particular language of cellular biology and biochemistry was taking unjustifiable
liberties with the available evidence.
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The original Eugenics Movement was eventually discredited, and the motives of
many of its adherents were exposed as prejudiced With the ascension of fascist regimes
in Europe in the 1930s, the word "eugenics" became inextricably linked to the abuses
committed in its name. As Kevles notes, "plant and animal geneticists were discouraged
from having anything to do with human genetics because of its associations with racism,
sterilizations, and scientific poppycock" ( 1992, p 11) For these reasons, serious
discussion of the deliberate shaping of the human gene pool was frowned upon for a time
The reform eugenicists, however, were motivated by a concern that mutations
(changes in the nucleotide sequence of the genome) were accumulating in the human
gene pool at a rate that could jeopardize humanity at some point in the future Mutations
occur naturally at a low frequency But other modern developments, it was feared, would
increase the frequency of mutations among the population. Chief among these were life
saving medical advances and artificially generated radiation. Advances in medicine
meant that persons with some genetic diseases were living long enough to reproduce and
pass along their deleterious genes to their offspring, whereas in earlier times they had not
The medical use of X-rays, and later radioactive fallout from bomb testings, was cause
for alarm since radiation was known to be a highly effective mutagen.
The overall picture, then, was that humanity was facing some distant "Genetic
Apocalypse" (Ramsey, 1966, p. 132) that could only be circumvented by humankind's
intervening in its own evolution. As one contemporary scientist noted, "[t]he three great
problems created by the exponential explosion of man's power over nature are nuclear
war, the population explosion, and genetic deterioration" (Shockley, 1966, p. 104) It
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was this gloomy outlook that permitted geneticists of the 1960s to publicly speak of
eugenics at all in the wake of the Nazi Holocaust (Ramsey, 1966, pp 109-110).
(Concerns about a high rate of accumulation of deleterious mutations have recently
resurfaced, although not in "apocalyptic" terms (see Wade, 1999d).)
By what means were we to direct our own evolution and stave off genetic
disaster? HJ. Muller, a Nobel laureate and leading reform eugenicist, proposed a system
of"germinal choice." This essentially meant the voluntary selection of frozen sperm
from desirable donors, with guidance from genetic counselors, for use with artificial
insemination. But there was at the same time (ca 1960s) no shortage of futuristic
speculation about human cloning, in vitro fertilization (IVF), cross-species hybrids, and
human genetic engineering At this time, partial success with cloning had been achieved
in frogs; experimentation into human IVF was just beginning; cells from different species
had been fused, and scientists were well on their way to discovering the complete genetic
code. This futuristic speculation was set centuries or even millennia in the future, which
no doubt tempered some of the alarm that might otherwise have been expressed In 1963,
for example, the British biologist JBS Haldane gave a speech at a meeting of futurists
titled"Biological Possibilities for the Human Species over the Next Ten Thousand
Years." Haldane predicted that the cloning of humans would become possible, and
would benefit humankind by simplifying the eugenic program of reproducing only the
highest achievers, bettering humankind (1963, pp. 352-353) This frank
acknowledgement of the eugenic purposes to which reproductive technology might some
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day usefully be put was typical of the speeches and debates at this meeting, which was
attended by Lederberg, Crick, and other scientists of the highest distinction.

Genetic engineering: a third wave of eugenics?

Muller's germinal choice proposal was viewed by Lederberg as shortsighted. In
Lederberg's view, the way to ensure human survival was not through what amounted to
technologically assisted human husbandry Instead, the eugenic project would best be
served by investing in the new techniques of molecular biology and genetic engineering
ln doing so, Lederberg felt, humankind could "accomplish in one or two generations of
eugenic practice what would now take ten or one hundred" (Lederberg, 1963, p. 265)
We are now able to go inside the nucleus of cells and change the genetic code.
When the cells on which we perform this genetic surgery are the sperm, egg, or zygote,
then the genetic change is carried in each nucleus-containing cell of the adult organism a complete genetic transformation
Thus, human GE makes possible a eugenics program that is fundamentally
different from those of the 1960s. ln the 1960s, the possible offspring of, say, Muller's
germinal choice strategy were limited to those made possible by the joining of any human
egg with any human sperm Today, with gene-splicing technology, there is no such
clearly circumscribed limit Genes of non-human origin, or artificially synthesized genes,
could without great difficulty be introduced to a developing human embryo Thus, in
addition to fears about prejudicial abuses, eugenics-via-human GE is subject to a new
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ethical objection, namely, that something morally fundamental to human beings - our
very "humanness" - could potentially be lost.
Other breakthroughs in reproductive biology are proving just as remarkable as our
ability to alter the genetic code. We are evidently - although the confirmatory
experiments are not permitted - now able to create human beings from "seeds" other than
the combination ofsperm and egg. The seeds we are speaking ofare the nuclei ofour
body cells, which would be used in human cloning, and human embryonic stem (ES)
cells But first, let us turn our attention to the gene itself

Genes, Chromosomes, and Human Seeds

What is a gene ?

Everyone has heard ofgenes, and many have heard ofgene therapy. But I think it
will help us ifwe give ourselves a clear picture at the outset ofwhat genes are and how
one might go about altering them
Our body is composed ofat least a trillion cells (Aldridge, 1996, p. 5), and in the
center ofalmost all ofthem is a nucleus. The nucleus is surrounded by a membrane, just
as the whole cell is, so it looks like a little cell within a cell. And the membranes - both
cell and nuclear - provide a physical barrier that some things can cross and other things
can't. Held within the nuclear membrane are the chromosomes Most human cells have
chromosomes, and in those that do there are 46 (two sets of23), except for the sperm and
egg cells which have just one set of23 chromosomes. Each chromosome is composed of
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an enormously long double-strand of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) supported by proteins
that serve as a sort of biologically active scaffolding The double-strand is in the shape of
a helix, sort of like a spiral staircase. The chromosomes would be over six feet in length
if one could manage to get hold of the ends, stretch them like rubber bands, and lay all 46
of them end to end (Thus stretched, all the DNA from one human body would reach to
the moon and back 8,000 times (Weatherall, quoted in Harris, 1992).) But inside the
nucleus of the cell, the total length of the chromosomes is only 0.3 millimeters (Aldridge,
1996, p. 60). A reduction in length from six feet to O 3 millimeters is analogous to a cord
stretching across the US being shortened until its length was only a few city blocks
What accounts for this 20,000-fold reduction in chromosome length? The answer
is that the DNA on its protein scaffold is "supercoiled," or subjected to higher-order
coiling To illustrate higher-order coiling, think of a braided rope. First-order coiling
consists in the braids winding around each other to make up the rope Second-order
coiling would be present if one coiled the rope, as when sailors make a roughly
cylindrical stack for easy access at sea. If one could imagine such a stack of rope that
was very tall and somewhat rigid, then third-order coiling would be accomplished by
coiling that tall cylinder around something else
So that's a chromosome - what's a gene? A gene is any stretch of the
chromosome that codes for a protein. In thinking conceptually about genes, we can for
our purposes imagine just the DNA double helix and forget about the proteins and the
supercoiling of the chromosomes on which the genes lie. What do we mean when we say
"codes for a protein" ? Let's start with the DNA code first. We said that DNA is a long
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double helix. We can now say a bit more about it Each strand of DNA is a long chain
made up of individual links called nucleotides Each nucleotide has a characteristic
chemical structure, which we won't bother ourselves with. There are four nucleotides
making up DNA: adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine, or A, T, G and C for short. So
we can now picture two long nucleotide chains running side by side. For example, one
strand might have the following partial sequence
ATTGCGGAATCGTACCA
If this were the nucleotide sequence on one strand, then its partner or complementary
strand would have this sequence
TAACGCCTTAGCATGGT
So when you put both strands together they look like this
ATTGCGGAATCGTACCA
TAACGCCTTAGCATGGT
You might have noticed that A always pairs with T and C with G (called "base pairs"). If
we think of our DNA double helix as a ladder, the AT and CG bonds between strands are
analogous to the rungs G and A can't pair because they're both big; the rung would be
too long. C and T can't pair because they're both small; the rung would be too short.
(Also, A and T each have two binding sites, while C and G each have three.)
Protein is not made directly from DNA An intermediary molecule, called
messenger RNA (mRNA), is "transcribed" from one of the two DNA strands. RNA is
chemically very similar to DNA It also is a chain (single-strand) made up of
nucleotides. These are the same nucleotides as with DNA, except that U (uracil) takes
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the place ofT The messenger RNA is in effect a copy of the DNA code. Each mRNA is
a tiny fraction of the length of a chromosome, and is not all bound up in the chromosome
superstructure. This means that it is free to foat off into the nuclear space and make its
way across the nuclear membrane to the cytoplasm (the space between the nuclear and
cell membranes) where proteins are assembled.
We won't concern ourselves with the fine details of protein synthesis. We will
say only a few things First, the genetic code, as delivered in the form of mRNA, is
translated into the amino acid sequence of a protein Like DNA and mRNA, proteins are
chains, too. They are single-stranded and made up of amino acids instead of nucleotides.
One amino acid is drawn to a particular triplet of nucleotides at one of the cell's
ribosomes While the mRNA chain ratchets its way through one side of the ribosome
(the image of ticker tape comes to mind), an amino acid chain is formed on the adjoining
side, with the sequence being determined by the three-by-three sequence of the mRNA
So what's so great about a protein ? Proteins are the workhorses, chemically
speaking, of biological lif e The immunoglobulins (antibodies) and certain hormones are
proteins Proteins are important structurally. (Chromosome structure is but one example )
Transmission of nerve impulses relies on proteins Enzymes are perhaps the most
important class of proteins. Without enzymes all of our biochemical machinery would
come to a halt including, as just one example, the breakdown of our food into
biochemical building blocks and the reassembly of those building blocks into
macromolecules, cells, organs, and ultimately us.
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We said earlier that a gene is any stretch of DNA that codes for a protein
Humans have about

50, 000

to 100, 000 genes and a gene of average length comprises

roughly 1, 500 base pairs. But there are about three billion base pairs of DNA making up
the chromosomes. This means that only about 2% of the genome appears to "code" for
protein, thus there is a lot of non-coding (so-called "junk") DNA (Aldridge, 1996, p. 57).
The Human Genome Project has undertaken to sequence the human genome (i.e., the
complete sequence of chromosomal DNA) The long-range goals are to distinguish the
coding regions (genes) from the non-coding regions, and to fgure out what proteins each
gene codes for and what those proteins do in the cell Since many genes/proteins are
involved in multiple cellular processes, the full interconnected understanding of
biological life is certain to be incredibly complicated
Some genetic phenomena, however, appear to be relatively straightforward
There are some diseases that result from a defect in a single gene. Sickle cell anemia and
cystic fibrosis are two common examples In sickle cell anemia, a mistake in the DNA
code at just one nucleotide results in a change in the amino acid sequence of the protein
and that single amino acid mistake causes the protein to malfunction. Other single-gene
disorders are cystic fibrosis (CF), Tay-Sachs disease, and Huntington's disease (HD)
Single-gene disorders lend themselves to gene therapy because a modification would be
needed at only a single locus in order to correct the genetic defect More will be said
about these diseases below
Before considering the potential medical benefits of gene therapy, however, it will
be helpful to outline what is involved in gene therapy, technically speaking In turn a
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brief introduction to the stages of embryological development and certain reproductive
technologies will make the subsequent explanation of gene therapy easier to follow
Some parts of this introduction also bear on later arguments related to the moral status of
the embryo.

Embryonic andfetal development
Fertilization takes place in several steps. First, one or several sperm stick to the
outer protective covering - the zona pellucida - of the egg, which is making its way
through the Fallopian tube on its journey from the ovary to the uterus. The sperm has a
roundish head and a whip-like tail which propels it along The sperm, upon contacting
the zona pellucida, releases enzymes that dissolve the zona. In this way, the sperm gains
access to the space between the zona and the next barrier, the cell membrane of the egg.
The second step, then, is fusion with the egg cell membrane. Initially the sperm
tail and the membrane surrounding the sperm head are intact, but these dissolve after a
few minutes, leaving the bare nucleus, or pronuc/eus Thus there are now two pronuclei
inside the egg cell membrane - one from the egg and one from the sperm The third step
involves the erection of chemical barriers to prevent the ent ry of other sperm (If a
second sperm cell penetrates the egg before these barriers are in place, the fused sperm
egg dies because of the excess genetic material i.e., three sets of chromosomes
[triploidy] instead of the required two [diploidyl) The zona becomes harder, and a
repellant electrical "screen" is established at the egg cell membrane
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In the fourth step, the maternal (or egg) DNA is reduced by half. That is, the
process ofreducing the chromosome number to 23 (one copy ofeach, or "IN") from 46
(two copies, "2N") is completed after penetration by the sperm. It is a popular
misconception that the egg has a IN chromosome number prior to fusion with the sperm.
The fifth and final step is fusion ofthe pronucleus ofthe sperm with that ofthe
egg. Here we encounter a second popular misconception: The two pronuclei do not fuse
with one another to form one nucleus at the one-cell embryo (or zygote) stage. Instead
each ofthe two pronuclei is duplicated, then the zygote divides. At this point there are
two cells, each containing one sperm-derived pronucleus and one egg-derived
pronucleus. It is at this two-cell stage that the pronuclei in each daughter cell commingle,
giving rise to a 2N (i e , 46-chromosome) state Fertilization is now - at the two-cell
stage - complete (Silver, 1997, pp 37-38)
Between days two and six there is further cell division and differentiation A cell
differentiates when it progresses from a cell type that has the potential to give rise to any
(or many different) cell type in the body to one ofthose final cell types, such as skin,
brain, blood or liver cells. Taking the example ofan oak tree, the acorn is the
undifferentiated precursor cell that has within it the potential to develop into all ofthe
many cell types ofthe mature tree. The acorn is an example ofa totipotential cell In the
embryo, all cells are totipotent until the eight-cell stage. Thus, ifone took an eight-cell
embryo, split it into its eight component cells, and coated each in an artificial zona
pellucida, one would have eight genetically identical embryos (or embryo-equivalents)
where before there had been just one. Each, ifsuccessfully implanted in a uterus, could
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give rise to a fetus and the supporting placental tissue (This human embryo "splitting"
was in fact done in 1993 - converting 17 human embryos into 48 - by researchers at
George Washington University and, not surprisingly, was met with vehement public
opposition (McCormick, 1994; National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction,
1994; Robertson, 1994) The term "cloning" was used in reference to the procedure,
further fanning the flames of controversy, although embryo splitting is distinct from the
nuclear transfer cloning used to produce Dolly the sheep in 1997 (Cohen & Tomkin,
1994; Wilmut, Schnieke, Mc Whir, Kind, & Campbell, 1997)) Of greater practical
importance, using IVF one can remove one of the cells of the eight-cell embryo and test it
for genetic defects. Only those embryos that pass the genetic screening are then
implanted into the uterus. This technique is known as preimplantation (genetic)
diagnosis, or PID.

After the fourth division (at the 16-cell stage)the outer cells of the embryo are no
longer totipotent These outer cells are destined to form the placenta The inner cells are
still totipotent (Silver, 1997, p. 49). At day five, the embryo, still encased in the zona
pellucida, enters the uterus (ibid , p 51). At about day 7 or 8, the embryo "hatches," i e ,
it slithers through a break in the zona wall and implants in the uterus, prompting the
establishment of blood vessel connections

At this point the inner cells of the embryo

are still totipotent, meaning that the formation of twins (triplets, etc.)is still possible
(ibid., p. 52)
On day 14 or 15, the inner cells of the embryo at last begin to differentiate That
is, they are destined to be progenitors offetal cells, rather than placental cells. Thus, as
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embryologist CR. Austin notes, "The whole egg certainly becomes the embryo, and the
whole fetus becomes the child, but the whole embryo does not become the fetus only a
small fraction of the embryo is thus involved, the rest of it continuing as the placenta and
other auxiliary structures" (quoted in ibid , p. 53) (This fact has been used to argue that
it makes no sense to say that the embryo is a human individual prior to the beginning of
the third week of development) On day 15, the primitive streak, or "precursor to the
spinal cord and backbone" appears, and twinning is no longer possible (ibid , p. 53).
In week four, the internal organs appear. By the end of that week there is a
heartbeat and circulation, and the earliest stages of brain development have occurred
The embryo is less than one-quarter inch in length. Between weeks six and eight,
external human-like features appear, prompting a change in terminology from "embryo"
to "fetus " By week twelve, all major internal organs have appeared, but neither these
nor the central nervous system is yet functional (ibid , pp. 53-54).
Between weeks 24 and 26, the lungs become functional and, therefore, the fetus
becomes viable. By "sheer coincidence" at this same time the cerebral cortex also has
become functional, meaning that the potential for consciousness exists at this stage (ibid ,
pp. 55-57)
Now that we have been introduced to human embryonic development and the
related notions of embryonic potency and differentiation, we may introduce embryonic
stem cells. Embryonic stem (ES) cells could play a key role in human GE technology, as
we will explain below, relying on Silver (ibid ) Since the publication of Silver's book
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(in 1997), two teams of researchers have discovered human ES cells, bringing us one
major step closer to technically feasible human GE.

Embryonic stem cells
In 1993, scientists removed certain cells from a mouse embryo, wrapped them in
other genetically disabled cells meant to resemble a placenta, implanted them in the
uterus of a mouse, and produced adult mice (Kolata, 1999) These cells are called
embryonic stem cells. Since then, human ES cells have been discovered (Gearhart, 1998;
Thomson et al, 1998) The general presumption is that what can be done with ES cells in
mice can be done in humans. That is, human ES cells, if properly handled, would give
rise to adult human beings
Human ES cells have been a sort of Holy Grail for biologists for reasons unrelated
to the potential to produce entire human beings. Human ES cells have been called "the
raw material for

human tissue engineering" (Marshall, 1998, p. 1014). Since ES cells

are primordial cells for all the organs and tissues of the body (i.e , they are totipotential),
the hope is that scientists will be able to figure out the molecular signals that direct ES
cells and their close descendants down the path that ends in, say, pancreatic cells "that
could squirt out insulin for a person with diabetes or a fresh layer of skin for a burn
patient" (Kolata, 1999) The creation of transplantable ES-derived human tissue has been
called the "home run" of ES technology by private-sector financial backers. Genetically
engineering ES cells prior to tissue engineering would provide a means to alter the
transplantable tissue so that it cannot be rejected by the immune system of the host
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patient (Marshall, 1998, p. 1015) Human ES cells will also benefit the research and
development of new pharmaceuticals. Instead of having to screen potentially useful
drugs using non-human or abnormal (i.e , cancerous) human cells in culture, the hope is
that normal human tissue of any type (e.g , liver, brain) can be produced from ES cells
and then used to screen drug candidates (Marshall, 1998, p. 1015).
At present, the molecular signals that direct human ES cells down particular
developmental pathways are unknown. Thus, ironically, while it is technically
impossible at present to produce isolated human organs or tissues from ES cells, the
prevailing scientific opinion seems to be that creating a complete human organism from
ES cells, though illegal, is possible (Kolata, 1999)

Cloning

The significance of cloning, many feel, has little to do with reproducing "carbon
copies" of existing persons, and much to do with genetic engineering As Lee Silver
notes, "For the f rst time, germ-line gene therapy becomes realistic" (Mirsky & Rennie,
1997, p 122) And Theodore Friedmann, director of the gene therapy program at the
University of California at San Diego and an early advocate of the technology, echoes
this view saying, "The need for enlightened public debate over the merits and risks of
germ-line therapy has, however, been made more urgent by the recent cloning of an adult
sheep" (1997, p. 96). We shall see why this is so shortly. First, however, we need to
explain briefly what cloning is.
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The term "human cloning," as commonly used, refers to the creation of a human
offspring not from sperm and egg, but from the combination of a modified egg and the
nucleus of a body ("somatic") cell, such as a blood, skin, or muscle cell. Recall that the
embryo, to be viable, must have 46 chromosomes, two sets of twenty-three. We called
this the2N chromosome number Normally, the2N chromosome number is achieved in
the fertilized egg (zygote) by the contribution of one set of23 chromosomes by the egg
and one set of23 by the sperm. There may be a great number of reasons why not just any
of the body's cells can fulfill the role of one of the gametes (the egg and sperm). But
primary among these is the fact that only the egg and sperm and their immediate
precursors have a 1 N chromosome number, and thus in combination can add up to the
required 46 chromosomes
What if one were to take the 46 chromosomes from one of the run-of-the-mill
somatic cells and place those chromosomes in an egg from which all chromosomes had
been removed? The answer, we now know, is that apparently normal mammalian
offspring are produced This is the procedure that led to the birth of Dolly the sheep, the
first mammal cloned from adult cells (Wilmut et al., 1997).
Now, the procedure was not as simple as it has just been made to seem. The
major breakthrough in the creation of Dolly was not cloning per se. After all, other
animals had been cloned using the donated nuclei (containing the 46 chromosomes) from
embryonic cells. But repeated failures to clone adults - i.e., using donated nuclei from
adult cells - led scientists to believe that the latter was not possible. This was the
accepted belief virtually up to the moment that Dolly's birth was announced to the world.
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The explanation was that nuclei in adult cells were fully differentiated, whereas
embryonic cell nuclei were totipotent, or at least potent enough that they could be made
totipotent once placed in the biochemically accommodating environment of the
(enucleated) embryo. As we described it above, the process of differentiation - of going
from totipotential embryo to the terminally differentiated skin cell - seemed to be a one
way street. One can go from the acorn to the leaf cell, but not from the leaf cell to the
acorn.
The major breakthrough in cloning Dolly, then, was that, in some way, the
process of differentiation was reversed. The mammary gland cell nucleus that was used
to "fertilize" the enucleated egg was somehow made to regain the potential of an early
embryo nucleus.
How this process of"de-differentiation" is stimulated in the laboratory, while of
great scientific interest, is not central to our discussion. What is significant about cloning
as it concerns human genetic engineering is that it helps make possible the strategy of
gene replacement, which has been called the needed technological breakthrough for safe
germline gene therapy (i e , human GE).
Let us turn now to a brief overview of gene therapy. First, we will discuss the
common classifications of gene therapy. This will be followed by a brief summary of the
potential medical benefts of gene therapy. And finally, we will discuss how exactly
genetic alterations are made - at which point we will re-visit cloning, ES cells, and some
earlier points of discussion.
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What is Gene Therapy?

Gene therapy refers to making biological improvements in an organism through
direct biochemical modification of genes There are two important distinctions that are
now commonplace in the bioethics literature on gene therapy The first distinction is
between germ line and somatic cell gene therapy In germline gene therapy (GGT), the
genetic modification is made in the chromosomes of the just-fertilized egg (a k.a., zygote,
or one-cell embryo) (In principle, the change could be made in the sperm or egg prior to
fertilization.) Once the chromosomal DNA is modified in the one-cell embryo, that
modification is carried to each of the cells that result from the multiple cell divisions that
are part of embryonic and fetal development - first two cells, then four, eight, sixteen,
and so on The modified genome, then, is present in all of the cells of the adult organism
This includes, significantly, the gametes (sperm or eggs) of the adult, meaning that the
genetic modification will be passed on to future generations should the adult reproduce.
In somatic cell gene therapy (SGT), the genetic modification is made to the
chromosomes of somatic cells of the (fetus or) adult, i.e., any cells except the sperm or
eggs or their precursor cells This of course means that the genetic modification cannot
be passed on to future generations. Should there be some unanticipated ill effect from
SGT, the harm comes only to the treated patient The case of cystic fbrosis provides a
good example. Researchers are trying to figure out a way to deliver the normal cystic
fibrosis gene (which is really the non-cystic fibrosis gene) to the lung cells of affected
patients If they can succeed in delivering the normal genes, the hope is that those genes
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will take up residence at suitable sites on the chromosomes of the affected lung cells and
begin to produce normal protein The normal protein, in this case, is called CFTR, which
stands for cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator. It situates itself in the
cell membrane, sort of like a gate in a wall, and regulates the flow of water and ions into
and out of the cell The abnormal protein, coded for by the (abnormal) cystic fibrosis
gene, also situates itself in the cell membrane. But it fails to properly regulate the flow,
resulting in viscous deposits in the lungs that promote infections and interfere with
respiration CF is the most common single-gene disorder, affecting one in 2,000 persons
(Aldridge, 1996, pp 141-143).
The second distinction is between treatment (and prevention) gene therapy and
enhancement gene therapy. Treatment gene therapy, as one might suspect, is gene
therapy intended to treat (or prevent) a medical condition Enhancement gene therapy is
intended to improve or enhance biological functioning over normal functioning There is
some difficulty in distinguishing between these two types of gene therapy, owing to the
difficulty in distinguishing disease from a merely undesired or unpreferred biological
state (We will return to this point in a later chapter.) These two distinctions leave us
with four types of gene therapy
1)
2)
3)
4)

Treatment somatic cell gene therapy
Enhancement somatic cell gene therapy
Treatment germline gene therapy
Enhancement germline gene therapy

47

Terminology
We have used the terms gene therapy and genetic engineering. Genetic
engineering (GE) as used herein is synonymous with germline gene therapy, but not
somatic cell gene therapy. The term (germline) gene therapy is perhaps more commonly
used, especially in public policy circles. Because of that convention, we will continue to
use the term in this paper, especially in those sections that make frequent reference to
policy statements and the bioethics literature. However, the word "therapy"
(notwithstanding the antecedent qualifiers "treatment" or "enhancement") implies that the
genetic alteration has a medical purpose. Since our discussion of genetic engineering will
encompass both therapeutic and non-therapeutic purposes - and will emphasize non
therapeutic purposes especially in the latter sections - avoiding the word "therapy" is
preferable and we will make use of genetic engineering
One final term is sometimes taken to be synonymous with genetic engineering or
germline gene therapy and that is tran.sgenics. Velander's usage, however, is more
typical. According to Velander (Velander, Lubon, & Drohan, 1997, p. 70) "transgenics"
is GE in which the non-human recipient embryo is supplied with a gene from another
species whose proper expression in the adult (non-human) organism is in some way
useful. Following this convention, we will use for the term transgenics only when
referring to GE in non-human animals.
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What are the potential benefits of human genetic engineering (germline gene therapy)?
It is the promise of medical benefits that proponents of germline gene therapy
(GGT) point to when pleading their case Diseases such as Tay-Sachs, Lesch-Nyhan
syndrome, sickle cell anemia, cystic fibrosis, and Huntington's disease, all of which are
associated with horrible suffering and premature death, can not only be prevented in the
genetically-altered "patient" (as with somatic cell gene therapy), they can also be
eliminatedfrom the gene pool entirely. The prospect of the total eradication of certain
genetic diseases provides much of the momentum behind the pro-GGT arguments
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 76). It is worth digressing at this point to briefly describe
some of these diseases, for only if we have a full appreciation for the benefits of human
GE will we be able to responsibly assess, in the light of the ethical objections to be stated
below, what we ought to do.
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome is a disease in boys that causes mental retardation, a
chronic, gout-like pain, and an irresistible urge to self-mutilate Typically, this selfmutilation consists of gnawing at the lips and finger tips to the point that those tissues are
raw and bleeding (Kitcher, 1996, pp. 82-83)
Tay-Sachs disease results in neural degeneration in the first year and death
invariably by the age of four. This recessive genetic disease is most common in
Ashkenazi Jews (Kitcher, 1996, pp. 25, 351) 4 Sickle-cell disease is another recessive

4In humans, there are 23 pairs of chromosomes. Each gene is present in two copies, one on each of a
chromosome pair. Recessive traits are traits that only appear in the organism when both copies of the
gene are defective. Dominant traits are traits that appear in the organism even when only one copy of the
gene is defective.
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genetic disease and is caused by a mutation in the gene for a component of hemoglobin.
Under anoxic conditions (e.g , prolonged physical exertion) the red blood cells that carry
hemoglobin collapse, taking on a characteristic sickle shape. Such crises can lead to
premature death (ibid , pp. 106, 3 51)
Cystic fibrosis (CF) was introduced above in molecular and cellular terms. In
clinical terms, disease symptoms are caused by thick mucus from mucus-producing cells
- a consequence of the inadequate water concentration in those cells. While several
organs may be affected, the lungs usually are most affected, with the mucus acting as a
trap for infectious microbes. Persons with CF have typically died in adolescence or
young adulthood; 90% of CF deaths are from acute respiratory failure (Kitcher, 1996, p
40; Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 29).
Huntington's disease is a dominant genetic disorder. The symptoms are a
particularly cruel deterioration of neural tissue and, thus, mental functioning Since
symptoms don't appear until later in life - usually between ages 30 and 50 - a parent may
conceive children without knowing that a) he or she carries the gene; b) he or she will
therefore suffer the disease later in life; and c) he or she has at least a 50-50 chance of
passing along the gene and disease to his or her children (Kitcher, 1996, p 39)

How are genes modified in genetic engineering (germline gene therapy)?
There are three general approaches to GE. The currently used, less desirable
approach is gene addition. The preferred approach, not yet technically feasible, is called
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gene replacement. A third approach, no doubt in the even more distant future, would
make use of artificial chromosomes. We will consider each of these in tum
In gene addition, the added gene is introduced (e.g., microinjected) into a one-cell
embryo (Walters & Palmer, 1997) When successful, this results in the added gene
randomly incorporating into the chromosomal DNA We can imagine this as a small
length of chain- the gene and important adjacent DNA- being "spliced" into the very
much longer chromosomal DNA chain of one or more chromosomes. (Thus, the origin
of the once-popular term "gene-splicing ") In fact, multiple copies of the exogenous gene
are typically spliced into multiple genomic sites. As the embryo divides from one cell to
billions in the mature animal, the added genes are faithfully passed along to each
daughter cell, and if all works well at the chromosomal level, the genes are properly
expressed and the therapeutic or other desired result is achieved. The gametes in this
mature, genetically engineered animal also contain the transferred genes. This means that
the genotypic and phenotypic changes arising from the GE will be expressed not only in
the individual 5 receiving the treatment, but also in all of those of his or her descendants
who are fortunate enough to inherit the correction.
The strategy of gene addition has some significant disadvantages. First, owing to
the randomness of the integration of vector DNA into the host-cell chromosomal DNA,
the added genes may be located at sites that are not conducive to their expression- i.e.,
transcription into mRNA and subsequent translation into protein. A second disadvantage,

Note that "individual tt is used as a neutral tenn with respect to status as a human being or person. The
individual actually receiving genes in this procedure is, as indicated, a single-cell gamete or fertilized
egg.
5
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also associated with the randomness of the site of chromosomal integration, is that the
added gene might situate itself within or near an important or essential cellular gene,
thereby disrupting that gene's expression with potentially deleterious consequences for
the organism. (Such a disruption is called an insertional mutation (ibid., p. 67)) A third
disadvantage is that the defective gene is still present in the host cell or cells, and the
presence of the corrective gene may not be able to (completely)overcome the deleterious
effects of the defective gene. A final disadvantage - which applies to germline gene
therapy and is related to the desirability of gene replacement - is that the defective gene
persists in the gene pool. In the ideal case, the defective cellular gene would be replaced
with the corrective, or therapeutic gene, rather than having the latter merely added to the
mix with the defective gene persisting in the genome. Because the defect is not replaced,
the corrective gene and the defective cellular gene may segregate from one another
during meiotic cell division (ibid, p. 68) so that the therapeutic effect of the added gene
may not be conferred to some or all of the descendants.
A strategy of gene replacement is, therefore, preferable to that of gene addition.
Gene replacement, as the name implies, means removing the deleterious gene and - in the
same physical site on the chromosome from which the deleterious gene was removed inserting the corrective gene. Gene replacement has been called the "needed technical
breakthrough" that would likely make germline gene therapy (human GE)acceptably
safe in humans (Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 72) It is here that cloning and ES cells come
into play.
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Silver (1997, pp. 232-233) explains how gene replacement would work. First, an
egg would be fertilized using standard in vitro fertilization (IVF) techniques. The
embryo is next grown in conditions in which cells continue to divide, but differentiation
into the various cell types is blocked. The cells that result are called "embryonic stem
cells>' 6 The "stem cell" component of that term refers to the retained capacity (or
"potency") to develop into any kind of embryonic or fetal cell - lung, brain, heart, etc.
Next, the ES cells in a laboratory culture dish are exposed to DNA containing the
corrective replacement gene. Cells in a culture dish will internalize DNA under certain
conditions. The procedure, known as tramfecfion, is commonly used. A precise
replacement is exceedingly rare, occurring in about one cell per million. But the sheer
number of transfected cells makes it likely that a replacement event will be detected.
Herein lies the critical advantage of ES cells over one-cell embryos: In order to perform
gene replacement, one needs to transfect millions of cells in order to find a cell in which
the precise gene replacement has occurred There is no ready source of millions of
human one-cell embryos. But human ES cells in culture can be grown to virtually
unlimited numbers of cells.
Once a cell containing the replacement gene has been identified, it is isolated and
cultured, and then nuclei from these genetically identical cultured cells can be used to
clone the desired genetically altered organism. The cloning technique is essentially that
used by Wilmut et al (1997) to produce Dolly the sheep - nuclear transplantation, or

6 As previously noted, human embryonic stem cells have been successfully isolated since Silver published
his book.
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nuclear transfer (see above). This entire gene replacement GE protocol has already been
used successfully in mice (Silver, 1997, p 232 and citations therein).
Artificial chromosomes are a relatively new item in the GE toolbox. These are

artificially constructed chromosomes or chromosome segments that contain both genes of
interest and sequences essential to the perpetuation of the artificial chromosome itself
There are two main advantages that come with using artificial chromosomes: First, genes
can be added without disrupting the host cell genes - that is, without the problem of
insertional mutations, noted above. Second, many genes can be carried on one artificial
chromosome.
Artificial chromosomes may be used either as part of a gene addition strategy, or
possibly as a part of gene replacement strategy In gene addition, the desired transgene(s)
is introduced to the recipient cell as part of the artificial chromosome. The critical
advantage of gene addition-via-artificial chromosome is that the host cell chromosomes
aren't physically disrupted leading to the potentially serious consequences mentioned
above.
With respect to a gene replacement strategy, Silver claims that artificial
chromosomes could be used as part of a different sort of gene replacement - one
involving the replacement of genefunction rather than the physical substitution of the
corrective gene in place of the defective. This gene-function replacement uses an
approach called "anti-gene therapy" Although we will not delve into the technical
details of anti-gene therapy, Silver's example conveys the general idea (1997, p. 233)
Based on this approach, an anti-sickle-cell gene and a normal hemoglobin
replacement gene could both be added together - as a gene-pack [i.e., on the same
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artificial chromosome] - into an embryo with a sickle cell disease genotype. The
anti-gene would prevent the production of sickle cell protein while the normal
transgene would make normal protein to take its place. The child that emerged
from this embryo would be completely healthy even though he would still carry
two defective sickle cell alleles (that are now silenced)
Researchers have already constructed "the first wholly synthetic, self-replicating,
human 'microchromosomes,' one-ffth to one-tenth the size of normal human
chromosomes" (Harrington, Van Bokkelen, Mays, Gustashaw, & Willard, 1997; Roush,
1997) Not only that, when human mini chromosomes were transferred into mouse ES
cells, and those ES cells were added to mouse eight-cell embryos, the resultant chimeric
embryos gave rise to viable mouse offspring Various tests showed that the human genes
residing on the artificial chromosomes functioned normally in the mouse cells This
study demonstrated that artificial chromosomes could be used in GE, and that the genetic
changes thus introduced would be stably inherited from generation to generation (Rastan,
1997; Tomizuka et al, 1997).

This chapter has sought to accomplish several things. First, of course, was simply
the goal of elucidating the nature of the biological alterations in question. Second, it is
hoped that knowledge of some of the pertinent scientific details will help in evaluating a
range of moral objections (see below), perhaps especially those having to do with the
moral status of the embryo Third, highlighting some of the medical benefits of human
GE was intended to make clear what it is that will give human GE its momentum as a
public policy issue. (The opponent to human GE might say instead that it is the promise
of medical benefits that will put us on the slippery slope to human GE) Fourth and last,
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it is hoped that, the claim that safe human GE will likely become available in the
foreseeable future now seems plausible
If human GE, as expected, becomes acceptably safe, then we will have dealt with
one of the primary ethical objections to it But the potential for direct harm to genetically
engineered offspring is not the only objection. The current policy prohibited germline
genetic intervention in humans has a broad ethical base The question remains, however
- is that base secure?

CHAPTER THREE: The Tenuous Consensus on Human Gene Therapy Policy

The intuitive moral aversion that many feel to human genetic engineering persists,
we have suggested, even when we account for many ofthe more obvious ethical
objections. Two ofthese objections - threat to personal identity and risk ofharm - have
already been discussed (in Chapters I and 2, respectively). The sense that human GE
threatens "who we are" persists even ifit is conceded that, by the phrase "who we are"
we cannot mean particular personhood (i.e., personal identity over time) Unlike surgical
or drug-induced psychiatric interventions on already existing persons, GE alters single
celled zygotes or gametes (sperm or eggs), not persons. (Other objections based on the
moral status of embryos, rather than personal identity, are taken up below) And our
moral aversion persists even ifwe stipulate that human GE will become acceptably safe a stipulation that is plausible, as discussed in the previous chapter However, we have not
yet spoken to a number of other objections that have been made against human GE (i e ,
germline gene therapy).
In the present chapter we will first trace the development ofU.S policy on human
genetic engineering Of interest here will be the early appearance and then later re
appearance of concerns about the intrinsic wrongness of human GE. Second, the current
"orthodox position" on the ethics ofhuman gene therapy will be shown to be lacking
long-term stability The ethical objections on which the orthodox position is based, it
will be argued, are either time-bound or are probably not strong enough to undergird
continued ethics-based restrictions on the technology Third, it will be shown how this
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need for an alternative ethical foundation for a restrictive policy on human GE leads us
again to Silver's futuristic scenario and the question, "ls (safe) radical human genetic
enhancement intrinsically wrong?"

The Development of U.S. Policy on Buman Genetic Engineering

The Mondale and Kennedy Hearings (1968-1973)
In 1968, Senator Walter Mondale ofMinnesota introduced Senate Joint
Resolution 145, which proposed the formation ofa President's Commission on Health
Science and Society (Jansen, 1998, p. 90). Mondale's proposal came at a time when
medical advances seemed to be racing ahead, leaving unresolved in their wake some
troubling ethical questions. Organ transplantation raised questions offair allocation of
the scarce organs. Research involving human experimentation led to calls for an elevated
regard for patient autonomy, and to demands that informed consent be taken seriously
Advances in life-sustaining technologies, combined with the first successful heart
transplants, called for a revised conception ofdeath from a biological state defined by
cardiopulmonary criteria to one defined by neurological criteria. And the world's leading
scientists spoke futuristically oflending a technological hand to the creation ofhuman
beings through such novel means as cloning and genetic engineering.
In light of this exciting yet morally disquieting surge of biomedical activity, the
involvement ofCongress should have come as no surprise. Mondale, citing popular
support, recommended that the Commission study "organ transplantation, genetic
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engineering, behavior control, experimentation on humans, and the financing of research"
(Jansen, 1998, p. 91).
Mondale's resolution faced surprisingly vehement opposition from physicians and
scientists, who had been used to having the final word on research and patient care and
were fearful of an uninformed regulation by laypersons. Christiaan Barnard, the
renowned South African physician responsible for the first human heart transplant, was
especially critical of the proposal (Jansen, 1998, p. 91). Under this pressure, the
resolution failed
Mondale returned, however, in 1971, spurred in part by news of a scandal. From
1970 to 1973, Stanfield Rogers, an American physician and researcher, assisted a
German colleague in the treatment of three German girls with hyperargininemia elevated blood levels of the amino acid arginine. Rogers treated with a virus called
Shope papilloma virus (SPY). Laboratory workers who handled SPY were observed to
have relatively low levels of arginine, thus it was hoped that a similar effect could be
brought about in the girls by SPY treatment. Much of the ensuing controversy had to do
with the ethical treatment of human research subjects generally. Nonetheless, given that
the intent was to correct the abnormal expression of certain genes through SPY
treatment, an element of the debate had to do with the ethics of the genetic alteration of
humans (Fletcher, 1990, pp. 58-59)
In 1971, prompted by news reports of the Rogers case, Senator Walter Mondale
again called for the formation of a national commission to investigate the "legal, social,
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and ethical implications of medical research, including the aims of geneticists.
Mondale's testimony referred to the dangers of genetic manipulation" (ibid., p. 59).
It was not until 1973 that a version of Mondale's original proposal was given
Congressional approval Once again, political controversy provided legislative incentive.
This time the controversy was over a recommendation from an NIH advisory panel to
keep late-term aborted fetuses alive for the purposes of research The recommendation
had been reported in the Washington Post, and prompted not only a quick about-face by
the NIH, but also and once again Congressional hearings. Senator Edward Kennedy of
Massachusetts presided During the course of the hearings, other scandals became
prominent. Of particular note were the use of prisoners as research subjects, and the
Tuskegee Syphilis Study Report (Jansen, 1998, pp. 94-98). In the latter study, which
became public in 1972, a cohort of African-American men infected with syphilis were
left untreated for decades so that the clinical course of the disease could be studied
(Kolata, 1998, pp. 77-78).
Finally, in July, 1974, the National Research Act was signed into law by President
Nixon, and with that the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research was created (Jansen, 1998, p. 99) The National
Commission ended its work in October, 1978, when its term expired. In just over four
years, it produced a number of reports. Several had to do with the protection of research
subjects from special populations, e g , children, prisoners, and the institutionalized
mentally disabled There were also reports on psychosurgery, health care delivery, and
institutional review boards (Jansen, 1998, p. 104) In 1980, the National Commission
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was succeeded by the President's Commission for the Study ofEthical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The President's Commission also
produced a number ofreports, extending the scope ofstudy beyond the subject of
protection ofresearch subjects Securing Access to Health Care was published in 1982.
Defining Death and Deciding to Forego [sic] Life-Sustaining Treatment were published
in 1981 and 1983, respectively. These reports were undertaken in large part as a result of
the social upheaval caused by the Karen Ann Quinlan case. It was Quinlan that finally
forced the issue ofwhat to do with the irreversibly comatose who were being kept alive
on respirators. The Quinlan case also solidified the standing ofthe new field ofbioethics,
as Rothman notes: "After Quinlan .. every national commission addressing medical
issues would have among its members a bioethicist, and no media account ofa medical
breakthrough would be complete without a bioethicist commenting on its implications"
(Rothman, 1991, p 241)
Two reports - Screening and Counseling for Genetic Conditions and Splicing
Life: A Report on the Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human
Beings - had to do with human genetics. Both were released in 1982. Splicing Life was
not originally on the agenda ofthe President's Commission. However, in 1980 President
Jimmy Carter received a letter from concerned theologians asking for an ethical review of
the new genetic technologies Thus prompted, Carter assigned the task to the
Commission. We will have more to say about this letter and Splicing Life shortly
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The Recombinant DNA Debate

At the same time that Mondale and Kennedy were advocating for the creation of
the National Commission, a new biotechnology was being discovered and developed.
This technology was known as recombinant DNA (rDNA), or gene splicing. The
discovery ofa few key bacterial and viral enzymes made rDNA possible, for these
enzymes could cut, copy and paste specific segments ofDNA as ifthey were typed
sentences in a word processing program.
In 1972, DNA from two different species was spliced into one contiguous rDNA
molecule One year later, rDNA molecules were successfully grown in bacteria in the
laboratory (US Congress Office ofTechnology Assessment, 1984, p. 3) The rDNA
molecules were plasmids, or circular DNA molecules capable ofreplicating themselves
independently ofthe much larger bacterial chromosome By growing large numbers of
plasmid-containing bacteria, one has a virtually limitless source of plasmid DNA This
accomplishment came to the attention ofthe broader scientific community at the Gordon
Research Conference on Nucleic Acids, held in New Hampshire in June, 1973. The
chairpersons ofthat conference, Maxine Singer ofthe US National Institutes ofHealth
(NIH) and Dieter Soll of Yale University, expressed the concerns ofa majority ofthe
conferees over the propagation ofrDNA molecules in an innocuous strain (called Kl2) of
the common intestinal bacterium E. coli. Some ofthe rDNA molecules ofinterest at that
time were genes oftumorigenic viruses and genes coding for antibiotic resistance. Thus,
the fear was that genetically engineered K 12 E. coli could cause cancers or be resistant to
common antimicrobial agents. Singer and Soll communicated these concerns in a letter
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to the presidents of the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Institute of
Medicine, which also appeared in the journal Science (Singer & Soll, 1973).
In response, a committee of the NAS, chaired by Stanford's Paul Berg (in whose
lab the first rDNA molecule was made), called for a moratorium on rDNA experiments
that posed theoretical risks of carcinogenesis or antibiotic resistance. The Berg, or
Moratorium, letter was published both in Science and its British counterpart Nature in
mid-1974 (Berg et al, 1974). The letter also called for an international conference to
discuss the issue of potential biohazards related to rDNA research and appropriate safety
measures. That meeting was held at the Asilomar Conference Center south of San
Francisco in February, 1975 The Conference report was issued several months later It
recommended a four-tiered categorization of risk and a corresponding four-tiered system
of biological containment, and called for voluntary compliance among scientists
internationally until their respective governments could formalize their own guidelines or
recommendations (Berg, Baltimore, Brenner, Roblin, & Singer, 1975)
Throughout the 1970s, especially from the conference at Asilomar on, the public
policy focus was on "inadvertent biohazard." NIH had formed, prior to Asilomar, the
Recombinant DNA Molecule Program Advisory Committee (a k.a RAC), and it was this
body that was charged with developing U S guidelines for rDNA research. These were
finally published in June, 1976, and were more stringent than the Asilomar
recommendations which scientists had been following voluntarily (Watson & Tooze,
1981, pp 63-66) A final revision followed in December, 1978, and reflected in them
was the sentiment expressed by NIH Director Donald Frederickson, in the introduction to
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the revised guidelines, "that the burden of proof is shifting towards those who would
restrict recombinant DNA research" (quoted in Watson & Tooze, 1981, p. 431). In the
end, much of the oversight responsibility was delegated to local biosafety committees
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 145)
With inadvertent biohazard now moved to the back burner, scientists in the early
1980s moved from genetic engineering in bacteria to genetic engineering in higher
animals

Transgenics: Genetic Engineering in Non-Human Animals

The biotechnological accomplishment with the strongest implications for human
GE is the creation of genetically engineered - or transgenic - animals. Ruddle and
Gordon (1980) first successfully transferred foreign genes to mice by microinjection into
a one-cell embryo. Shortly thereafter, other researchers microinjected the rabbit
hemoglobin gene into mouse zygotes and were able to produce a mouse that had
incorporated the rabbit gene into its chromosomal DNA, and passed along the gene to its
progeny. The gene functioned normally (Velander et al, 1997, p. 71). Since then,
according to Silver (1997, p. 230) "hundreds of thousands of transgenic mice, pigs, cows,
and sheep [have] been produced." What are the incentives to produce such a vast number
of transgenic animals ?
Three applications of transgenics, in particular, have enormous potential to benefit
humankind Those three applications are xenotransplantation, molecular "pharming,"
and designing transgenic animals to be used in biomedical research. Xenotransplantation
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is the transplantation of organs or tissues from members ofone animal species into
recipient animals of another species. The availability oftransplantable organs for human
patients from human donors has been, and is projected to be, insufficient to meet demand.
In 1993, approximately 33,000 persons in the US. were waiting for an organ transplant,
and there were only 7,600 donors Approximately 3,000 persons died that year while on
the waiting list. And about half of those on the list will eventually die due to lack ofa
suitable organ for transplant (Institute ofMedicine, 1996, pp. I 0-11 ). The discovery and
use ofimmunosuppressive drugs effectively increased the pool ofpossible donors for a
given patient to include genetically unrelated donors (Lanza, Cooper, & Chick, 1997, pp.
54-55). Yet the gap between supply and demand remains. The pool ofnon-human
animals is, for all practical purposes, unlimited Genetic engineering ofdonor animals is
one ofthe leading strategies for circumventing the problem ofhyperacute immune
rejection The genetic modification involves the introduction into (e.g.) a pig zygote and thus into the transplantable organs ofthe adult pig - ofa human gene that codes for a
protein that inhibits the normal immune response (Institute of Medicine, 1996, pp. 3031 ).
A technique for producing virtually limitless quantities ofcertain pharmaceuticals
in transgenic (non-human) animals is on the very near horizon (Reed, 1998; Velander et
al, 1997). The technique, dubbed "pharming," is being employed for the production of
certain proteins that heretofore have had to be purified from large quantities ofdonated
blood at great expense. One such protein is protein C, which controls clotting in persons
with an inborn deficiency (ibid., p. 70). Also valuable as a clotting factor is factor VIII,
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used by hemophiliacs Tissue plasminogen activator is a blood protein that dissolves
blood clots, and is typically used for heart attack and stroke patients. And alpha-1antitrypsin is used to ease breathing in emphysema patients. Not only is pharming
expected to be much more cost-effective than current blood purification methods, but,
according to Velander (ibid., p 71), it "circumvents the risk of contamination with
infectious agents "
Using transgenic animals as bioreactors (i.e., pharming) or as organ sources in
xenotransplantation are not the only ways in which these creatures are of potential benefit
to humans In some cases, transgenics may be developed to serve as animal models for
certain human diseases, such as Alzheimer's (Shuldiner, 1996), sickle cell anemia
(Nagel, 1998), or multiple sclerosis In the latter case, Leroy Hood and his colleagues,
then at the California Institute of Technology, produced a genetically engineered mouse
containing a transgene that appeared to eliminate symptoms of incessant shivering
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, pp 60-61, and references therein). These "shiverer" mice had
been found to lack myelin basic protein (MBP), a protein important in the conduction of
electricity along nerves The transgene contained a function MBP gene, and it was the
expression of this transgene that was responsible for elimination of shivering symptoms.
The shiverer phenotype and multiple sclerosis in humans are both characterized by
dysmyelination, suggesting that germline gene therapy might offer a useful approach to
curing the latter disease as well Reiss and Straughan (1996, p. 169) list as examples
eleven human diseases for which there are transgenic mouse models, including cystic
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fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, sickle cell anemia, atherosclerosis,
and various cancers.
Thus we see that remarkable progress has been made in the genetic engineering of
non-human animals in less than two decades, and this using the less precise GE method
of gene addition discussed in Chapter 2. Once the more precise (i.e., less risky) method
of gene replacement becomes available, it seems entirely possible that safety will fade
from its currently prominent place on the list of ethical concerns, just as it did in the
recombinant DNA debates of the 1970s

Revisiting Genetic Eng;,ieering in Humans
The achievement of recombinant DNA in the early 1970s precipitated a swift
change in the scope of the ethical debates. Whereas, just prior to that achievement, the
debates often had to do with the prospect of the biotechnological manipulation of
humans, once rDNA plasmids were constructed the issue of risks associated with
ecologically devastating, cancer-causing, or otherwise pathogenic bacteria thrust itself to
the top of the agenda By the end of the decade, notwithstanding the increasingly
entrenched position of environmental groups, there was sufficient political consensus that
rDNA (at least in the Kl2 strain of E.coli being used) was not a significant hazard that
the scope of the ethical debate with respect to GE could once again be broadened.
Two events in 1980 re-focused attention on the ethics of GE in humans. First
there was the unauthorized gene therapy treatment of two patients by Martin J. Cline,
Chief of the Division of Hematology-Oncology at UCLA (Murray, 1990, p. 50) In 1980,
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Cline had attempted to treat two thalassemia patients, one in Italy and one in Israel, with
genetically altered bone marrow cells (Thalassemia is a hereditary blood disorder )
Cline had originally submitted a treatment protocol to two committees at UCLA One
committee was responsible for biosafety, and had oversight responsibilities because the
protocol called for DNA to be introduced to the patient in a particular recombinant form
that was viewed at the time as potentially hazardous. The other committee, UCLA's
Institutional Review Board (IRB), had oversight over the human experimentation aspects
of the proposal Meanwhile, in order to circumvent the requirement for review by the
biosafety committee, Cline altered his experimental design so that the DNA to be used
was a non-recombinant form This maneuver was made moot by the IRB's rejection of
the proposal It was after, and because of, this administrative rejection that Cline
arranged to do the treatments overseas. After Israeli authorities confirmed with Cline and
with UCLA that Cline's protocol as revised did not involve rDNA, approval was given.
Cline, however, after gaining clearance to proceed, reverted to the original protocol and
injected the suspect rDNA form of the genes (Fletcher, 1990, pp 60-61; Walters &
Palmer, 1997, pp. 145-146).
Cline's deceptions were discovered, and various punitive actions were meted out
by Nill and UCLA (Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 146). As with Rogers, the ethics of
human experimentation was the primary issue, with the ethics of the genetic manipulation
of humans a secondary, though still important, issue What Cline and Rogers had both
attempted to do, each in a different way, was to manipulate the expression of genes in the
somatic cells of patients. Manipulation of the genes of somatic cells became known as
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somatic cell gene therapy, and of germ cells or very early embryos, germline gene
therapy.
The second event came in the form of a letter from the general secretaries of
representative Catholic, Protestant and Jewish national organizations to President Jimmy
Carter expressing concern about genetic engineering The letter was prompted in part by
the Supreme Court decision (Diamond v. Chakrabarty) allowing GE-microbes to be
patented. The general secretaries felt that "fundamental ethical questions" were at stake questions that dealt with "the fundamental nature of human life and the dignity and worth
of the individual human being" (U S President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982, pp. 95-96).
Therefore they called on the President to assemble a broadly representative task force to
look at the need for governmental regulation and to address these issues [ibid.; Walters,
1997 #115, p. 145].

The Report Splicing Life The Orthodox Position on Human Gene Therapy
The President's Commission responded by initiating a study on the science and
ethics of GE. This study culminated in 1982 with the report Splicing Life, which was
made public in hearings chaired by then-Congressman Al Gore of Tennessee. Much of
interest came before Gore's committee, including an appearance by Dr. Martin Cline.
But the most salient points, for our purposes, address the distinctions with respect to gene
therapy - somatic cell versus germline, and enhancement versus treatment. The
Commission found germline gene therapy to be ethically unacceptable given the state of
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the technology at that time, although it recommended against banning the technology
outright. The overriding consideration was the fact that, since genetic changes were
heritable, mistakes once made could be perpetuated in future generations. Somatic cell
gene therapy, in contrast, had no such complications, and was effectively cleared for
further research and development
The Commission found enhancement gene therapy morally problematic as well,
on the grounds that it might lead to eugenic applications
Interventions aimed at enhancing "normal" people, as opposed to remedying
recognized genetic defects, are also problematic, especially since distinguishing
"medical treatment" from "nonmedical enhancement" is a very subjective matter;
the difficulty of drawing a line suggests the danger of drifting toward attempts to
"perfect" human beings once the door of"enhancement" is opened. [U.S.
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982 #117, p. 3]
The position of the Commission - that somatic cell gene therapy for pwposes of
treatment was ethically acceptable, while germline or enhancement gene therapy were
not

became established as a widely shared consensus position internationally. In a

more recent statement, the European Commission's Group of Advisers on the Ethical
Implications of Gene Therapy stated that "[b]ecause of the important controversial and
unprecedented questions raised by germ-line gene therapy, and considering the actual
state of the art, germ-line gene therapy on humans is not at the present time ethically
acceptable"[, 1995 #151, p. 268; emphasis added] 7 Walters and Palmer (1997, pp 4 7

7This objection seems to imply (though not clearly) that there may be some ethical concerns ("important
controversial and unprecedented questions") over and above concerns about safety (alluded to by
reference to the "actual state of the art").
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49, 90-91) reviewed an international sample of28 government policy statements on gene
therapy, dating from 1980 through 1993, and found that "most expressed grave
reservations about germ-line techniques" Few addressed enhancement germline gene
therapy directly - the presumption was that gene therapy implied treatment Those that
did mention enhancement (e.g., United Kingdom, Canada) found it ethically unacceptable
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 134)

Splicing Life thus cleared the way in the U S for the submission of human
somatic cell gene therapy research protocols. A committee at the National Institutes of
Health prepared guidelines - called the "Points to Consider in the Design and Submission
of Human Somatic-Cell Gene Therapy Protocols" - for researchers considering such
projects. These guidelines are still in use and are still consistent with the consensus, or
"orthodox," position on human gene therapy. That is, only protocols for clinical research
in somatic cells are considered, and only if the ultimate goal is medical treatment ( or
prevention) Germline or enhancement gene therapy protocols are not considered for
funding

The Tenuous Consensus: A Critique of the Ethical Grounding for the Orthodox
View on Human Gene Therapy
A number of ethical objections have been raised against human genetic
engineering, and it is to these that we now tum Following the distinctions emphasized in

Splicing Life, we will consider first the objections to germline genetic intervention, and
second the objections to enhancement
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Objections to Germline Genetic Intervention
Walters and Palmer (Walters & Palmer, 1997, pp 82-86) list eight common
objections to germline gene therapy (GGT), and respond to each of the eight Unless
otherwise specified in the language of the objection, it will be assumed that we are
referring to gene therapy for treatment, not enhancement.

Objection # 1 • Irreversible harm
The first argument is that GGT carries with it a significant risk of harm to future
generations Because of our limited knowledge, and the subtle, sometimes delayed
effects of alterations to the genome, irreversible mistakes are likely to be made that will
put our descendants in harm's way. (Harm to embryos will be considered below. See
Objection #5 )
As argued in the previous chapter, the response to this objection is that technology
is likely to advance to a point where germline interventions are acceptably safe It is
worth briefly reviewing some of the relevant scientific reasons for making this claim
First, genetic engineering has been done successfully in non-human animals, although the
strategy used - gene addition (see Chapter 2) - is not at an acceptable level of safety for
use in humans. Second, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is good reason to
believe that an acceptably safe GE technique - gene replacement - will become feasible
in the foreseeable future. Third, initially human GE can be expected to target well
characterized, single-gene disorders such as cystic fibrosis. As expertise is gained in the

72

genetic treatment of these relatively straightforward genetic diseases, a broader
knowledge of human genetics will become available as research into the human genome
progresses. The Human Genome Project, as the collective effort is known, is expected to
have identif ed all 100,000 human genes by the year 2020, and all common versions (or
alleles) of those genes by 2030 (Silver, 1997, p. 208).
Fourth, an added measure of safety may become available for genetically
engineered organisms, including humans Recent research has shown that genes that are
altered or added (the transgenes) can be present in the cells in an "off' mode. That is, the
gene is present in the cell, but its ability to become active (i e , produce the protein it
encodes) can be placed under external control. Specifically, such a transgene will only
turn on when the person carrying the gene takes a certain pill (Wade, 1999a; Ye et al.,
1999).
Finally, one expects that the usual protections for human subjects that have
become so prominent in clinical trials for novel drugs and medical procedures will be
even more prominent in germline gene therapy trials. This has certainly proved to be the
case so far with somatic cell gene therapy.

Objection #2 Alternatives to GGT available
The second argument is that there is no need to incur the risks of GGT when other
options are available to those who wish to avoid having children with certain genetic
diseases. One option is to use in vitro fertilization (IVF) in combination with
preimplantation diagnosis (PID). The IVF-PID option involves removing a cell or cells
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from the very early embryo and testing for genetic defects If no defects are present in
the tested cells, then no defects will be present in the embryo from which the cells were
removed, since all the descendant cells of the fertilized egg are genetically identical. (For
our purposes, we may ignore differences in mitochondrial DNA) The embryo may then
be implanted in the prospective mother's womb where, if all goes well, a normal
pregnancy will follow The second option is prenatal diagnosis in combination with
selective abortion Here cells of fetal origin are removed from the amniotic fluid and
subjected to genetic testing. Parents may opt to abort the pregnancy if the test results are
unfavorable
Walters and Palmer argue that treatment GGT is more consistent with the ethical
mission of medicine than are discarding unused or affected embryos or aborting affected
fetuses In addition, a strategy of genetic treatment is more respectful of those members
of society who are challenged by genetic diseases, or by disabilities generally To this
counter-argument, one might add quite simply that it is mere speculation to assume that
GGT will always be riskier (or more expensive) than the two options in question. IVF is
expensive and often fails even after several attempts. Abortion is not without medical
risk, and in any case is, for most women, an unpleasant or even traumatic experience.
Finally, most disease-causing genes reside in the cells of heterozygote carriers, i e ,
persons who carry only one copy of a recessive gene when two copies are required to
cause disease. These carriers are unaffected by disease, but could have children who are
affected should they happen to conceive with another carrier Only germline GE will
permanently remove the disease-causing genes from heterozygote carriers - that is, from
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the gene pool at large Whether or not such a eugenic goal is morally defensible is a
separate question (We will have more to say about eugenics below) But the eradication
of certain well-characterized recessive genetic disorders such as cystic fibrosis from the
human population seems on its face to be a worthy and humanitarian goal, akin to the
eradication of smallpox or polio

Objection #3 • High cost, limited availability
A third objection to GGT assumes that it will be an expensive and therefore
scarce commodity. As such, the wealthy will have access and the poor will not. The
counter-argument is that it is, again, pure speculation to say that GGT, once available,
will remain prohibitively expensive In any case, the costs of GGT must be compared
with costs associated with genetic diseases not treated by GGT. Finally, GGT could be
(more) equitably distributed if subsidized
Society has many commodities

medical and otherwise - that are scarce and in

high demand And society finds solutions to the problem of how best to distribute those
commodities. The solutions are rarely ideal, and often there is inequity between the
wealthy and the poor. However, for better or worse, some level of inequity is generally
tolerated. Rarely if ever is the commodity denied to all on the grounds that its
distribution is inequitable One would expect, then, that human germline gene therapy
will be made available even if problems of inequity accompany it.
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Thus, although the issue of equity in the distribution of scarce medical resources
is an important one, it is not unique to human GE, nor is it likely to be seen as a sufficient
ethical justification for prohibiting the technology

Objection #4: Use for enhancement
A fourth argument relies on the third - assuming that human GE will be
preferentially available to the wealthy - and on the second - assuming that less expensive
options for "treatment" (avoiding disease) will be available. In this scenario, no one will
use human GE to avoid genetic disease. Instead, they will use human GE for
enhancement Only the wealthy will pursue genetic enhancement, since the government
is unlikely to subsidize enhancement as opposed to treatment, and the poor will be
effectively denied access to genetic enhancement Over the course of time, society will
be divided into two or more classes of genetically-enhanced "haves" and unenhanced
"have-nots" Silver (1997) presents such a scenario in some detail, and sees this as being
an important objection to human GE (see Chapter I).
There seem to be three components of this objection. First, there is the basic
inequity - the wealthy have access to a valuable resource while the poor do not This
issue was addressed above (see Objection #3). Second, although it is not explicitly
stated, one might take part of the objection to be against genetic enhancement per se. As
has been noted above, this objection to enhancement is one of the two foci of the
orthodox position on gene therapy. We will take up this issue in the next section. Third,
the objection might be against the divergence into two genetic classes. Here the issue is
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not so much that one class is better off than the other. It is not that one class (the
enhanced) is super-human while the other is merely human The issue is that we have
gone from one class of beings all of whom were equally human to two classes one
(unenhanced) human and the other (enhanced) modified-human.
Silver's (ibid ) GenRich v. Natural scenario introduced in Chapter 1 is just this
kind of scenario

a world filled with genetically-enhanced GenRich descended from the

wealthy and unenhanced Naturals descended from the poor. Silver finds nothing
inherently wrong with enhancement, even enhancement so radical as to result in species
diverg�nce (Recall that in Silver's future world there were several GenRich species )
The issue for Silver is equity Glover ( 1984) views the problem similarly.
The suggestion that, once problems of equity are resolved, there is nothing
ethically regrettable about a world in which, in a relatively short period of time, humanity
has been fragmented into a number of non-human (or at least quasi-human) offshoots is a
bit difficult to swallow As indicated in the introductory chapter, an alternative
hypothesis is that our moral aversion to (radical) genetic enhancement is grounded in a
belief that there is something intrinsically valuable in humanness
This ethical concern is, of course, central to this inquiry and therefore will be
taken up in later chapters.

Objection #5 Moral status of human pre-embryos
GGT is held to be morally objectionable because, both in the clinical research
stages and as part of post-research treatment, human embryos will be discarded or
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otherwise destroyed This harm to embryos is morally objectionable, it is argued,
because a human embryo is the sort of thing that is due an elevated moral respect Let us
recall from Chapter 2 that GGT (human GE) is performed on a single cell - typically the
zygote, but possibly also the embryonic stem cell, or the as-yet-unfertilized egg. For the
purpose of addressing this objection, let us assume that the target cell is the zygote (or
one-cell embryo) The human embryo during its frst fourteen days of development is
often referred to as a "pre-embryo," presumably because it is only after fourteen days that
the early embryo is incapable of twinning Also, it is only after fourteen days that each
of the cells of the early embryo have committed either to become placental cells or to
become fetal cells. (Silver suggests that political motivations are at play also in the
adoption of the new term "pre-embryo" (1997, p. 39))
According to the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, there are
three principal views on the moral status of human pre-embryos (American Fertility
Society, 1986, p. 3 59) The frst is that pre-embryos "are entitled to protection as human
beings from the time of fertilization forward" Two scientific reasons are given in
support of this claim. First, a new genotype - that is, a unique combination of genes - is
created at the moment of fertilization And second, pre-embryos have the potential to
develop into fetuses, children and adult human beings.
The second view "denies that human pre-embryos have any moral status."
Scientif c reasons are given in support of this view as well First of all, only about a third
of all human pre-embryos conceived through sexual intercourse attach to the uterine wall,
develop and are delivered as live infants. Since the "natural" fate of two-thirds of pre-
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embryos is a death that no one seems to find ethically regrettable, one is led to conclude
that pre-embryos are not the sort of thing to which we have ethical duties or obligations.
Secondly, as noted above, pre-embryos can divide into twins, triplets, etc. Not only that,
in the IVF laboratory several pre-embryos - each the product of different sperm-egg pairs
- can literally be stuck together to form one pre-embryo Silver ( 1997, p. 46) asks us to
imagine a scenario in which parents initially intend to have twins created using IVF and
splitting the single pre-embryo into two prior to implantation After the split, however,
they have a change of heart and request that the twin pre-embryos now be physically
unified in the culture dish The physician complies with the request Silver finds it
implausible to say that such a series of actions is morally objectionable. We have, he
notes, destroyed a potential life without killing anything
The third view takes an intermediate position. While acknowledging that the
potential to become an adult human being gives the pre-embryo a more elevated moral
status than nonembryonic human tissues, it is held that other moral duties and obligations
can outweigh our duties and obligations to the human pre-embryo
There are problems with the first view (and that part of the third view that defers
to the first view) over and above those already mentioned. The first problem has to do
with the claim that the human pre-embryo has a unique genotype beginning at the
moment of fertilization. As we learned in the previous chapter, fertilization is a multi
step process that is not complete until the zygote has divided once, forming the two-cell
pre-embryo. It is only at the two-cell stage that the genes from the sperm and those from
the egg commingle and a new genotype is achieved If that is the moment at which the
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pre-embryo becomes morally important, then human GE is not touched by this objection
since it must occur at the one-cell stage. Moreover, germline genetic interventions may
be made in other cells - either gametes prior to fertilization [already done in cattle; see
\Moffat, 1998 #195]; or human ES cells (Gearhart, 1998; Wilmut, 1998); or human
somatic cell nuclei to be used for cloning (Wilmut, 1998).
Technology is racing ahead of ethics on these questions. Since 1995 the US
Congress has effectively banned embryo research in federally funded facilities The ban
has been attached to the bills authorizing spending for the National Institutes of Health,
which funds the vast majority of the nation's biomedical research. The use offederal
funds is prohibited for "research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed,
discarded or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for
research on fetuses in utero" (quoted in Wade, 1999b)
The picture is clouded, however, since embryos evidently are no longer the only
cells that can give rise to fully developed human beings. Human ES cells, discovered in
late 1998 (Thomson et al, 1998), were recently ruled by the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) to fall outside the Congressional ban. The distinction that
DHHS and its general counsel made was that an ES cell, if implanted into a uterine wall,
could not develop into a human being whereas an embryo could. In earlier experiments in which adult mice offspring came from ES cells - the ES cell needed to be surrounded
by an "artificial placenta" in order to implant in the uterus (Kolata, 1999). The DHHS
ruling means, according to Nm Director Harold Varmus, that it would be illegal for
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federally funded labs to derive human ES cells, since that would involve embryo
research, but they could use ES cells produced in private labs (Wade, 1999b)
The matter was immediately taken up by 70 members of the House of Representatives
who, in February 1999, asked the Secretary of Health and Human Service to rescind the
ruling (Wade, 1999c)
Thus, those who would argue against human GE on the grounds that it violates
the moral integrity of the embryo would have to stipulate a very broad definition of
"embryo." Essentially they would need to protect all totipotential cells (Walters &
Palmer, 1997, pp. 83-84) But what we are discovering is that "all totipotential cells"
may include everything from human embryonic stem cells growing in culture, to somatic
cells such as skin or blood cells (which can be used in cloning), to cells removed from an
early embryo for genetic testing
While there is certainly much more that remains to be said regarding this
objection, it appears unlikely that, in the long term, human GE will be prohibited because
of a perceived violation of the moral status of the human embryo and other totipotential
cells. It is not only the dubious scientific grounding for the arguments that prompts this
conclusion. Current biomedical practices indicate a public willingness to allow
manipulation of pre-embryos. IVF is common, and the disposal of unneeded embryos,
while not without controversy, has not aroused the passions of the majority. Genetic
screening, which involves the discarding of embryos, has been done in humans (see, e g ,
Mulkay, 1997, pp 139-140). Abortion, though controversial, remains legal Initially, the
focus of human GE will be on treatment gene therapy, which

as discussed in Chapter 2
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- promises to alleviate much pain and suffering from genetic diseases Emphasizing this
point, Walters and Palmer ( 1997, p 86) argue that "there is a presumption in favor of
fostering continued development of human embryos and fetuses, but that presumption
can in our view be overridden by other considerations like serious harm to the developing
individual or others and the needs of preclinical research " Already there has been
political movement on the part of advocates for persons with certain genetic diseases who
would like to see less restrictive regulations on the use of human embryos in research
And finally, there will be pressure from corporations that stand to profit from treatment
GGT.

Objection #6 Concentration of power
A sixth objection is that making human GE commonplace would give to a
relatively small number of people a tremendous amount of power over the direction of
the course of human evolution Let us assume that those in power are well-intentioned,
conscientious individuals (The "mad dictator" scenario is dealt with below.) Let us also
assume that this objection does not have to do with the possibility that those in power
will, through ignorance or accident, cause harm to future generations. (The issue of
irreversible harm was addressed above.) The issue here is this: given that a huge number
of possible evolutionary courses may be available to genetic engineers of the future, all
generally beneficial, who should make the decisions that collectively determine the
course?
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The response is that it is unlikely that authority over human GE will be
centralized (Glover, 1984; Silver, 1997). Human GE is unlike other technologies (e.g.,
nuclear) that require huge capital investments and therefore are not left to the unimpeded
marketplace of individual consumers. The private market for reproductive and genetic
technologies already exists, and that industry - at least in developed countries

is

flourishing. The course of human evolution, thus, will be set by many individuals acting
independently in a free market The potential for harm (i e., consumers making genetic
choices that would bring harm to fuure generations) can be minimized by a limited
number of government restrictions - based on the best genetic science - on decisions that
are legally permissible. Glover (ibid., p. 51) proposes just such a "mixed system," a
system of parental initiative in making genetic choice in combination with a centralized
veto power.
Human GE will have its start with treatment germline gene therapy, not
enhancement To deny to those suffering from horrible genetic diseases the medical
benefits of treatment GGT cannot be justified on these grounds.

Objection #7: Misuse by dictators
The seventh objection reflects what some have in mind when they use the term
"eugenics" in a pejorative sense. They imagine that a mad dictator, or someone with
excessive political authority, will attempt to genetically engineer a class of humans with
desired skills or characteristics. One imagines a super-race of persons exceptionally
skilled at, and amenable to, warfare. Or, on the other hand, the most useful product of the
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human GE apparatus might be a particularly docile and servile underclass, much like the
epsilons of Huxley's Brave New World The counter-argument is that this scenario is
both politically unlikely (Nazi Germany notwithstanding) and would be an inefficient and
ineffective means of achieving the mad dictator's goal. It would be inefficient even
assuming we had a vast and comprehensive understanding of the human genome
because the fruits of one's GE labor take roughly twenty years to grow to useful
adulthood. The program would be ineffective because, to put it simply, we are more than
just our genes and so giving humans the desired genotype does not guarantee the desired
person.

Objection #8 Human rights and tampering
The eighth objection is that we all possess a right to a genetic inheritance that has
not been artificially tampered with. Here it is interesting to contrast the policy statements
emanating from Europe with those of the United States. The American treatment of the
ethics of genetic engineering thus far has had a consequentialist bent. That is, roughly
speaking, the moral rightness or wrongness of GE hinges on whether the consequences
were good or bad. The European treatment has had an additional component
Recommendation 934: On Genetic Engineering was issued by the Council of Europe's
Parliamentary Assembly in January, 1982, just prior to Splicing Life Of particular
significance in this policy statement is the assertion of a "right to inherit a genetic pattern
which has not been artificially changed" (Council of Europe, in Jonsen et al., 1998) This
right, it was claimed, is derived from the "rights to life and to human dignity protected by
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Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights" (ibid , p. 297) In the
formal recommendations, however, this right is importantly qualified. Recognition is
asked for a "right to a genetic inheritance which has not been artificially interfered with,
except in accordance with certain principles which are recognised as being fully
compatible with respect for human rights (as, for example, in the field of therapeutic
applications)" (ibid , p. 297) Thus the door is left open, it seems, for human GE for
purposes of medical treatment.

Splicing Life, while also adopting the orthodox position on gene therapy, made no
reference to a right to an unaltered inheritance, as had Recommendation 934 and other
European statements. Instead it compared gene therapy with conventional medical
treatments. The President's Commission could find no basis for the suggestion that
human genetic engineering was intrinsically wrong. The ethical emphasis, it argued,
should properly be placed on the potential uses, both beneficial and harmful, to which the
technology might be put
The motivation for this objection, according to Walters and Palmer (1997, pp. 8486), is that human GE should not be allowed because future generations are incapable of
giving consent The proper moral consideration of future persons is a complex matter
With respect to making a decision about a genetic alteration of a one-cell embryo that
will one day be one's child, it is enough to observe that we routinely make medical
decisions for our children who are not competent to do so. The fact is, however, that
multiple future generations may be affected by one's decision to proceed (or not proceed)
with a genetic intervention. Does this mean that it is morally incumbent on us to preserve
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the genetic lineage in its "natural" state? As Walters and Palmer (ibid., p. 86) have
argued, at least certain interventions are unlikely to be viewed, by future generations, as
violations of rights
Insofar as we can anticipate the needs and wants of future generations, we think
that any reasonable future person would prefer health to serious disease and
would therefore welcome a germ-line intervention in his or her family line that
effectively prevented cystic fibrosis from being transmitted to him or her. In our
view, such a person would not regard this intervention as tampering and would
regard as odd the claim that his or her genetic patrimony has been artificially
tampered with. Cystic fibrosis was not a part of his or her family's heritage that
the future person was eager to receive or to claim
In the end, it seems that a right to an unaltered inheritance is in need of further
defense. The recognition that our actions today will affect many future persons, rather
than one, ought to sharpen our desire to arrive at the best decision. That, however, says
nothing about whether the best decision will be in favor of, or against, GE.

Objection #9 "Playing God"
The objection that human GE is morally objectionable because it amounts to
"playing God" was not one of those listed by Walters and Palmer. This omission is very
likely due to the ambiguity of the objection So many others, however, have made the
charge that it is worth a brief inspection.
The faith-based version of the "playing God" objection relies on a literal belief in
God. This objection, we may surmise, is just that the creation of life lies within God's
domain, and by genetically engineering human (and perhaps other) organisms, we have
infringed on God's domain But we already interfere in many ways with the creation of
human life, for example, with birth control pills, or in vitro fertilization (IVF) Assuming
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that many of those who would raise this objection would not find the use of birth control
pills or IVF morally offensive, we must look for an alternative interpretation of
"interference."
Perhaps the objection is that what falls within God's domain is not whether a
child should be conceived, or even how it should be conceived, but rather, how it will
biologically develop from a fertilized egg to a newborn In other words, we ought not
interfere with, or alter, the gene-directed embryological and fetal development of the
(future) child If that were God's domain, then this might constitute a legitimate
challenge to GE, for this is precisely what GE does.
This view does not, however, appear to be shared by the majority of those
theologians who have engaged in the public policy debate. Peters [, 1995 #228; 1997
# 123], for instance, argues from a religious perspective that we have no reason to believe
that the creation of human life is the domain of God alone. He argues that it is not
inconsistent with the faithful life to believe (as Peters himself does) that we are intended
by God to be "created co-creators" A similar stand is taken by the World Council of
Churches, which has declared, "[a]s Christians we believe that we are both creatures of
God and co-creators with him in fulfilling the image He has given us" (Abrecht & Shinn,
1980, p 49)
The Catholic, Protestant and Jewish theologians contributing to the
aforementioned report, Splicing Life, were of a like mind on this question (U S
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, 1982, p 53)
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In the view of the theologians, contemporary developments in molecular biology
raise issues of responsibility rather than being matters to be prohibited because
they usurp powers that human beings should not possess. The Biblical religions
teach that human beings are, in some sense, co-creators with the Supreme Creator
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore theological doctrine on the question
whether humans should or should not be "co-creators" in the relevant sense. For our
purposes, it is enough simply to point out that the leading religious commentators in the
public policy debate thus far do not agree that all "interference" of the sort involved with
GE is morally objectionable
Hubris is frequently associated with the charge of playing God. Some have
termed this an "arrogant interference in nature," meaning that "in 'creating new life
forms' scientists are abusing their learning by interfering with nature" (US President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 1982, p 55). (We will consider "interfering with nature" just
below.) Chadwick, in her article on cloning, considers the "playing God" objection to be
that, in "try[ing] to gain some control over life and death .. [m]an is seen as overreaching
himself' (Chadwick, 1982, p. 203)
If the argument is against hubris, or overreaching, on the part of humankind, then
it seems that some account of humankind's morally proper place is needed. ls the
argument that there is a threshold over which one must not cross in the pursuit of
knowledge related to GE, or in acting on that knowledge ? Surely there must be a reason
for circumscribing human GE in this way and declaring it morally off-limits
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Chadwick's attempt to give a reason seems plausible. According to Chadwick,
actions that are associated with the terms "hubris" or "overreaching" are actions that have
unforeseeable consequences that are undesirable either because they tend to "arouse
anxiety" in people, or because they may actually lead to bad consequences (ibid , pp.
203-204) What is the proper response when faced with an action that might reasonably
be considered overreaching? "Rather than ruling out the action with no more ado . it
may be preferable to consider the possible consequences, and adopt some kind ofrisk
assessment" (ibid , p 204)
A third interpretation ofthe "playing God" objection is roughly a secularized
version ofthe f rst, with nature's rightful domain taking the place ofGod's domain. The
claim implies that nature is sacred or inviolable. The most obvious problem with this
objection is that we seem to violate nature all the time. ls prescribing eyeglasses for
myopia a violation ofnature (US. President's Commission for the Study ofEthical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982, p 55)? What
about using the modern, artificial marvels ofmedicine to interrupt the "natural" course of
cancer and other major diseases ? Or, for that matter, what about damming rivers,
educating our children, or spaying our pets? It seems that we must conclude that not all
human-directed change in nature entails a violation ofnature. So which changes are
violations and which are not?
Chadwick considers the objection that certain actions or procedures are wrong
because they are "unnatural." As one plausible interpretation, she says that this claim is
equivalent to claiming that the action in question, ifcarried out, prevents members ofthe
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species from functioning properly She gives as an example the moral objection against
keeping hens in battery cages because it prevents them from spreading their wings, a
natural function for hens. Analogously, then, the argument from function would claim
that there are "certain very basic features with which we associate being human" that are
threatened by some practice such as GE (Chadwick, 1982, p 202)
Chadwick cites two main problems with the argument from function First, it is
difficult to give criteria for basic human features or functions. Second, a moral
assessment based on "naturalness" seems to be at a disadvantage compared with an
assessment based on people's preferences or desires. At the very least, the latter are
easier to identify (ibid , p. 203)
The issue of naturalness - specifically, the question of the "sacredness" of human
nature - will be revisited below. For the time being, however, we are forced to conclude
that the playing God objections as formulated above are not particularly compelling.

In spite of the political consensus having been reached that germfine gene therapy
in humans was off-limits, the groundwork has been laid for revisiting the question of the
moral permissibility of this technology. The prohibition against germline genetic
intervention, as articulated in Splicing Life, appeared to be based mainly on the fact that
technology heretofore has not been at an acceptable level of risk for use in humans.
This implies that once technological advances minimize the risk sufficiently, this primary
obstacle to human GE will have been removed. We have argued above (see Objection
#1) and in Chapter 2 that there is good reason to expect the necessary technological
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advances. We will assume, therefore, that human GE will become safe in the foreseeable
future.
Although risk of harm was the most prominent of the objections to germline gene
therapy (human GE), it was certainly not the only objection Thus, we were led to
consider eight other common ethical objections to human GE (Objections #2 through #9,
above). While space does not permit an exhaustive treatment of each objection, the
foregoing discussion indicates that none of these other objections are particularly
compelling This implies that, once human GE becomes acceptably safe, there will be
little ethical momentum, so to speak, on the side of those who would wish to continue to
restrict germline gene therapy
One need not look far to see evidence of this open-mindedness towards human
GE. In fact, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, some academics again opened the
question of the moral acceptability of germline genetic interventions (Walters, in Jonsen
et al., 1998, p. 257). These academic discussions led in 1990 to a consensus statement
called the Declaration oflnuyama, which was remarkable for its openness to the prospect
of treatment germline gene therapy, as the following clause indicates
The modification of human germ cells for therapeutic or preventive purposes
would be technically much more difficult than that of somatic cells and is not at
present in prospect Such therapy might, however, be the only means of treating
certain conditions, so continued discussion of both its technical and ethical
aspects is essential. Before germ-line therapy is undertaken, its safety must be
very well established, for changes in germ cells would affect the descendants of
patients (in Jonsen et al., 1998, p. 323)
The foregoing discussion indicates that the moral prohibition against germline
genetic interventions will be relaxed once these interventions become acceptably safe
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This leaves the prohibition against enhancement - the second cornerstone of the orthodox
view on human gene therapy - as the lone remaining ethical constraint on human GE
We now turn to a discussion ofthe objections against human genetic enhancement

Objections to Genetic Enhancement

The objection to human genetic enhancement is not as well formulated as are the
objections to germline interventions generally In this section we will highlight some
difficulties with the claim that human genetic enhancement as such is ethically
objectionable.

The treatment-enhancement distinction is problematic
In the bioethics literature on enhancement, a central problem is the difficulty in
defining exactly what is meant by the terms treatment and enhancement (REFS)
Nevertheless, the examples given are consistent with our common-sense expectations
Examples of treatment GE (germline gene therapy) are the proposed genetic
modifications that would pre-empt cystic fibrosis, Huntington's disease, Lesch-Nyhan
syndrome, and the other single-gene disorders mentioned in the previous chapter.
Examples of enhancement GE are increased physical height, decreased need for sleep,
increased longevity or lifespan, increased memory, decreased aggression, and improved
general cognitive ability (Walters & Palmer, 1997, pp. 101-107; Whitehouse, Juengst,
Mehlman, & Murray, 1997). In other words, treatment - the proper domain of medicine
- has to do with improvements from a state ofbelow-normal functioning (disease or
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disability) to normal or at least closer-to-normal functioning, while enhancement has to
do with improvements from normal functioning to above normal or at least higher
functioning. Let us take this common-sense understanding of the terms treatment and

enhancement as our starting point.
The question now is this: can we be ethically opposed to enhancement if we are
not opposed to treatment? In other words, can we justify being opposed to improvements
from normal-to-"supernormal" when we are not opposed to improvements from
"subnormal" -to-normal? Aren't improvements just improvements?
A common view is that "health" means freedom from disease or disability.
According to this view, the purpose of health care or medical treatment (including
preventive treatments) is to "maintain, restore, or compensate for the restricted
opportunity and loss of function caused by disease and disability" (Sabin & Daniels,
1994, p. I 0). An alternative view is that embodied in the controversial World Health
Organization definition of health - "a state of complete physical, mental, and social well
being" ( quoted in Parens, 1998, p S2). Sabin and Daniels call these views "hard-line"
and "expansive," respectively ( 1994, p. 5). The distinction in the literature between
treatment and enhancement seems to assume the hard-line - or normal function - view.
There are problems with the hard-line, or normal-function, distinction between
treatment and enhancement (see Parens, 1998, pp S3-S4) First, it is often unclear when
a certain biological state should be classified as a disease or disability, and when it should
be classified as normal though disadvantageous That translates directly into an unclear
boundary between treatrnent and enhancement. Since both treatment and enhancement
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are improvements, perhaps it makes more sense, following Walters and Palmer (1997, pp.
109-110), to distinguish between health-related and non-health-related enhancements.
On the other hand, this only seems to postpone the question of what constitutes "health."
To better illustrate this difficulty, consider the following cases involving the use of
human growth hormone (see Lantos, Siegler, & Cuttler, 1989; Parens, 1998):
1) Child A suffers from a brain tumor that causes a def ciency in the secretion of
growth hormone (GH), and has a predicted adult height (without GH
treatment) of 5 feet 3 inches
2) Child B, whose parents are both very short, is not GH-deficient and has a
predicted adult height (without GH treatment) of 5 feet 3 inches
Of Child A, the advocate of the normal-function view of health and disease would
presumably say that this is a case of disease, and administering growth hormone to this
child would therefore constitute medical treatment. But what then should be said of the
other case? Assuming that Child A and Child B will both suffer equally from short
stature, and benefit equally from growth hormone therapy, do we say that only in the case
of Child A do we have disease, and therefore only in that case is growth hormone
supplementation justifiable ? Is it not the effect, rather than the cause, that is morally
relevant here ? This criterion - i e, level of growth hormone - for moral line-drawing
seems unsatisfactory.
Another problem with the normal-function model is that it implies a theoretical,
and not merely a statistical, account of the organism That is, it requires that we be able
to give definitive criteria for the (normal) human being, implying that the "human being"
is an unchanging part of the universe - a natural kind rather than a convenient
classification for an organism whose "nature" continues to change over evolutionary
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time. We will pursue the question of human nature further in subsequent chapters. For
present purposes, suffice it to say that attempts to defend the view that human beings are
a natural kind have generally been unconvincing
Thus, our inability to define human normality, health, disease, and so on, make it
impossible to make a logically consistent distinction between treatment and
enhancement.
In response, it might be argued that, despite the imprecision of concepts such as
"normality" or "species-typical functioning," it defies common sense to say of at least
some cases that they cannot be clearly identified as either enhancement or treatment.
Continuing with examples related to hormone use, consider the following two examples
Example 1. A professional baseball player ingests hormones and thereby boosts
his strength to such a degree that he smashes the record for home runs in a single
season
Example 2: A breast cancer patient takes certain hormones and thereby causes her
cancer to go into remission.
Is it plausible to say of these examples that we cannot distinguish one from the
other? Can we deny that the first is an instance of enhancement and the second an
instance of treatment? Perhaps the objection is that there will frequently be cases - such
as the growth hormone deficiency example - that are not so clear-cut. But just because
there are borderline cases does not mean that there are not also clear cases, and in clear
cases a morally relevant distinction between treatment and enhancement can and should
be made.
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In spite of our not having satisfactorily resolved this question, let us for the sake
of argument grant that a distinction can be made between treatment and enhancement.
We do so for two reasons. First of all, there have been clues that our attempts at moral
line-drawing may be directed at the wrong target Recall that, in referring to potentially
objectionable genetic enhancements, we have f equently used the parenthetical phrase
"certain kinds or degrees of' to qualify "enhancement." In addition, it has been asserted
that relatively minor enhancements, such as plastic surgery, do not seem morally
problematic. These two observations taken together suggest that, if there is a line to be
drawn between morally significant and insignificant (genetic) alterations, then the line is
not the same as that separating treatment from enhancement. This suggestion will be
taken up in later sections The second reason the Permissive View proponent might, for
the sake of argument, be willing to concede this point (i.e , that treatment and
enhancement can be distinguished) is that she may issue a more direct challenge to the
defender of the Restrictive View. That challenge is taken up in the next section.

Even if we can make the distinction between treatment and enhancement, what is morally
wrong with enhancement ?
Earlier the example of Prozac, or a Super Prozac, was used to suggest that
enhancement of already existing persons becomes morally problematic when the degree
of change involved reaches a critical threshold, at which point the "self," or personal
identity, is threatened. Whether or not such a view can be defended in the case of
pharmacological enhancement of already existing persons, it was argued that loss of
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personal identity over time was not at stake in the case of genetic enhancement because
the thing that is enhanced is a one-cell embryo and not a person. And harm, it was
argued, was not at issue with (safe) human genetic enhancement for the simple reason
that an enhancement, by definition, is a beneficial modification.
If personal identity over time is not threatened nor harm entailed by (germline)
genetic enhancement, what of ethical significance is threatened?
In our earlier discussion of eugenics, we observed that the old (pre-GE) eugenics
aimed at improving humans Whatever the improvement, the offspring would be a
human being. The new (GE-) eugenics could potentially aim at improving on
humankind Some improvements could conceivably yield an offspring that is not a

human being We asked earlier Is it only certain kinds or degrees of enhancement that
are morally problematic ? Maybe the answer is yes - those enhancements that threaten
our humanness.

Is (safe) radical human genetic enhancement intrinsically regrettable?

It seems that there are two possible positions on the above-stated question
I) Even very radical genetic enhancements are not ethically regrettable.
2) Very radical genetic enhancements are ethically regrettable (although minor
enhancements are not)
The first position seems to conflict with our pre-philosophical intuitions - that is,
roughly, the intuitions we have prior to in-depth philosophical reflection or
argumentation This claim is saying that human GE would be ethically acceptable even if
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we created a human-derived organism that bore no or few recognizable human features such as Silver's GenRich - and it rejects the claim that genetic enhancement is inherently
wrong or ethically problematic Let us call this the Permissive View on human GE
The second position, on the other hand, is problematic even though it sits well
with our pre-philosophical intuitions Let us call this view - i.e., that there is something
inherently wrong or objectionable with at least certain kinds or degrees of genetic
enhancement - the Restrictive View on human GE The difficulty with the Restrictive
View is that, once we have granted that neither germline GE nor enhancement per se are
inherently wrong, it is not obvious what of ethical significance is lost with radical genetic
enhancement For the moment, this Restrictive View has been supported only by
appealing to the implausibility of the Permissive View. But what positive argument can
be given in support of the Restrictive View ?
The Restrictive View implies that something of ethical significance is at stake
when we consider certain types or degrees of (even beneficial) genetic alteration. This is
the case, it will be recalled, not because we have violated the moral status of the one-cell
embryo, nor because there has been a loss of personal identity, nor because someone has
been harmed. We have found those and other arguments unpersuasive, and hence have
agreed to set those arguments aside The Restrictive View holds that radical genetic
alterations - even enhancements - destroy or diminish something intrinsically valuable.
Despite its intuitive appeal, it remains an open question whether the Restrictive
View and the core intuition that motivates it are rationally defensible, or whether, on
balance, the Permissive View is on firmer ground It is to this question that we next tum
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Before doing so, however, it will be useful to reconsider both the practical and
philosophical importance of the question at hand.

Is the Permissive View a straw man?
It might be argued that the Permissive View is a straw man, since no serious
minded person would hold such a view, and, as we have already noted, there is broad
based consensus that undertaking genetic enhancement, radical or otherwise, is morally
impermissible. So whom are we trying to persuade? And, as a practical matter, why is it
urgent or even necessary to explicitly formulate grounds for the Restrictive View if all
agree that the latter is correct ? In response, it can be said that few have actually seriously
considered the Permissive View - at least not explicitly and in a public forum Some
serious-minded commentators (Glover and Silver are two) have, and have found that
view defensible, although each has had significant ethical reservations about potential
consequences stemming from genetic enhancement. Further, the ethical challenges posed
by enhancement are now taken seriously in a way they weren't even as recently as the
early 1990s. As Erik Parens relates ( 1998, p. S2), at a 1993 meeting at the Hastings
Center (an independent center for studies in bioethics), senior scholars refused to take the
issue of enhancement seriously. Yet four years later, "the first NIH Gene Therapy Policy
Conference was devoted to that very topic."
In fact, it seems to be the case that the Permissive View is more easily defensible
than the Restrictive View. The Restrictive View relies on some notion of humanness As
we shall see, if humanness is just biological humanness, then the Restrictive View is
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difficult to defend. If it is some broader notion of humanness, then it is no small matter
to say (and we shall try) what that broader notion is. Weighing in against the Restrictive
View is the fairly common position in philosophy that human beings are morally
significant in virtue of their being persons, where personhood is understood to consist in
the possession of certain psychological properties This seems to make humanness
ethically irrelevant to the extent that it has necessary connections to such things as the
human form or species membership (That is, neither possession of human form nor
species membership is a necessary condition for psychological personhood )
The Restrictive View would not deny that (psychological) personhood is ethically
important. It would, however, argue that personhood does not capture all that is morally
important about human beings. Thus, the Permissive View is incomplete because it
omits the fundamentally important notion of humanness
But the question can be put again - as a practical matter, is the pursuit of the
Restrictive View of any importance in the formulation of public policy?
An affirmative answer may be given for the following reasons First, if the
various "other objections" do not hold in the long term - as suggested in this chapter and there is over time an increasingly greater demand for genetic enhancement, then we
will face increasing pressure to justify the Restrictive View if we are to deny this benefit
to those who demand it. Second, even if one or more of the "other objections" do hold meaning that we need not rely on the admittedly difficult and elusive basis for the
Restrictive View to restrict genetic enhancement - it will nevertheless still be important
to develop, if possible, the notion of humanness upon which the Restrictive View
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depends. If a rational articulation of morally significant humanness can be given, then
we will have made clear ( or clearer) something of central ethical importance that helps
explain our intuitive moral aversion to enhancement generally and genetic enhancement
in particular. Future ethical assessments, then, would need to include the impact on
humanness as a significant ethical criterion.
All of this assumes that some sense can be made of the Restrictive View and
humanness. What if that effort proves futile? Will the insights gained in a fruitless
pursuit of the Restrictive View still be important for the formulation of public policy?
If, following Glover and others, we can find no justification for the Restrictive
View, then the implications for public policy are, if anything, even more dramatic. What
is implied is that the sort of scenarios envisioned by Glover and Silver are not inherently
wrong. That is, radical enhancements of humans would be morally permissible if other
moral objections ( e.g., harm. eugenics abuses, and just distribution of genetic technology
resources) are adequately addressed. (The implications for public policy will be taken up
in more detail in Chapter 6.)

What conceptions of humanness or intrinsic human value could make the
Restrictive View plausible, in light of the formidable obstacles that have been placed in
its way in this chapter? And what can be said in favor of the Permissive View? These
questions will be taken up in the following chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR: IS THE PERMISSIVE VIEW INCOMPLETE?

We ended the last chapter contrasting the Permissive and Restrictive Views on
human genetic engineering The Permissive View holds that there is nothing intrinsically
wrong with even radical human genetic enhancement. The Restrictive View holds that
there is something intrinsically wrong with radical genetic enhancement. Ifwe assume,
per the arguments in Chapter 3, that the usual consequentialist and other arguments are
unlikely to justify restrictions on human GE in the long term, then the Permissive View
implies that even very radical, non-harmful departures from present-day humankind, such
as the GenRich, are morally permissible The Restrictive View implies that there is an
ethically significant remainder - something remaining which, if violated, would be
ethically regrettable The motivation for the Restrictive View is quite simply the
implausibility of the Permissive View and its implications.
The question that this chapter and the next will address is this Are there any
rational underpinnings to the Restrictive View? ls the underlying moral intuition - i e ,
that radical genetic enhancements per se are ethically objectionable - sound ? To make a
case for the Restrictive View, three things must be accomplished. First and most
important, we are in need ofa conception ofethically significant "humanness," human
sacredness, or human intrinsic value. Second, this "humanness" must be capable ofbeing
violated by radical genetic enhancements. And third, it must be shown that such
violations are ethically objectionable These challenges will be taken up in the Chapter 5.
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In the present chapter the Permissive View will be held up for closer scrutiny.
Thus far we have said little to suggest that a case can be made for it. While few writers
have explicitly argued that radical genetic enhancement of humans is not intrinsically
wrong, several have argued against the claim that genetic enhancement generally is
intrinsically wrong (Recall that our qualifier "radical" indicates a change that results in a
loss of biological humanness. That is, roughly, the offspring in question would not be
recognizably human and would be incapable of interbreeding with unaltered human
beings ) It will be seen that personhood, understood in psychological terms, plays a
central role, whereas our status as human beings seems to be peripheral, corning into play
only in virtue of its facilitation of our psychological lives These arguments against the
intrinsic wrongness of genetic enhancement are helpful. Psychological personhood is
important, and its preservation of obvious moral significance. However, it will be
suggested that the ethical picture that is painted by this wholly person-oriented view is
lacking An alternative view that places human beings in an ethically fundamental
position will be proposed. A critical discussion of that proposed view will be the subject
of the next chapter

In Favor of Human Genetic Enhancement

Almost as soon as the orthodox position on human gene therapy was articulated in
Splicing Life and Recommendation 934, the moral prohibition on human genetic
enhancement was called into question. Jonathan Glover's 1984 book, What Sort of
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People Should There Be ? , was influential both for its clarity and for its prescience.
Glover argues persuasively for a "greater willingness" to consider changing human
nature. There are three methods by which we might change the genetic composition of
future generations. First, there is environmental change, which might be brought about
by such things as medical discoveries and even tax policies Second, there are eugenic
policies of the sort discussed in previous chapters These may be considered "intended"
environmental changes And third there is genetic engineering (Glover, 1984, pp 26-27)
GE is preferable to conventional eugenics both because it can have an immediate effect
that traditional breeding cannot, and because it escapes a number of moral objections
associated with conventional eugenics having to do with violations of autonomy (ibid ,
pp. 27-29)
Glover is sympathetic to the Permissive View. He agrees with proponents of the
orthodox view on gene therapy that safe germline gene therapy (human GE) for medical
purposes is morally permissible He differs from orthodox view proponents, however,
with respect to human genetic enhancement Glover seems to be motivated in part by the
vagueness of the notion of"human nature," and in part by a dissatisfaction with certain
aspects of contemporary humankind (ibid., pp 55-56)
The idea of"human nature" is a vague one, whose boundaries are not easy to
draw And, given our history, the idea that we must preserve all the
characteristics that are natural to us is not obvious without argument. Some deep
changes in human nature may only be possible if we do accept genetic
engineering It is true that our nature is not determined entirely by our genes, but
they do set limits to the sort of people we can be.. Given the risks that positive
genetic engineering is likely to involve, many people will think that we should
reject it, even if that means putting up with human nature as it is And many
others will think that, quite apart from risks and dangers, we ought not to tamper
with our nature. I have some sympathy with the first view.. It is less easy to
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sympathize with opposition to the principle of changing our nature. Preserving
the human race as it is will seem an acceptable option to all those who can watch
the news on television and feel satisfied with the world. It will appeal to those
who can talk to their children about the history of the twentieth century without
wishing they could leave some things out. When, in the rest of this book, the case
for and against various changes is considered, the fact that they are changes will
be treated as no objection at all.
It is interesting to note that Glover seems to have in mind changes that, however
substantial, would leave us human persons. Despite his misgivings about vagueness, he
clearly thinks that it is not meaningless to speak of human nature. He speaks of"deep
changes in human nature" and the "sort of people we can be." The title of his book, from
which the passage quoted above was taken is What Sort Of People Should There Be? Of
course, this is just suggestive, and it is not clear from this account what Glover would
think of the sort of radical changes that we are interested in - i.e., changes so radical that
the resultant would uncontroversially be considered non-human.
In addition to the sort of"moral enhancement" (Walters & Palmer, 1997, p. 126)
alluded to in the passage quoted above, Glover envisions the possibility of intellectual
enhancement. There may be certain concepts that are simply beyond the powers of
comprehension of humans today As Glover puts it, quoting British biologist JBS
Haldane, "the universe may be 'not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we
can suppose'.

Just as calculus is too much for a dog's brain to grasp, so some parts of

physics might turn out to be too difficult for us as we are" (1984, p. 180). If our
intellectual capacities can be (safely) expanded through genetic engineering, Glover sees
no reason why we should not do so.
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Glover, in the following example, suggests that foreignness relative to present-day
humanness is ethically irrelevant We are asked to imagine that we wanted to genetically
engineer a "half-human slave species" that would be useful to society (ibid., pp. 39-41).
This semi-human species would perform society's menial or physically demanding labor,
and do so quite contentedly. An initial reaction might be that it is wrong to create
"contented mental defectives" rather than normal humans. But, Glover asks, is it more
accurate to classify these beings as defective humans or, say, "super-cows" (ibid , p. 39)?
The answer is not obvious. If one were (arbitrarily) to classify the half-human species as
super-cows, then it seems that one would tend to think of the genetic alteration as a
benefit to cows, rather than, as in the other case, a harm to humans.
There is something paradoxical about this example Normally we would consider
deviations from humanness in the direction of subnormal functioning as ethically
regrettable. Let us imagine that a mad scientist were able to genetically engineer
offspring - derived from human and non-human (say, bovine) genetic material - with a
range of mental disabilities, from mild to severe. Increasing levels of disability would be
achieved by increasing the ratio of non-human to human genes. It goes without saying
that, as we move along the continuum from normal to increasingly diminished
functioning, we feel an increasing sense of regret, just as we find more severe cases of
mental retardation more regrettable than less severe cases. Glover's example seems to
suggest, however, that such outcomes are only regrettable if the offspring are human. We
might reach a point on our scale of hybridization and disability at which we no longer
would classify the offspring as human; we would classify it as a cow. And at that point,

'
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the hybrid offspring might be functionally superior to cows. Thus, although we have
continued along the scale of increasing disability and associated ethical regret, all of a
sudden with the change in biological classification, the outcome is no longer regrettable!
Glover suggests that our moral reaction in this case might simply be hostility to
the blurring of our system of classification If so, then we might dismiss it as a
"revulsion against anomalies," similar to revulsion against miscegenation (ibid., p. 40)
That is, biological humanness should be irrelevant to our ethical regardfor others just as
race is irrelevant. Glover's "supercow" example is complicated by the question of
whether, in creating the half-human slave species, our mad scientist has harmed that
future individual. We now see that the question is not quite as straightforward as we
seem to assume in our labeling the inadvertent creation of monstrous subhumans
"irreversible harms" (see Chapter 3) And we have not yet even raised afurther
complication, namely, the difficulty in saying that we have harmed a subhuman creature
by bringing it into existence it owes its very life (with which it is contented) to our act.
A full discussion of the potential ethical significance of biological classifications
and the moral consideration of future persons is beyond the scope of the present work
The issue at hand is human genetic enhancement, or alterations in the "superhuman"
direction rather than the subhuman - and with that we avoid at least the harm-related
complications of the subhuman cases. However, Glover's implication that humanness, in
a narrow biological sense, should have no bearing on our moral regard for others is
relevant to the issue of radical human genetic enhancement. The Restrictive View
advocate claims that even if we improve on humankind, it would be regrettable if we lose
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humanness. Humanness has a deep ethical significance that race does not Hence, a
revulsion against an anomalous human hybrid is not analogous to a revulsion against
miscegenation
Glover takes seriously the possibility of risk - i e, of making an irreversible
genetic mistake - but argues that this justifies a "principle of caution" and not a ban on
human genetic enhancement (ibid , p. 42) As noted previously, he advocates a "mixed
system" of parental initiative in genetic decisions limited by a centralized veto power
(ibid, p. 51 ).
Walters and Palmer are generally sympathetic to the Permissive View as well
While distancing themselves from the ill-fated eugenic goals of the past ("we do not have
in mind .. a perfect society or ideal human beings" (I 997, p 132)), they "are open to
gradual improvements, appropriately distributed, in [some] human characteristics" (ibid,
p 132) Walters and Palmer categorize enhancements as physical, intellectual, or moral.
Physical enhancements are further classified as health-related or non-health-related
Those enhancements that are seen as relatively unproblematic are the health-related
physical enhancements (e g., a bolstered immune system), and intellectual enhancements
that bring children from subnormal to normal functioning (Both of these would be
considered "treatment" gene therapy according to our distinction between treatment and
enhancement - see Chapter 2 ) The other kinds of enhancement are viewed as more
problen;atic - but not intrinsically objectionable Walters and Palmer have two concerns.
The frst is "what might be called a new form of child abuse," i.e., parental decisions
about the genetic engineering of future children that are not in the best interests of those
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children (ibid., pp. 131-132) This concern, though, could be addressed by some form of
regulation, such as Glover's proposed centralized veto power (above) The second
concern is over equitable access to genetic enhancement - an ethical issue that is not
unique to human GE. But the main point, for our purposes, is that human genetic
enhancement is not viewed as inherently wrong.
A third proponent of human genetic enhancement is philosopher John Harris.
Like Glover, Harris does not take the simple fact that human genetic enhancement may
change human nature to be a sustainable ethical objection In his book Wonderwoman
and Superman ( 1992) he argues that it is clearly fallacious for us to reason that human
nature just is the nature that contemporary humans possess
The fallacy here, and for once it is proper to talk of something as hard and
concrete as a fallacy, is that human nature is constituted by its complete
description at a particular moment in time In other words that human nature just
is the nature of the humans now existing Human nature is changing and evolving
constantly and we are very different from our ancestors. Our descendants, if the
species survives, will differ from us in ways it would be hard to predict. We have
changed and can still change radically and still be human (p 171; emphasis
added)
Harris's view - that we can change radically and remain human - seems to be based on
the fact that we have changed radically over evolutionary time. But the former statement
only follows from the latter if it is true that our very distant ancestors were human And
by any account, our very distant ancestors were not human (The point, after all, of the
theory of evolution is that humans evolved from non-humans - from apes )
Perhaps Harris, in referring to our evolutionary origins, has in mind a time in the
not-so-distant past, when humans were very different from their contemporary
counterparts, but were still human. And perhaps in referring to "radical" change, Harris
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has in mind changes that would make our descendants strikingly different from
contemporary humans, but still human. If this is what Harris has in mind then one might
grant him his point. But then, of course, one will also want to know what to think of our

more distant ancestors and descendants - i.e., our ape ancestors, and our non-human
descendants. When one has these evolutionary ancestors and descendants in mind, then a
revision to Harris's conclusion is called for We have changed and can still change to
such a degree that "we" (i.e., our descendants) are no longer human.
Harris is not alone in being imprecise on this point. His comments are
reminiscent of Glover's (above) Walters and Palmer also continue to use the word
"human" in reference to our genetically-enhanced descendants (1997, p 133):
While there are historical and evolutionary reasons for human nature's being as it
is, we do not view the human race as being fated to accept the current state of
affairs. Rather we accept the possibility of change in human nature and have tried
to argue for the ethical acceptability of certain kinds of planned changes in the
characteristics of future human beings In our view, such genetic enhancements
are an important part of the overall task of attempting to provide a better life and a
better world to our descendants.
The explanation for the continued use of"human" may simply be that indicated above namely, that the authors are envisioning a relatively close technological horizon, before
which (safe) wholesale changes to humankind are feasible
Silver, however, recognizes this potential for loss of humanness explicitly in his
futuristic scenario, in which the (unenhanced) "Naturals" are one still-human species, and
the GenRich clans are several distinct no-longer-human species (1997, pp. 240-249)
Even with this explicit recognition, he does not view changes in human nature - even to

the point of a loss of humanness - as morally significant in themselves. Our attempts to
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make human life sacred have been misguided What we have taken to be sacred about
human beings has, Silver argues, dwindled over time Few insist that the entire human
body is sacred (an exception may be certain Christian Scientists). Some insist that the
cell nucleus is sacred. Silver has in mind here those who f nd JVF with microinjection of
sperm morally acceptable as a treatment for infertility but would reject human GE But
now for many even the genes are not considered morally inviolable, given the increasing
acceptance of the prospect of treatment germline gene therapy. Thus, human sacredness
ultimately seems to have vanished. "This frightening notion compels some people to
draw a final line .. around the genetic material" (ibid , pp. 234-235).
But it is flawed reasoning that leads us along this progression from body to DNA
in search of the "essence of human life " The flaw is centered on the ambiguity in the
term "life!' The two relevant meanings of"life" (so to speak) are what Silver calls "lifein-general" and "life in a special sense" (ibid., pp. 18-23) By "life-in-general," Silver
just means biological life, characterized by such things as ability to use energy,
reproduce, and evolve. Both humans and bacteria have life in this sense. By"life in a
special sense" Silver means conscious life, which requires an"ability to feel and express
a range of genuine human emotions and, most important, their attainment of the uniquely
human condition of reflective self-awareness" (ibid , p. 22). The essence of human life is
not to be found in biological life, Silver claims, but rather in conscious life (ibid , pp.
235-236) And controlling the essence of human life should not be morally off-limits
Why not seize this power? Why not control what has been left to chance in the
past? Indeed, we control all other aspects of our children's lives and identities
through powerful social and environmental influences and, in some cases, with
the use of powerful drugs like Ritalin or Prozac. On what basis can we reject
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positive genetic influences on a person's essence when we accept the rights of
parents to benefit their children in every other way? (ibid., p. 236)
Thus, there appears to be agreement among most commentators that human
genetic enhancement has the potential to change human nature. Our motivating intuition
for the Restrictive View was that such changes would be, in themselves, ethically
regrettable. This intuition has now been more forcefully challenged, leaving us to
wonder, is loss of humanness really ethically important?

A More Plausible View?: Moral Importance Attaches to Psychological Personhood,
Not Humanness

Perhaps we have been making too much of humanness in suggesting that some
deep ethical significance attaches to it. In practice, it seems that we attribute moral
standing to individuals who possess certain mental or psychological characteristics On a
very basic level, creatures capable of feeling pain are, in virtue of that capacity, taken to
be worthy of a basic moral consideration namely, they should not be made to suffer
unless there is a compelling ethical justification for doing so And if there is such a
justification, harm should be minimized. The capacity for feeling pain is, of course,
dependent on an organism having a certain neurological constitution.
More neurologically advanced organisms have more sophisticated mental and
psychological capacities Examples are the capacity for memory, emotions, rational
thought, and self-awareness According to a common philosophical view, it is the
possession of psychological capacities such as these that determines whether or not an
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organism is a person A person, according to Locke, is "that conscious thinking thing .
which is sensible or conscious ofpleasure and pain, capable ofhappiness or misery, and
so is concerned for itselfas far as that consciousness extends" (Locke, 1856, p. 214).
There is disagreement about exactly which psychological capacities are essential for
personhood, although (following Locke) rationality and self-consciousness seem to be
held in particularly high regard (Harris, 1985, p. 15).
Our ethical treatment ofone another is in many ways consistent with this
psychological view ofpersonhood Thus, we terminate the lives ofthe irreversibly
comatose (or "brain-dead") and anencephalic babies. Those without neurological (and
hence psychological) activity and no possibility ofsuch activity in the future are, in
effect, absent. They are non-persons - bodies without minds - and as such are not
entitled to the usual moral respect that human persons receive. More precisely, we judge
that there is no one there to be entitled to moral respect or anything else
Ifpersons are essentially psychological, then biological humanness (membership
in the species Homo sapiens) is not, in principle, a necessary condition for personhood
Thus, on a generous interpretation of"person," one might argue that other non-human
organisms (chimpanzees or dolphins, for instance) are persons. Similarly, one can
imagine a day when, thanks to phenomenal advances in the f eld ofartificial intelligence,
robots are produced that are self-aware, and capable ofrational thought and memory. It
is ofcourse a matter ofsheer speculation as to whether such advances are possible But
the relevant point here is that, ifsuch intelligent robots were created, they would be
morally significant persons according to the psychological view Thus, it is a contingent
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fact that persons (morally significant beings) are embodied in human form and exhibit
other species-typical characteristics. We can imagine other possibilities and in those
cases placing human persons on a higher plane than non-human persons would require
justification, the basis or even possibility ofwhich is not obvious.
Silver's GenRich super-beings would be persons as well. And ifit is personhood,
and not biological humanness, to which ethical importance attaches, then the fact that the
GenRich are non-human (non-Homo sapiens) - according to this view - is irrelevant to
their moral standing

GE-Accelerated Evolution

Yet our intuitive misgivings about the GenRich persists, and they depend notjust
on the degree offoreignness, or loss ofbiological humanness, ofthe GenRich. They also
depend on the time interval over which our GE-accelerated evolution has occurred.
Imagine that, through human GE, we create over the course ofthe next year (rather than
over several centuries, in Silver's version) a GenRich organism And let's assume that
this organism (call it "GenRich-A") is exactly the same kind oforganism as that which
would have evolved from Homo sapiens naturally (i.e., without technological
intervention through GE) over the course ofthe next, say, 100,000 years. GenRich-A is
non-human, meaning (roughly) that the difference between GenRich-A's appearance and
behavior and that ofcontemporary Homo sapiens is at least as great as the difference
between contemporary Homo sapiens and chimpanzees. In addition, GenRich-A cannot
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interbreed with contemporary humans Finally let us stipulate that GenRich-A possesses
all of the psychological capacities that are definitive for personhood, and possesses them
at least to the same degree that contemporary humans do.
What can we say of the ethical ramifications of creating GenRich-A, of its
appearance on such short notice? If GenRich-A had appeared I 00,000 years hence, the
product of"natural" evolution, its appearance on the planet would, in itself, have no
ethical implications whatsoever. Can we plausibly say, then, that GenRich-A's
appearance next year, in itse(f, has ethical implications? According to the psychological
view, the appropriate response would seem to be that only (psychological) personhood
matters. And since GenRich-A is a person, there can be nothing inherently objectionable
in its creation. It is incumbent upon us to get over our "revulsion against anomalies" and
see non-human persons for the persons they are. Yet we feel a sense of moral alarm
about the appearance of the non-human GenRich-A next year that we do not feel about
the appearance of GenRich-A J 00,000 years from now. And whether or not that moral
alarm is merely a revulsion against its anomalous nature or a revulsion defensible in
ethical terms remains an open question.
Suppose that at roughly the same time that GenRich-A was created, it was
discovered that whales are possessed of even greater intelligence than anyone had
suspected. Suppose that, among other scientific revelations, we managed to decipher
whale language and found that their communications provided unequivocal evidence that
whales have all of the psychological characteristics that we take to be indicative of
personhood Their psychological life, we find, rivals our own in terms of the level of
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intellectual and emotional sophistication Ifwe imagine whales to be as we have just
described, we would want to say two things about them First, we would' say that they are
persons in some full sense ofthe word That is, whales would be on a par with humans,
as opposed to dogs or chimps or other non-human animals that (as far as we can tell) only
marginally meet our psychological criteria for personhood Second, whales, in virtue of
their (full) personhood, must now be recognized by humans as moral peers, i.e., as
creatures ofapproximately equal moral significance So the fact that whales are non
human (non-Homo sapiens) is irrelevant to their moral standing; and the fact that humans
are human (Homo sapiens) is irrelevant to their moral standing. More simply, species
membership is irrelevant to the moral standing ofany creature. Again, only personhood
matters, ethically speaking. Getting back to GenRich-A's accelerated appearance it
seems that, just as with the whales, A (and all A-like creatures) must now be recognized
by humans as creatures ofroughly equal moral importance.

The Moral Standing of Human "Non-Persons"

We have been discussing a view that holds that we are morally important in virtue
ofour personhood (understood in psychological terms) and not in virtue ofour
humanness. The argument against the importance of"human being" looks like this
(Diamond, 1991, p. 35) a) We are morally important in virtue ofcertain properties we
possess b) The properties tied to our biological classification as human beings are not all
morally relevant c) Properties that are morally relevant are such things as self-
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consciousness, capacity for reasoning, etc d) Anything that has such properties is
morally important. e) "And so it would be better to use a word like 'person' to mean a
being that has these properties, to bring out the fact that not all human beings have them
and that non-human beings conceivably might have them."
What, then, are we to make of human beings that lack the psychological
capacities that are taken to be definitive of persons? When one thinks of the kinds of
things that might arguably be considered human non-persons one thinks, for example, of
the irreversibly comatose, the profoundly retarded, and fetuses Clearly most people
attach some, and often great, moral importance to individuals in each of these three
categories
Since one's status as a person (on this view) depends on the possession of certain
psychological capacities, and since those capacities can be present in different individuals
in varying degrees, it seems natural to conclude that there must be varying degrees of
personhood (Perring, for one, has so argued (1997).) One might infer from this that
there are corresponding degrees of moral standing. Persons of high intelligence would be
of greater moral standing, while intellectually disabled persons would be of lesser moral
standing (Edwards, 1997) Even if one rejects the idea of a continuum and insists that
personhood is a threshold concept, it seems that certain non-human animals (dogs, say)
have more to commend them, mentally speaking, than do humans at the end stages of
Alzheimer's disease.
Most would find such an assessment of the intellectually disabled offensive And
we can point to many examples of our treatment of the intellectually disabled that belie
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the claim that they are of lesser moral status - as when a beloved family member is
lovingly and respectfully cared for well past the onset of an all-encompassing dementia.
On the other hand, however, there is evidence in support of this claim. Consider, for
example, our moral consideration of a fetus or neonate born with Down syndrome. A
prenatal diagnosis with Down syndrome is considered sufficient justification for
terminating a pregnancy And until the early 1980s, a diagnosis of Down syndrome or
similar mental disability was used to justify withholding nourishment leading to death by
starvation (ibid , pp. 31-33) In the case of a normal fetus or infant, such options would
be considered unthinkable While some severely disabled adults are placed in institutions
by loving families who visit regularly and generally look after their interests, many are
abandoned in squalid institutions or poorly regulated homes by persons who would not
dream of treating a physically ill family member in such a fashion
Whether there are plausible justifications for the differential treatment of the
intellectually disabled that do not imply a lesser moral status is a matter that will not be
debated further here. For our purposes, it is enough to note that a) some human beings do
not seem to qualify as persons, and b) the psychological view of personhood implies that
(human) non-persons are not intrinsically morally important.
What, if anything, could justify our belief that these human non-persons are
intrinsically morally important? One attempt to shed light on this question has been
made by Ronald Dworkin, whose views on the abortion debate and the "sacredness" of
human life provide a good starting point.
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Dworkin's "Sacredness"

Dworkin, in his book about abortion (1993, pp 68-101), has argued that the views
of advocates on both sides of the political issue are flawed They are flawed for two
reasons. First, the arguments are based on the claimed existence or non-existence of
rights. But it makes no sense to assign rights to beings that cannot be said to have
interests, and this is the case with (at least early stage) fetuses (We will not pursue these
arguments here.) Second, these rights-based arguments are inconsistent with the stated
beliefs of the very people making those arguments According to Dworkin, what people
truly believe - i.e., what gives an internally consistent account of their positions - is that

human life, including fetal life, is intrinsically valuable. The political disagreements arise
from a conflict between two different kinds of intrinsic value. Dworkin posits a secular
kind of sacredness, or moral inviolability, as the basis for a better, internally consistent
explanation of the body of views on abortion
Dworkin believes that views on abortion are internally inconsistent. Opponents of
abortion claim that the fetus has the same right to life as (non-fetal) human persons do
However, most abortion opponents are willing to make exceptions in cases of rape or
incest This entails that they are willing to kill an innocent person (or at least a living
human being with a right-to-life equal to adult human persons) in order to spare the
pregnant woman a harm that, while substantial, is clearly less severe than loss of lif
Abortion proponents claim that the fetus (or at least the early fetus) is not a person
(or rights-bearing entity) and therefore has no right to Iife But most feel a sense of regret
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that increases in direct proportion to the stage offetal development even at fetal stages
prior to viability or sentience - the stages normally taken as the earliest possible for
personhood or the possession of interests and rights This entails that there is something
other than personhood that is morally significant
This collection of views, according to Dworkin, leads to the following
foundational premise: "It is intrinsically regrettable when [even embryonic] human life,
once begun, ends prematurely" (ibid , p 69; emphasis in original). That is, human life is
intrinsically valuable, or valuable independent of any usefulness or desirability to people.
Intrinsic value is contrasted with instrumental value (dependent on usefulness) and
subjective or personal value (dependent on people's desires). The example of a
Rembrandt painting is given to illustrate the concept of intrinsic value: "We say that we
want to look at one of Rembrandt's self-portraits because it is wonderful, not that it is
wonderful because we want to look at it" (ibid , p 72).
The objection might be raised lf human life is intrinsically valuable, then why do
we not believe that more human life is necessarily better? Dworkin claims, in response
that there are two categories of intrinsic value (ibid., p. 70) Things may possess
incremental (intrinsic) value. The more of such things there are, the better. Or things
may possess sacred (or inviolable) value. These things are intrinsically, but not
incrementally, valuable
We believe that human lives are intrinsically valuable: We view death as a loss
even when we attach no instrumental or subjective value to the deceased. So, of the two
types of intrinsic value introduced above, what kind is attached to human life? Dworkin
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claims that human life is sacred or inviolable, not incrementally intrinsical)y valuable.
"[T)he sacred is intrinsically valuable because - and therefore only once - it exists"
(ibid., pp. 73-74)
A thing may become sacred in two ways - first, by association or designation; and
second, through history or genesis (ibid , pp 74-75) An example of something
possessing associational sacredness is the American flag (Dworkin considered this
relatively unimportant) Examples of things held to possess the second type of
sacredness - which I will call developmental rather than historical or genetical8 - are
great paintings, and animal species
Since humans are an animal species, humans possess developmental sacredness.
They are sacred in virtue of their genesis, or the creative process of their development
But their development is, according to Dworkin, of two morally significant types. To
refer to the first of these, Dworkin uses the terms "natural,. sacredness, or the "natural
investment" inherent in humans Humans possess natural (developmental) sacredness in
virtue of the creative process of human embryonic, fetal (and later) development. Human
persons are also sacred in virtue of the creative process of their life in society - the hopes,
aspirations and life projects that they have, etc. Thus, the second of the two types of
developmental sacredness possessed by humans is what Dworkin calls "human"
sacredness, or the "human investment."

8Dworkin's terms may have confusing connotations here: "Hisiorical sacredness" might be taken to mean
"held sacred at some point in the past." "Genetical sacredness" - given the emphasis o� molec�ar
biology and genetics elsewhere in this paper might be taken to mean "sacredness associated with the
genes."
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A recapitulation ofDworkin's categorization of values looks like this
Three types of value
I) instrumental
2) subjective (or personal)
3) intrinsic
Two types of intrinsic value
I) incremental
2) sacred (non-incremental)
Two types of sacredness
I) associational
2) developmental
Two types of developmental sacredness (of humans):
I) natural
2) human
Thus, we will use the shorthand terms "natural sacredness" and "human sacredness" to
refer, respectively, to natural, developmental, non-incremental, intrinsic value; and
human, developmental, non-incremental, intrinsic value
We take the abortion of fetuses to be more problematic the older the fetus is
Likewise, most believe it is a greater tragedy when an 8-year-old dies when compared
with the death of a newborn (ibid., pp. 86-87) "Most people's sense of that tragedy, if it
were [graphed], would slope upward from birth to some point in late childhood or early
adolescence, then follow a flat line until at least very early middle age, and then slope
down again toward extreme old age" (ibid., p 87). The simple loss-of-life view

the

view that the tragedy is greater if the number of expected life-years lost is greater - fails
because it focuses only on the future, and ignores past investments, plans for the future,
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expectations, etc It is these past things that make it more tragic to lose a 8-year-old than
an infant. The 8-year-old has a greater human investment.
Dworkin uses the term "frustration" to "describe this more complex measure of
the waste of life [that refers to a] combination of past and future considerations that
figure in our assessment of tragic death" (ibid , p 88) The frustration-of-life view better
fts our views about tragic death than does the simple loss-of-life view Abortion is
worse later in pregnancy because a greater natural investment has been wasted.
So Dworkin's dichotomy

natural sacredness inherent in the biological creation

and "human" sacredness inherent in the creative endeavors of the human person provides a view of what is sacred, or of intrinsic value to humans. Does this
interpretation of the intrinsic value of human beings accomplish what we need it to
accomplish?
With respect to providing a basis for the moral standing of human "non-persons,"
Dworkin' s conception of sacredness arguably fares better than the unadorned
psychological view of personhood. Dworkin's "human" sacredness obviously requires
that its possessor have certain minimal psychological capacities (or roughly, requires
personhood), since a non-person simply is not capable of having future plans, life
projects, deep commitments, and so on. However, natural sacredness inheres in the
biological creation - the organism. Thus, natural sacredness might serve as a basis for
elevating the lower moral status that intellectually disabled persons are claimed to hold.
Whether this elevation is sufficient is another matter. ls the natural investment of
humans greater than that of other mammals whose biological "creation" rivals the
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sophistication of our own? It is not clear why human biological creation should be held
in higher regard than the biological creation of dogs or horses. And if the natural
sacredness of dogs, horses and humans are more or less comparable, then critics might be
expected to find Dworkin 's natural sacredness an inadequate foundation for the moral
status of human non-persons
That this lack of a clear connection between "sacredness" (or intrinsic human
value) and humanness is problematic can be seen also when we assess whether
Dworkin's sacredness has provided grounds for objecting to human genetic enhancement
We want to know, does human genetic enhancement violate (either type of) Dworkinian
sacredness?

The answer at first glance appears to be no. By stipulating that the alterations are
enhancements, it seems that natural or human investments would, if anything, be greater
in enhanced individuals as compar�d with unenhanced, all else being equal.
Here again it is hard to know how far Dworkin would have us go. Is it crucial to
natural sacredness that the natural or biological creative investment is human (i e., of the
species Homo sapiens)? And is it crucial to "human" sacredness that the creative
investment embodied in our projects and deep commitments has to do with our human
personhood? These notions of sacredness conceptualized as creative investments do not
seem to depend on the preservation of biological humanness. The intrinsic value seems

to reside in the creation or the creative act If that is the case, then - as just noted - other
biologically complicated mammals (e.g., apes and dogs) would possess natural
sacredness in much the same way that humans do. And genetically engineered, human-
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derived creatures of the future - in virtue of their creative projects and commitments would possess "human" sacredness in much the same way that contemporary humans do
So it seems that neither (biological) humanness nor human-personhood is
necessary for the possession of sacredness of the sorts that Dworkin postulates. Thus, we
have no ground yet for finding the genetic enhancement of humans to be morally
impermissible.

The point of introducing Dworkin' s theory, in spite of the fact that it is not
obviously useful in arguing against radical genetic enhancement, is that it illustrates that,
as suspected, humanness will have to be central in any notion of sacredness that is to be
employed in arguing for the Restrictive View. Can we find a ground for sacredness that

has a central role for some notion of humanness, such that even apparent improvements
over contemporary humankind would be ethically regrettable ?

Human Beings, Not Essentially Psychological Persons, Are of Fundamental Ethical
Importance

In our discussion to this point there has been a tacit separation of considerations
of the mind from considerations of the body. Personhood is largely or entirely associated
with the mind, and humanness with the body. Thus, we take it as uncontroversially true
that (human-derived) embryos and early fetuses, anencephalic babies, the irreversibly
comatose ("brain-dead"), corpses, and the profoundly intellectually disabled all are
human. And our differential treatment of these human "non-persons" indicates that they
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have either little or no moral standing relative to human persons. Our sacredness - our
intrinsic moral value - depends on the mind; the body is unimportant.
Humanness, as commonly conceived, is essentially a matter of biological
classification

species membership We are one kind of animal among many, each

representing a particular branch on the evolutionary tree, some kinds having evolved
from others The fact that human animals came into existence at all had to do with
innumerable quirks of evolutionary fate. The claim that human animals (assuming they
avoid extinction) will evolve into something else - a non-human species - is widely
accepted. This solely biological conception of humanness seems like an extremely poor
foundation on which to build arguments in favor of"human" sacredness
Some philosophers, however, have argued for the central moral importance of the
human being, and have meant by that term something distinct from "member of the
species Homo sapiens," or "person" according to some psychological criteria of
personhood The mind-body dichotomy plays no part in this conception of human being
In fact, this dichotomy interferes with our proper moral regard for others
In the next chapter, we shall see what this conception of humanness looks like and
see also whether it provides a sufficiently strong basis for the Restrictive View. As noted
earlier, in order to provide that strong foundation, several things must be accomplished
First, a plausible notion of morally signif cant "humanness" must be described. Second,
it must be shown that radical human genetic enhancement violates that "humanness."
And third, it must be shown that such a violation is morally regrettable. In light of our
discussion of the GenRich-A, we may now add an additional requirement We must
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account for the fact that our moral objection to the appearance of the GenRich depends
on the suddenness of their appearance

CHAPTER FIVE: HUMAN BEING-NESS AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE
RESTRICTIVE VIEW
The current policy on human gene therapy is shaped in large part by ethical
considerations A number of ethical objections have been made (per Chapter 3), and on
the collective strength of these objections some types of human gene therapy are
restricted. First, germline gene therapy (or human genetic engineering) is not permitted;
and second, enhancement gene therapy (whether in germ or somatic cells) is not
permitted As argued above, the objections commonly raised against human gene therapy
are either time-bound or cannot be expected to justify a restrictive policy in the long term.
In particular, it is expected that human GE will become acceptably safe (per Chapter 2)
And since safety is the primary reason for restricting germline genetic interventions in
humans, we may expect that the prohibition against human GE will be relaxed in the nottoo-distant future The prohibition against human genetic enhancement also seems to rest
on rather shaky ethical foundations. Thus, again in the long term, we may expect an
incremental expansion of the range of germline genetic interventions considered ethically
acceptable - starting with treatment and moving eventually to enhancement.
The moral line between treatment and enhancement seems to be drawn in the
wrong place. Yet there remains a sense that some moral line should be drawn. Even if
one considers only genetic enhancements, or improvements, radical deviations that
threaten humanness seem morally problematic. That is, a Permissive View on human GE
- declaring even radical human genetic enhancement morally permissible - strikes us as
implausible A Restrictive View - claiming that radical human genetic enhancement is
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not morally permissible - seems more plausible (per Chapter 4) Yet it has proven
difficult to say what ofmoral significance, if anything, would be violated in such cases.
The Restrictive View seems to need grounding in some notion of intrinsic value or
"sacredness" that is associated with humanness, although we have yet to find an aspect
of, or conception of, morally significant humanness that might be jeopardized by radical
genetic enhancement
In our pre-philosophical reflections, we are inclined to think that both biological
humanness and psychological personhood are morally significant in some deep sense.
But it has proved difficult to defend the view that human sacredness inheres either in
biological humanness or in psychological personhood. Is there a view of morally
significant humanness - or sacredness - that preserves this pre-philosophical intuition
which has motivated the Restrictive View; that is potentially jeopardized by radical
genetic enhancement; and that avoids the shortcomings of the other attempts to ground
sacredness ?
In the present chapter we will consider a view, drawn from the philosophy of
Wittgenstein, that attempts to meet these desiderata That view, as articulated by
Cockburn9 with insight from Cora Diamond on the role of"imaginative understanding"
of others, suggests that human sacredness is a property human beings have in virtue of
their membership in a network of morally significant relationships - membership in a
moral community Cockburn argues that it is "the tangible persisting human being - a
being with a distinctive bodily form and having its own distinctive kind ofvalue" - that is
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morally significant (p x) It is towards this tangible human being (and not disembodied
or essentially psychological persons) that we have instantaneous responses, or attitudes,
that are of central ethical importance It will be argued that the human being-centered
view accommodates our sense that human sacredness is grounded in biology and our
sense that it is grounded in psychology. Moreover, it appears that human being-ness
could potentially be jeopardized by certain genetic enhancements, and thus might serve
as a guide in our re-drawing the moral line between problematic and unproblematic
human GE Finally, it accounts for our sense of an extended moral community centered
on human beings yet with the potential for being extended to include a broader range of
others.

"Attitudes" Are Fundamental

Cockburn holds that what a person is "cannot be separated from those attitudes
which are expressive of a recognition that an individual is a person" (p ix) IO Now
"attitude" here has a special meaning Wittgenstein used the term to refer to the
instantaneous feelings and responses we have towards one another, responses that are not
the result of conscious deliberation. As an example, think of the anguish a mother feels
in observing her child in pain. She responds instantaneously and with deep feeling The
response is non-rational, in the sense that there is no quick assessment of the facts of the
9 we shall rely on Cockburn's Other Human Beings (1990) for an articulation of this view. All page
references in this section are to this work unless otherwise noted.
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matter followed by a conclusion that the appropriate moral response in these
circumstances is anguish The instantaneous moral recognition of other is seen in other
situations as well, such as when the same mother observes her child joyfully playing and
responds instantaneously - viscerally, one might say. To say that she is pleased because
she infers from her son's behavior that he is enjoying himself - that she is glad about the
evidently good state of affairs - gives an incomplete account And what she feels in
response to her son suffering, say, a cut finger, cannot be completely accounted for by the
expected bad consequences (p. 4).
Cockburn (p 6) quotes Wittgenstein "My attitude towards him is an attitude
towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul" Wittgenstein is not using
"soul" in a theological sense. He is referring to the core of the individual human being.
The idea here is that "attitudes towards" rather than "beliefs about" others should be
central or fundamental to our ethical thought (p. 7). My moral responses to another do
not follow from a rational deduction that includes an appraisal of evidence of the other's
personhood In other words, "Wittgenstein seems ... to reject the view that the attitude
which we have towards another rests on something else: our grasp of the kind of being
that the other is" (p. 9).
How could it be that attitudes are fundamental in this way? After all, it seems that
there must be some justification, based on some intrinsic features of the individual, for
our moral attitudes towards others lf we have, on the one hand, chickens being gathered
for the slaughter, and on the other hand, human beings being gathered for the slaughter,
10 In Cockburn's usage, "person" implies moral importance, not the possession of certain psychological
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we respond differently to each case And when asked why we are so strenuously trying
to intervene to save the one sort of creature and not the other, our explanation would no
doubt include the distinction that the human animals are more than the non-human
animals. They are persons and therefore are worthy of special moral consideration And
when asked further how we know that the human animals are persons (and chickens are
not), we would most likely recite some version of the now-familiar list of psychological
capacities that define personhood Isn't it the recognition that the object or individual in
question is a person that leads to our responsive attitudes towards others ?

Appealing to P:sychologica/ Persons Does Not Justify Our Moral Treatment of Others

We are looking for an explanation of what makes someone worthy of moral
consideration. What leads us to the ethical attitudes, or moral regard, we have towards
others? What justification do we have for treating others in the way we usually do, as
opposed to, e g, using others as means to our ends?
The special justification given by the advocate of the psychological view of
personhood is that there is present in others an imperceptible, essentially psychological
person. Cockburn offers two challenges. First he challenges the idea that we even need a
special justification for our (Wittgensteinian) attitudes towards - our usual moral
treatment of - others. To say that we need a special justification for our usual treatment
of others is to imply that some other attitude is the norm. "What, then, is the norm? Are
we to say that things in the world are to be used in our attempts to achieve our ends

capacities.
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unless reason is given, in particular cases, for thinking otherwise?" (p. 15) Cockburn has
no argument against this assumption His aim is simply to expose it as an assumption
and juxtapose it with the assumption "that nothing in the world is simply a thing to be
used in our attempts to achieve our ends .. " (p 16) To the extent that we do not accept
the former assumption, we do not accept the need for special justification of our attitude
towards others
Cockburn's second challenge is that the special justif cation itself does not do the
work it claims to do We attach special significance to things that people do, or actions,
that we do not attach to things that merely happen to people. What distinguishes actions
from things that happen to us? The former require willing while the latter do not And
willing is something that a (psychological) person does According to the special
justification, since nothing in the perceived world can ground our attitudes towards
others, there must "be an occurrence in a non-extended entity without mass, solidity or
spatial location which lies behind what we actually observe" (p. 19). This essentially
psychological person can ground our attitudes
But Cockburn asks, "how does what happens in this other realm ground - provide
reason for - such responses?" (p. 19). We've gone from the question (or "mystery") of
how things in the everyday, perceived world ground our attitude toward others to how
things in the unperceived, mental world provide such a ground. It seems that we want an
explanation of willing, and for that we turn to essentially psychological persons But,
Cockburn says, we've all directly experienced willing, so how could a further attempt to
explain - by invoking psychological persons - help ( 19)? He concludes, "To leave a
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place for the special kinds of significance which we attach to what people do we must
then, at the beginning, reject the paradigm of rationality in action which led us to think
that 'a man, considered as a moral being, is not really in the world at all"' (22).
In response to Cockburn's challenges, it might be objected that appealing to
psychological persons, or minds, makes available a justification for our ethical attitudes
towards others - a justification that is not available to Cockburn's human being-centered
view. Our ethical attitudes are justified by appealing first to our own first-person
experiences (e.g., of pain), and next to the argument from analogy.
This type of justification came to prominence in the work of Rene Descartes
Descartes wanted to know how he could have certain knowledge about anything. How,
for example, could he be sure that his sense perceptions really corresponded to objects in
the real world? Was it not possible that they could be images in a dream, or images
conjured by a spiteful demon ? If that were possible - and it seemed difficult to prove
that it was not - then we have reason to doubt all of our sense perceptions. Or in the
words of Descartes, "it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it
is wiser not to trust entirely to any thing by which we have once been deceived"
(Descartes, 1993a, p. 28). In turn, we have reason to doubt virtually all of knowledge, for
when one begins to give reasons in support of the claimed truth of virtually any piece of
knowledge, the chain of reasons leads eventually and inevitably back to sense
perceptions (Purely formal knowledge, such as mathematics, is an exception.) Faced
with this all-consuming skepticism, Descartes sought something certain upon which the
foundations of knowledge might be built. The realization that Descartes comes to is that
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he cannot be deceived about his own existence. "We must come to the definite
conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I
pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it" (Descartes, 1993b, p. 194). From this
starting point, Descartes "goes on to discover that he is essentially mind and, using the
mind's understanding, concludes that he can have infallible knowledge about
psychological states" ( see Descartes, 1993b, p. 196; Pojman, 1993, p. 193).
Thus, according to Descartes, I can be sure through the immediacy of
introspection that I exist - not the body that I perceive, but the immaterial thinking
subject l But since others are not available to us through this sort of introspection, how
do we know that these perceived others are thinking subjects, or essentially psychological
persons ? How do we know that "other minds" exist ? The traditional view rests on the
argument from analogy. Mill, for example, says, "I conclude [that other minds exist]
from certain things, which my experience of my own states of feeling proves to me to be
marks of it .

I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, first,

they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the antecedent condition
offeelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which
in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings" (quoted in Pojman, 1993,
pp 455-456).
Let us return now to our original problem

i e , how we justify our

(Wittgensteinian) attitude towards others. The advocate of psychological personhood is
saying that "[t]he 'arbitrariness' of my attitude towards others is removed by showing
that it is the analogue in relations with others of the attitude which is clearly securely
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grounded in the case of my thought about myself' (Cockburn, 1990, p 3 5) Thus, for
example, when I see someone step on a nail, and then see the contorted facial expressions
and hear the screams of agony, I take this experience to be analogous to my own first
person experience of pain (Pojman, 1993, p 466)
Cockburn argues, in the same way many others have, that this special
justification, appealing to one's own first-person experience and the argument from
analogy, fails It fails because there are first-person/third-person asymmetries.
Continuing with the example of pain, Cockburn argues that my own pain is something to
be a) relieved by me, and b) feared by me. But another's pain is something to be a)
relieved by me, but b) not feared by me. This points up a flaw in the argument from
analogy. When I step on a nail there are three stages the action (stepping on the nail);
the feeling of pain; and the outward expression of pain. What we see in others are the
first and third stage, but not the second, making the analogy imperfect (Pojman, 1993, p
466) Since I do not literally feel, or have nerve-mediated sensations of, another's pain, I
do not have the visceral reaction of fear that comes with my own experience of
impending pain
Another dissimilarity between the first-person and third-person experience of pain
has to do with the importance of the human form My horror at another's pain attaches to
her bodily form (especially the expressive face and eyes). But my horror at my own pain
is unattached to my (visualized) bodily form This is true also with respect to anger
introspection of my own anger won't reveal to me what we typically find disturbing about
another's angry glare (Cockburn, 1990, pp 37-39)
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Following Wittgenstein, Cockburn argues that my own
experience
of pam
·
· does
not "show me that pain is something to be relieved and something to be feared" (p. 40).
Instead, my attitude towards my present pain "pre-empts any questions about
justification;" it "does not stand in need of justification" (p. 41 ).

The Importance of the Human Form

If we are to illuminate the notion of attitudes, we must look first to the role of the
human body or human form, for it is frequently the expressive human form that evokes
our responsive attitudes. We have already taken note of several examples. There is the
parent's anguish in response to her child's pain, and her moment of elation, her thrill that
comes in watching her young child absorbed joyfully in his play. When a child opens
presents, for instance, "the particular way in which [the parent] is moved cannot be
characterized independently of the pleasure that he takes in her manifestations of joy" (p
67). Our horror at another's pain is tied to the other's bodily form - the look of suffering
in the eyes, the contorted facial expressions, etc. The other's bodily form possesses a
richness of expression that is important in our responses to the other's states.
People who lack this responsiveness, these appropriate attitudes towards others,
have a deficit that is profoundly important This is how we should regard, taking
Cockburn's example, slave-owners who view their slaves as automata and justify their illtreatment of the slaves by saying - and, we will assume, sincerely believing - that slaves
are not the kind of thing that feels pain. For Cockburn, awakening a proper moral regard
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in the slave-owners is not (or not merely) a matter of correcting the mistaken belief about
susceptibility to pain What matters most is not that the slave-owner has incorrectly
classified the slaves; it is that he has not paid proper attention to them. It is not that since we both see the same thing and he has an inappropriate attitude - there must be an
imperceptible person to explain the discrepancy It is the extended, tangible human being
in front of him that makes him wrong - and that makes this a moral judgment (p 47)
The slave-owners do not share with us a critical part (p. 47) They are like dogs
who inexplicably react angrily only to members of a certain race They are, in a sense,
"alien" (pp. 49-50) And we should say the same of slave-owners whose sole motivation
for not inflicting pain on their slaves is that one has a moral duty not to inflict pain on
things that feel pain. Such a position is a matter of detached reasoning, and the person
who holds it need only be convinced of some flaw in his reasoning in order to consider
beating slaves morally permissible While we might wish to find the ethical behavior of
this slave-owner more commendable than that of the first, what separates the two is
nothing more than the ability to correctly ascertain the biological fact of the matter (i.e.,
that slaves feel pain) and reason logically from there. We may be grateful, given that
there are slave-owners, to have more of the second type than of the first - bringing about
less suffering is of obvious moral relevance. But it is not everything. To the extent that
we lack responsive attitudes towards others, we are incomplete and our moral sense is
alarmingly shallow.
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Thus, the extended, tangible human being with its characteristic form and range of
behaviors is returned to a central place in our ethics. "Disembodied minds" are not the
proper objects of our moral concern.

The Legacy of the Mind-Body Dichotomy

We have inherited the philosophical notions of mind and body, and they have not
served us well as a basis for our ethical thought Mind and body, Cockburn argues,
"displace the notion of the human being from its fundamental place in our ontology" (p.
55). "There is a single divide in nature which can be said to be the divide of fundamental
moral significance (A being either has a 'mind' or it does not)" (p. 56). The extended,
tangible human being, on the other hand, is "of secondary importance in our relations
with each other; the philosophical notion of a 'body' is a direct expression of this
tendency" (p. 56)
Physical contact with others, the sight of others, or their presence matters to us.
We react to the bodily form of others; we don't just regard that form as the source of
evidence about their state of being. Our reaction upon seeing another in acute pain is not
mere squeamishness or aesthetic revulsion Another's pain callsfor more than just
rational appraisal followed by appropriate moral action (removal of pain). It calls for a
sense of horror in the observer Bodily form (esp. the face) is crucial to the horror
inducing demonstration of pain. Thus, the disembodied or essentially psychological
"self' is incomplete (pp. 66-70).
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Cockburn's goal has been to "cast doubt" on the idea that it is desirable or
admirable to be the sort of person who is unmoved by suffering but efficiently goes about
removing it (p. 70) The connection between pain (joy, etc.) and the human form "goes
deep"; and the extended, tangible human being is "the only possible object [of our]
responses to others which are central to our thoughts of them as persons" (p. 73)
But Cockburn's central role for the human form meets a strong moral objection
Must we say that our appropriate "responses to persons" are (rightfully) compromised by
certain disfigurements and disabilities (pp 77-78)? Cockburn responds that "there is no
more room for the denial that something of fundamental importance is lost with physical
damage than there is for the denial that something of fundamental importance, a person,
is lost with death" (78). The character of our concern changes, but the degree ought not
(78-79). Cockburn does not elaborate on this response, which seems rather inadequate.
After all, the complaint about the psychological view of personhood was that it too easily
excluded the mentally disabled from the shared moral community. On Cockburn's view,
are we not simply excluding from the moral community persons with certain
disfigurements instead of persons with certain mental impairments ? This objection can
be accommodated by incorporating Diamond's views on the imaginative understanding
of others, which we take up in the next section.
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"Human Being" Is Not Analyzable

It has been argued that the psychological view ofpersonhood, and the remnants of
the mind-body dichotomy generally, are inadequate, and that the extended, tangible
human being should resume a place ofcentral importance. The question then arises, "in
virtue ofwhat features do you identify this as a human being?" (pp. 119-120) Cockburn
responds, "on the basis ofwhat it looks like and how it behaves" (p. 120) - but necessary
and sufficient conditions.for being a human being cannot be given.

It does not follow from being unable to state necessary and sufficient conditions
for being a human being (or person) that there are no human beings (persons) (p 108)
After all, we can't cite necessary and sufficient conditions for being a bush (as opposed to
a tree), but there are bushes. There is no reason to assume that "human being" or
"person" must be analyzable, i.e., must be able to be put into other terms without loss
The notion that a human being just is a mind and body together "is a particularly
pernicious version of this confusion" (p 109)
Any suggested defining feature ofpersonhood seems at times ludicrously
inadequate. For example, Cockburn says, "not all human beings will emerge as beings
who are not to be killed or eaten" (pp. 112-113) But all human beings will so emerge if
we look to human being-ness - rather than.features ofhuman beings - as the foundation
for our treatment ofothers. This is reminiscent ofour discussion in the previous chapter
ofhuman "non-persons" - i e , human beings who did not meet the criteria for
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personhood according to the psychological view It is reminiscent also ofCora
Diamond's critique ofcertain arguments against eating meat.
Diamond (1978) objects, not to vegetarianism, but to arguments put forth in favor
of vegetarianism by Peter Singer and other philosophers. Singer's argument is centered
on rights. We ascribe certain rights to non-rational humans (e.g., severely brain-damaged
individuals) that we do not ascribe to non-rational (non-human) animals. For example,
we do not eat non-rational humans, nor do we use them for laboratory experiments. Both
non-rational humans and animals are capable ofhaving interests since "the capacity to
have interests is essentially dependent only on the capacity for suffering and enjoyment.
This we evidently share with animals" (ibid , p 466). Diamond rejects this approach
(ibid , p. 467)
This is a totally wrong way ofbeginning the discussion, because it ignores certain
quite central facts - facts which, ifattended to, would make it clear that rights are
not what is crucial We do not eat our dead, even when they have died in
automobile accidents or been struck by lightning, and their flesh might be first
class.. Now the fact that we do not eat our dead is not a consequence - not a
direct one in any event - ofour unwillingness to kill people for food or other
purposes. It is not a direct consequence ofour unwillingness to cause distress to
people. Ofcourse it would cause distress to people to think that they might be
eaten when they were dead, but it causes distress because ofwhat it is to eat a
dead person Hence we cannot elucidate what (ifanything) is wrong - ifthat is
the word - with eating people by appealing to the distress it would cause, in the
way we can point to the distress caused by stamping on someone's toe as a reason
why we regard it as a wrong to him. Now ifwe do not eat people who are already
dead and also do not kill people for food, it is at least primafacie plausible that
our reasons in the two cases might be related, and hence must be looked into by
anyone who wants to claim that we have no good reasons for not eating people
which are not also good reasons for not eating animals.
We treat each other in certain ways - in the giving ofnames, in birth, in death, in
our sexual relationships, in the obligations we have - not out ofrecognition ofthe
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particular class of beings that we belong to, nor out of recognition of the interests we
each have (ibid , p. 469) Rather, it is all these things "that go to determine what sort of
concept 'human being' is" (ibid , p 470).
Some will nevertheless insist that human being must be analyzable. In response
to these critics, Cockburn observes "The situation is a familiar one within philosophy
While in one sense it is recognised that chains of reasons must come to an end
somewhere it is felt that the point at which we allow them to come to an end in daily life
cannot really be a satisfactory stopping place" (p. 113, citing Gass, 1957).
There is a parallel with the foundational role that the notion of duty plays in
Kant's ethics. For Kant, when one asks, why should I act morally towards others, the
only reply that can be given is, "Because it is your duty." Duty is morally basic. Thus, it
is an illegitimate question to ask why one should do one's duty Similarly, on the human
being-centered view, when one asks why we should act morally towards others, the only
possible reply is, "Because she is a human being." Human being-ness is morally basic:
No further justification is required nor can one be given
On the one hand, then, we have the view that unanalyzable human being-ness is
morally fundamental, where human being-ness cannot be reduced to other terms without
loss On the other hand, we have the view that essentially psychological personhood is
morally fundamental, where personhood can - in principle at least - be reduced to other
terms. What are the implications of each view for the kinds of commitments we have to
one another?
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Commitments and Personal Identity

The psychological view, Cockburn argues, has unsavory implications for our
commitments to one another. The psychological view holds that personal identity is
preserved as long as psychological continuity is preserved. Thus, the Jane that I saw at
lunch yesterday is the same Jane that I saw at lunch today if and only if the two Janes in
question are psychologically continuous. Or more precisely, person Pl at time ti is the
same as P2 at t2 if and only if P2t2 is psychologically continuous with P It I. There is no
consensus on what is meant by "psychological continuity," but continuity of memory
seems to be key. The idea is that, while I might undergo radical bodily transformations due to a disfiguring accident, plastic surgery, transplantations, amputations, etc. - that
make me completely unrecognizable to those who knew me, as long as my mental life
remains intact I remain the same person.
Now, on the face of it, this view of personal identity over time seems to be on
target. However, viewing people as "persisting character and memory complexes" (p.
138, quoting Quinton) means that our commitments to persons are completely
conditional When I say, "I love Jane," on the psychological view this is equivalent to
saying something like "I love that person with those certain character and memory
complexes." Let us imagine that Jane, with whom we have heretofore had a committed
and loving relationship, is suddenly struck with Alzheimer's disease. In a matter of
months or years, Jane deteriorates to the point that her mental life is totally disconnected
from that of her "former self" Since we are now faced with a different Jane, so to speak,
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ought we to have the same committed relationship? On the psychological view, there
seems ample room to doubt that we should The commitment seems weak. On
Cockburn's view - where the extended, tangible human being is centrally important - it
is not just the psychological characteristics that matter

The Irreplaceability of Persons

If individuality lies in the possession of certain characteristics, then we are all, in
principle, replaceable (pp 150-152) On the psychological view, what it is to be a
particular individual is just to possess a certain set of psychological states. Thus, on the
psychological view I am, at least in principle, replaceable by another who possesses the
same set of psychological states that I now have. Cockburn argues that our relationships
take into account who this is, not just psychological features Individuals are not
replaceable. But if individuals are irreplaceable, then it seems that they will need some
unchanging core That unchanging core, according to Cockburn, is the series of past
events that make up each individual's personal history:
[I]t is not that my concern about 'who this is' is dependent on the significance
which this set of psychological characteristics has for me. Rather, the
significance which the characteristics have for me is dependent on who this is;
and the force of the words 'who this is' can only be brought out in terms of the
idea that this is an individual - a human being - with a particular history (p. 158)
By relying on the personal history that attaches to individuals, we can avoid the charge
that, since neither body nor mind are changeless, the persisting self is an illusion, or has
no deep significance (p 173).
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The centrality of the tangible, extended human being individuated by his or her
personal history also accounts for our attitudes towards the recently deceased. That
history is essential to particular individuals leads to the idea that there is something
significant in a corpse ( esp. of a loved one). There is something more than an "emotional
hangover" in our feelings upon viewing a corpse (187-188)
Cockburn has given a "central place" to terms such as "attitude," "ethical,"
"value," and "emotion," emphasizing our responses. This is in contradistinction to the
empiricist ethical tradition, in which people are (tacitly) held to be "passively registering"
the events in the world (208). Using those terms, Cockburn says, is "hazardous." By that
he means that these terms may be mistaken as being separate from our moral responses to
others But they are not prior to the re!>ponse, they are meant to signify the response
(209). If we use those terms (from the empiricist tradition) and they are used as they are
in that tradition (in the "prior to" sense), then we may be taken to be "taking seriously
ideas [ e.g , the question of whether one should eat one's dead grandmother] which one
does not think should be taken seriously" (210). But if those attitudes, values, and
emotions are taken to signify the response, then such a question is not taken seriously
from the start.

This brief overview of a Wittgensteinian brand of humanness - which we are now
calling "human being-ness" - is not intended to capture all there is to say on the subject
The object has been to introduce a more robust notion of humanness, and to see whether
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this notion, human being-ness, provides a better foundation for the Restrictive View on
human genetic enhancement. There are several key elements to this more robust view:

•
•
•
•
•

First is the idea that the tangible, extended human being is of fundamental
moral importance in our ethical thought.
Second, the legacy of the Descartes - in our everyday conception of human
beings as mind-plus-body - has not served us well in our development of a
proper moral appreciation for others.
Third, our attitudes - in the Wittgensteinian sense - to the human being are
part of, not separate from, our moral response to others
Fourth, the human form is important. The expressions of joy, pain, anger,
etc., to which we respond are manifested through the human form
Fifth, many things - e g., the significance we attach to birth, death, human
sexuality - determine the concept "human being."

The Evolution of "Human Being"

How does Wittgensteinian human being-ness measure up against biological
humanness (i.e., membership in the species Homo sapiens)?
In previous chapters it was seen that biological humanness could not serve as an
adequate foundation for human "sacredness," or intrinsic human value. Homo sapiens is
a biological category, not a natural kind. We have evolved from non-Homo sapiens and
presumably will evolve to a different non-Homo sapiens. Our species is constantly
changing, although the rate of change gives the illusion of stasis. But we can imagine,
with Silver (above), a scenario in which we accelerate our evolution to other non-human
species This accelerated evolution scenario points up just how tenuous biological
humanness is.
But the human being-ness articulated by Cockburn, Diamond, and others is a
different matter. Human being, on this view, is not a concept that can be put into others
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terms without loss. Thus, for example, it cannot mean "membership in the species Homo
sapiens." The fact that human being is not analyzable does not mean that the concept is
empty There are approximately six billion biological organisms on this planet
possessing a certain distinctive appearance and characteristics whom we recognize as
human beings. The evidence that huma11 being is a meaningful concept is that, when we
use the term, we almost always know what we mean.
The fact that we see stepwise variations in evolution - as opposed to, say, a
smooth continuum of intermediate creatures between man and monkey - makes
convenient the matter of classifying organisms in our language Moreover it leads to a
conceptual reification of those categories The concept human being has evolved in our
language as well The meaning of human being includes many subtle connotations that
go well beyond the conventional "member of the species Homo sapiens." That is,
although it would appear that the latter is a necessary element of human being, it is not
sufficient Biological humanness (i e, species membership) does not completely capture
the meaning of huma11 being, as the latter term has evolved in our language. Nor does the
language of personhood according to the psychological view, as has been argued above
It seems then that we have two kinds of evolution with which to concern
ourselves. We have evolution in the biological sense - the evolution of the species Homo
sapiens. But we also have the evolution of the concept human being in our language.
Diamond speaks of an "imaginative understanding of what it is to have a human life,"
which she explains with an analogy. When we think of death, we may think of the
biological concept (or concepts) of death, or we may think of a non-biological notion of
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death. By a non-biological notion, Diamond means "what we have made of the notion of
death in this and other cultural traditions" [Diamond, 1991 #106, p. 60; emphasis in

original] Our encounters with the death of others do not consist merely of the
observation that there has been a cessation of vital biological functions in a certain
individual. Death is marked, typically, with regret, sadness or grief, depending on how
well we knew the deceased. There are rituals, typically memorial services and burials or
cremations Gravestones may be inscribed with words that capture a cherished facet of a
loved one's character or personality Analogously, when we think of human beings, we
may think of the biological concept (or concepts) of human beings as one kind of animal,
or we may think of a non-biological notion (or notions) of human being. That is, just as
the non-biological notion of death goes well beyond the biological, similarly, according
to Diamond, human being in most contexts goes well beyond the limited notion of
species-membership.
The notion of human being-ness requires an "imaginative development of the
sense of what is mysterious in human life" (ibid , p. 40) Diamond gives two examples to
illustrate what she means by a "sense of what is mysterious " The f rst example makes
use of a D H Lawrence review of a book by H. M Tomlinson. In the book, a hunter on
safari in Africa has killed a mother gorilla with its baby "still clinging to the breast." The
hunter then proceeds to kill the baby so as to feel no remorse over having left it orphaned
Lawrence calls this a "degenerate insentience" in the hunter. "It is not cruelty, exactly,
which makes such a sportsman. It is crass insentience, a crass stupidity and deadness of
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fibre" (quoted in ibid , p. 41). An imaginative understanding of the mystery of gorilla life
is part (Diamond claims) of understanding the ethical dimensions of this situation.
The second example refers to the transformation of Ebenezer Scrooge in
Dickens's A Christmas Carol. Scrooge notoriously fails to respond to the plight of those
around him. He is unmoved by the poverty and need of others in spite of the Christmas
season and its tradition of generosity and good cheer The visits by the apparitions,
during which among other things he revisits scenes from his own boyhood, cause a kind
of rebirth in Scrooge On Diamond's interpretation, Scrooge's "being imaginatively
touched by himself as a child is then present in the awakening of humanity in him" (ibid.,
p. 42). This "being imaginatively touched" is not the same as Scrooge using his
imagination to envision, e g , what his actions might lead to for the Cratchits. On
Diamond's view, imagination gives rise to an "opening of the heart" (ibid., p. 49) by
which she means "that feeling of unavoidable solidarity; of the solidarity in mysterious
origin, in toil, in joy, in hope, in uncertain fate, which binds men to each other and all
mankind to the visible world" (quoting Conrad, ibid , p 50)
One of the shortcomings that we attributed to the purely psychological view of
personhood in the previous chapter was that it seemed to imply a lesser moral status for
intellectually disabled individuals - or at least those with severe intellectual disabilities
On the view of human being-ness advocated by Cockburn and Diamond, one would not
fail to give proper moral recognition to, say, the severely mentally retarded. Diamond
argues that there is no need to find a common ground or property on which to base our
moral concern for the retarded. "They are seen as with us in being human, where that is
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understood not in a biological sense, but imaginatively. Someone may be touched by the
response of a severely retarded person to music; and there may be in that being touched
an imaginative sense of shared humanity" (ibid , p 55) That recognition of human
being-ness also grounds our sense of outrage at the rape of a severely retarded woman
(ibid , pp. 55-56)
Thus, the recognition of human being-ness in others, as Cockburn argues, is a
non-discursive recognition of others as morally basic The Wittgensteinian attitude
towards other human beings forms the basis for our shared moral community
Diamond's contribution is to suggest a means through which we might extend the shared
moral community beyond normal human beings.

Human Being-ness and the Restrictive View

Our motivation for looking for a broader, non-biological notion of humanness was
that biological humanness is inadequate to ground the Restrictive View on human GE
The Restrictive View, it will be recalled, says that radical genetic enhancement of
humans is morally problematic An attempt to ground the Restrictive View in Dworkin's
notions of"human" and natural sacredness, while important for other reasons, failed for
this purpose since it did not appear that either type of sacredness would necessarily be
diminished in human-derived enhanced species. We then sought a conception of
humanness that would be jeopardized by radical genetic enhancement, and were led to
the Wittgenstein-inspired views on the centrality of the human being
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Having now introduced the notion of human being-ness, we are now in a position
to return to our main question Is human being-ness threatened by radical genetic
enhancement?
The answer is made difficult by the insistence that "human being" is not
analyzable - i e , that any attempt to capture human being-ness in terms of essential
features or properties that human beings possess will be inadequate If this is so, then we
cannot simply look to see whether the genetically enhanced human-derived creatures
have lost any of the defining features of human beings.
Cockburn and Diamond, in the writings here considered, have in mind the
contemporary world, not a Silveresque future in which the human species has diverged
into several other species in a fraction of the time it would have taken without GE It is
unclear, therefore, what each would have to say about our question But the following
view seems to follow naturally from the foregoing discussion:
•
•

The capacity to instantaneously respond to (have Wittgensteinian attitudes
towards) one another is of central ethical importance and is not accounted for in
other views on what makes us ethically significant.
Therefore, those genetic enhancements of humans that result in a loss of the
capacity to have the appropriate attitudes, or moral responsiveness, to one another
are ethically objectionable
This diminished human being-ness - or loss of the capacity for moral

responsiveness - might come about in either of two ways. A genetic alteration might
have a first-person effect or a third-person effect. That is, human being-ness might be
compromised through a diminished capacity in the moral agent to recognize others as
human beings (the first-person effect). Cockburn's slave-owner comes to mind here, as
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does the gorilla hunter criticized by D. H. Lawrence (above) Alternatively, human
being-ness might be compromised through diminished expressiveness in the observed
(the third-person effect) We have indicated the importance ofthe human form,
especially the eyes and face, as visual cues to which we instantaneously respond.
Perhaps certain genetic alterations - while having many benefts and generally being
viewed as enhancements - would as a side effect result in diminished outward
express1 veness.
Another possible third-person effect comes to mind when one recalls Silver's
fanciful description ofa GenRich creature as a "lung-modified thick-skinned dark green
human descendant" (Silver, 1997, p. 247) While it is hard to imagine that anyone would
consider such a creature "enhanced," it is not inconceivable lfwe assume, per Silver's
thought experiment, that large communities ofthis sort ofGenRich creature happily
coexist; that these communities are not shunned by other communities in our future
world, in which GE and its handiwork are no longer novelties; and that it is in virtue of
their particular "design" that enviable opportunities for space exploration have become
possible; then it is hard to see why we should not call this GenRich species enhanced
But there is one respect in which this sort ofradical enhancement might be ethically
regrettable Ifradical enhancements resulted in human-derived creatures that were
sufficiently alien or foreign in appearance, that foreignness might compromise our ability
to recognize the visual cues that we so readily respond to in our fellow human beings.
Let us consider again Diamond's example ofthe gorilla hunter. Diamond
emphasized the importance ofour capacity for "imaginative understanding" ofwhat
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things must be like for the gorilla mother suckling her young. The hunter's failure to
come to this sort of deep understanding was taken as evidence of a serious moral deficit
on the hunter's part. But one might argue that it takes more effort - a greater capacity for
imaginative understanding - when the object in question is non-human We may not
wish to excuse the gorilla hunter, at least if it is the case that gorillas resemble humans in
certain relevant behaviors and characteristics that ought to have been recognized Yet it
may nevertheless be true that our capacity for this sort of imaginative understanding is
not unlimited. Even with a good faith effort, foreignness (e.g, in physical appearance)
may place limits on the depth of our imaginative understanding of others.
What kind of genetic alterations might result in a loss of the capacity to be
morally responsive in this way? It is by no means certain that our knowledge of human
genetics will ever be great enough to predict which specific genes, if altered, would cause
this sort of loss Perhaps all that can be said is that, should our empirical observations
show that certain genetic alterations have such an effect, the effect should be recognized
as one that has ethical ramifications.

Accelerated Evolution

There is one other matter that we have yet to take account of In the previous
chapter, the case of "GenRich-A" was presented GenRich-A, we stipulated, is a
·
· II y engmeere
d, human derived organism that is created in one year's time. It just
genet1ca
so happens that GenRich-A is also exactly the same kind of organism as that which

154

would have evolved naturally (i e , without GE) in roughly 1 00, 000 years. The fact that
we only feel a sense of moral alarm over the prospect of GenRich-A appearing in one
year, and not in 1 00 , 000 years, we observed, means that there is nothing morally
problematic about GenRich-Aper se.
Now perhaps we are in a better position to see how the rate of GE-mediated
evolution could possibly make a difference in the ethical acceptability of human genetic
enhancement. It has just been suggested that certain radical genetic enhancements might
create a foreignness between, say, enhanced and unenhanced groups. This foreignness
would be ethically significant, we said, if it led to a diminished capacity among us for the
kinds of instantaneous responsiveness that is central to our moral treatment of others It
seems clear enough that mutual foreignness generally would increase in direct proportion
to the rate of evolution. Another way to put this is to say that GE-accelerated evolution
decreases the mutual similarity among us.
Thus, we should not alter our evolution at such a rate that there is a continuum of
creatures none (or few) of whom feels a sense of identification-with-kind With a
continuum, there would be no appearance of kinds, as there is in today's species-filled
world. And it is the appearance of kinds, not the metaphysical existence of kinds, that is
necessary for identification-with-kind, which in turn is necessary for Wittgensteinian
attitudes.
Rate of GE-mediated evolution may not be the only factor that could potentially
infuence mutual similarity (foreignness) The degree ofspeciation, or branching of the
evolutionary tree, similarly would increase mutual foreignness (or decrease mutual
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similarity). But it is not our aim here to stretch the scientific limits ofour thought
experiment any further Instead let us return to the conception ofhuman being-ness
articulated in the present chapter for a final observation.
It seems that we have strayed very far indeed from the bare notion ofbiological
humanness as a candidate for what is intrinsically valuable in human beings. Our
conception ofhuman being-ness elevates emotions, values and attitudes to a central place
in ethics. And the human form, on this view, is no longer seen as devoid ofethical
significance. However, it seems that we must sever the connection once and for all
between the instantaneous moral responsiveness that we have called "human being-ness"
in this chapter and biological humanness, or membership in the species Homo sapiens.
For it seems that - to the extent that it is a fact - it is a contingent fact that it is only
human beings who have the capacity for this responsiveness. As noted above, Cockburn
and Diamond were not envisioning the world ofthe GenRich. In that world, the world of
our thought experiments, there is no reason to assume that genetically enhanced, humanderived creatures would not be capable ofan "imaginative understanding" not only of
their own kind, but other kinds as well. And we (Silver's unenhanced Naturals) might be
capable ofresponding to a very broad range of"others "
In the end, the lesson might be just this that a sense ofidentification-with-kind a sense of"who we are" - might be more than vague nonsense. Recalling Diamond's
earlier example, we "may be touched by the response ofa severely retarded person to
music; and there may be in that being touched an imaginative sense ofshared humanity"
[Diamond, 1991 # J 06, p 55; emphasis added]. Even ifwe now use "humanity" in a
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much broader sense, we may find a world in which this instantaneous responsiveness
between individuals does not exist (or is diminished) profoundly regrettable. Shared
"humanity," as Diamond observes, is not nothing (ibid., p. 57)

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The preceding chapters have addressed two central questions First a two-part
question: What is the current ethical basis for public policy restrictions on certain kinds
of human GE, and is that basis stable? Second, can a rational basis be found to support
the intuition that certain kinds or degrees of non-harmful human genetic enhancement
violate what is intrinsically valuable in human beings?
With respect to the first question, it has been argued that the current ethical basis
for restricting germline and enhancement GE is unstable. A number of ethical objections,
taken collectively, constitute that ethical basis. Foremost among these is the objection
that present-day human GE technology involves an unacceptably high level of risk for
future generations However, as argued in Chapter 2, there is reason to expect that the
technology will become acceptably safe. Once that happens, restrictions on human GE
will need to be justified on other grounds When we considered (in Chapter 3) what
those other grounds might be, it was argued that these other objections to human GE were
not particularly compelling That is, they were not likely to slow the momentum of
human GE technology, which promises great medical benefits, as well as considerable
profits for the relevant industry. Thus, once human GE becomes acceptably safe, the
ethical foundations for our current restrictions on human GE will be seen to be unstable
If our intuition is correct that some limits on human GE are ethically called for, then we
will have to seek support or justification for holding that view elsewhere
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There is certainly room for argument on the foregoing points First of all, only
time and technological progress will tell whether the technological breakthroughs needed
to make GE safe will actually occur. During the course of the present research, two
major developments have already occurred - the cloning of mammals from adult cells,
and the isolation of human embryonic stem cells. But there is no way to rule out the
possibility that unforeseen obstacles might make the achievement of safe human GE
technically impossible Second, due to limits of space, a full treatment of the many
objections to human GE has not been undertaken here. It may be that one or more of
these objections - such as objections to embryo research or eugenics - will prove
sufficiently strong to limit human GE, making the question of the intrinsic wrongness of
changing human nature moot, at least as far as the pragmatic world of public policy is
concerned. In other words, the ethical foundation for current policy on human GE may
not be as tenuous as has been argued herein. Further analysis of the current set of ethical
objections is therefore appropriate.
With respect to the second question - regarding whether human GE is a potential
threat to intrinsically valuable humanness - it has been argued that this question will
become important to public policy because of the collective failure of other ethical
objections to justify restrictions on human GE. We have engaged in a thought
experiment in which we imagined a future world full of human-derived, radically
enhanced creatures, conveniently exemplified by Silver's GenRich. The initial
motivating intuition was that something was morally wrong with certain kinds or degrees
of genetic alteration even when those alterations resulted in significant benefts and no
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significant harms. The strategy in using such an extreme example of human genetic
enhancement was to isolate the ethical variable that we suspected might be placed in
jeopardy by human GE That variable, it was suggested, had something to do with
humanness, although it was not clear at the start whether humanness would be equivalent
to biological humanness (species membership) or a broader conception. If violating
some notion of humanness were ethically objectionable, this surely would be seen in
greater relief against the background of the radically deviant GenRich-populated future
We might then say that our thought experiment yielded an important discovery - namely,
the discovery that our isolated variable, provisionally called "humanness," is of
fundamental ethical importance That discovery then could be used to determine whether
less extreme cases of human GE would be ethically objectionable for the same reason.
While not all enhancements seem to be morally problematic, there is a sense that
some limits are ethically called for There is something intrinsically valuable, or
"sacred," about human beings - at least that is the intuition that motivated this inquiry and humanness ought therefore to be preserved. Radical changes through (safe) human
GE would violate human sacredness and thus would be morally objectionable. This
position we called the Restrictive View on human genetic enhancement. The Permissive
View, in contrast, denies that anything of moral significance attaches to our humanness,
and thus denies that even radical genetic enhancements are morally problematic.
Are we justified in holding the Restrictive View? To make a compelling
argument, the advocate of the Restrictive View, we said, must show the following: First,
a coherent notion of morally important humanness must be articulated. Second, it must

l
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be shown that radical human genetic enhancement violates that notion ofhumanness.
And third, it must be shown that such a violation is ethically objectionable
lfwe ask now whether we have met these three requirements, the answer is a
qualified yes. With respect to the first requirement, human being-ness, it was argued in
the previous chapter, is a coherent notion ofmorally important humanness. Yet there is
room for criticism. For example, the claim was made that, although one could not give
necessary and sufficient conditions for being a human being, one could nevertheless not
fail to recognize human beings. In a future in which genetic engineering has become
commonplace, however, the lines between species may become blurred, and human
beings may not be so readily distinguishable
The second requirement - that radical GE violate human being-ness - may also be
called into question It is not clear whether certain radical genetic enhancements in fact
would compromise human being-ness We have argued that it is reasonable to expect
that some would, especially given the importance that the human form has in our
immediate moral responsiveness to others - but this remains a matter ofspeculation
Perhaps through "imaginative understanding" we have the potential to respond to a wide
variety of others - human and non-human In fact, it seems that Diamond's call for
"imaginative understanding" exists in a kind oftension with our recognition ofhuman
being-ness. That is, on the one hand the claim is made that human beings enjoy a
morally privileged status On the other hand, we are called upon to look beyond the
world of human beings to non-human others, to whom we might also have
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notion of ethically significant human being-ness should be a subjec for further study.
t
Yet these criticisms notwithstanding, the human being-centered view articulated
above does seem to provide us with a plausible account of an intrinsically valuable
humanness that could ground the Restrictive View. What do these arguments in support
of the Restrictive View imply for public policy? We will look first at the implications for
policy on human GE (or germline gene therapy), after which we will consider the
implications in other policy areas as well

Implications for Human Genetic Engineering

A Re-Examination of the Orthodox Position on Human Gene Therapy
What we have called the orthodox position on human gene therapy makes clear
what is ethically permissible and impermissible Treatment gene therapy in somatic cells,
if safe, is permissible Germline and/or enhancement gene therapy is prohibited About
this there is a fairly broad-based consensus. The underlying reasons for this position are
not always fully and explicitly defended. It is clear that risk of irreversible harm is the
primary concern with respect to germline genetic intervention. But should the
technology become acceptably safe for use in humans, would there be some residual
opposition on grounds unrelated to direct harm to future generations? There very well
could be, but - as argued in Chapter 3 - it is unlikely that the other commonly voiced
objections to germline gene therapy will prove so compelling that society will willingly
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forgo the enormous medical benefits that are potentially in store for us. In fact, a number
of policy statements endorsing the prohibition of germline interventions have clearly
indicated an openness to reconsidering the question once the technology became
acceptably safe. There is every reason to expect that human GE will become acceptably
safe (see Chapter 2). This leaves the orthodox view with only the prohibition against
genetic enhancement. And since it is not obvious how an enhancement, in itself, could be
morally objectionable, the current consensus on human gene therapy appears tenuous
indeed.
The foregoing discussion makes a case for re-drawing the moral line. The line
currently is drawn between human GE intended for treatment (or prevention) and human
GE intended for enhancement Glover, Harris, and others have argued that genetic
enhancement is not intrinsically wrong and, therefore, we should give it serious
consideration Preservation of human nature appears to carry little if any moral weight,
on their views (see Chapter 4) The human being-centered view also holds that
enhancement as such is not ethically objectionable. It does, however, suggest a distinct
moral line between those genetic alterations that preserve human being-ness and those
that compromise it In other words, the new ethical criterion is preservation of human
being-ness, not biological humanness as the orthodox view implies In effect, this calls
for current policy on human GE to become more permissive.
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Jncrementalism and the Rate of Evolution
While we have argued for retaining a caveat to the Permissive View - roughly,
human genetic enhancement that does not jeopardize human being-ness is morally
unobjectionable - it seems that this limitation will have little practical effect in the short
term. The kinds of genetic enhancements people are likely to want, once the technology
becomes safe, are relatively modest, incremental improvements, not radical
enhancements. Speculation about the kinds of human traits that future parents might
wish to see enhanced in their offspring includes such things as decreasing the need for
sleep, increasing intellectual capacities, bolstering the immune system, and so on
(Walters & Palmer, 1997, pp IO1-108) Assuming that these genetic enhancements can
be achieved without compensating losses (Glover, 1984, pp. 33-35), they do not strike
one as coming even remotely close to the sorts of changes that might compromise our
"shared humanity."
The incremental nature of the expansion from treatment to enhancement GE will
also be dictated by the need to gather empirical data on risk (higher risk can be justified
more easily for cases of horrible genetic disease than for cases of non-essential
enhancement), and by the step-wise progress of human genomics and GE-related
technologies As a practical matter, then, incremental advances in human GE might
make the question of radical genetic enhancement moot
Earlier we argued that loss of human being-ness seemed possible only when the
rate of GE-mediated evolution was relatively rapid Thus, Silver's GenRich scenario,
which takes place over the course of a few centuries, might be problematic, whereas a
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similar scenario taking place over the course of several millennia might not be
problematic. Putting these observations together with our qualifed defense of the
Restrictive View, it seems that in the long run, policy on human GE will need to take
account of the rate of GE-mediated evolution of human beings That is to say, even in
the absence of deleterious effects from genetic alterations, preservation of human being
ness could in itself serve as sufficient justification for limiting non-harmful human GE
We have just indicated the implications of human being-ness for ethics of human
GE Does this view of human being-ness - of the central ethical importance of our moral
responsiveness or "attitude" towards others - have implications for public policy in other
spheres ?
Implications in Other Areas

Abortion

The most obvious policy area for which our notion of human being-ness has
implications is abortion. To begin this discussion - which revisits many of the themes of
Chapter 4 - we will consider a debate that took place more than thirty years ago between
two of the early and leading commentators on bioethics - Nobel Prize-winning geneticist
Joshua Lederberg and theologian Paul Ramsey. We will draw from two papers from
Lederberg and one from Ramsey. Lederberg's earlier paper had to do with the direction
of human evolution, or eugenics (1966), while the later paper dealt with contraception
and abortion (1967). Ramsey's paper (1970) covered a range of topics, including human
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cloning, but the relevant segment for our purposes is his critique of the two Lederberg
papers.
Lederberg at this time felt that human genetic engineering - which he then called
"genetic alchemy" or "algeny" - was not imminent and considered debates over it a
distraction (1966, p 521) He once considered addressing a mid- l 960s audience about
"molecular human biology" but decided against it, saying "it occurred to me that to dally
on such question would be an amusing and engaging futuristic escapism" (1967, p. 25)
As it turns out, the future was not so distant In any case, the topics he chose instead
were contraception and abortion, which he felt were much more timely and important.
Lederberg criticized the scientists and physicians of the 1940s and 1950s for not
having the courage to advocate for contraception Their lack of leadership on that issue
was partly responsible for the problem of world overpopulation, which was felt at that
time to be approaching crisis proportions This aura of crisis is communicated clearly by
Lederberg "It is even possible that the world will not survive as a habitat of the human
species simply because of our reticence, because of our pusillanimity, in coming to face
(the issue of contraception]" (ibid , p. 25). Abortion in the 1960s was, he felt, the same
kind of morally controversial issue that contraception was twenty or thirty years earlier.
It was shameful that over one million women per year were seeking illegal back-alley
abortions.
Lederberg objected to the fetal right-to-life arguments of abortion opponents. In
his view, the question, "When does life begin ? " has no clear answer because biological
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life has existed on a continuum over evolutionary time. "[I]f life had a beginning at all, it
was an event that occurred some 3 billion years ago," i.e., in the primordial soup.
Lederberg pointed out that evolution of the human species and development of the
human fetus and infant were analogous "During the evolution of the species there was
no sudden emergence of human personality but the gradual accumulation of those genetic
alterations controlling the development of the brain that in turn permit the development
of humanity" (ibid , p 26) Similarly, the brain develops in the fetus and infant, and only
at a certain point does the infant "achieve the full measure of humanity" (ibid., p. 26).
When does the infant achieve "humanity"?
An operationally useful point of divergence of the developing organism would be
at approximately the first year of life, when the human infant continues his
intellectual development, proceeds to the acquisition of language, and then
participates in a meaningful, cognitive interaction with his mother and with the
rest of society. At this point only does he enter into the cultural tradition that has
been the special attribute of man by which he is set apart from the rest of the
species
What is striking here is the implication that our "humanity" depends entirely on
our having attained certain neurological (and hence psychological) capacities. That is,
Lederberg seems to subscribe to a completely unqualif ed psychological view of
personhood. Immediately, however, he recognizes a possible implication of this view
He continues:
. . I do not advocate a discussion of infanticide a special intervention in the
period between the delivery of the inf�nt and the �ime at which he �c�uires_
language. We are all too emotionally mvolv�d with infant� t�at_ th1� 1s m_ 1�self
enough to create an inevitable and a pragmatically useful d1v1dmg lme. (1b1d., pp.
26-27)
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As for abortion, Lederberg argued that it is morally permissible and ought to be legalized
He gives two reasons for this view As noted above, the large number of back-alley
abortions and the related high morbidity and mortality were a great concern. If it weren't
for this "enormous inhumanity" traditional anti-abortion views and the associated
"conceptions of the dignity of human life" could possibly be deferred to (ibid , p. 27).
The second reason for favoring the legalization of abortion had to do with the fear that
the human gene pool was gradually accumulating harmful mutations and would continue
to do so unless society intervened in some way. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, this
fear of the increasing "genetic load," as it was called, was taken very seriously at the
time, and helped revive discussions of broad-based eugenics programs. Life-saving
advances in medicine may have saved a lot of personal grief, but they also increase
genetic load by ensuring that more people carrying deleterious genes survive to
reproductive age and pass on those genes to future generations. Lederberg argued that
the solution to genetic load was to rely on "differential fertility" - i e , the use of
contraception and abortion combined with genetic testing and counseling "Far from
limiting efforts to have children, the availability of voluntary abortion should go a long
way to encourage the gamble in risky matings, by putting the stakes under more effective
anticipation. Such a policy represents the only human reconciliation of the individual's
rights of parenthood and social concern for the containment of genetic disease" (ibid , p.
27).
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Let us return, however, to Lederberg's comments regarding a psychological view
of"humanity." In the earlier paper, there is more ambivalence on this subject (1966, p
530)
Humanistic culture rests on a definition of man which we already know to be
biologically vulnerable. Nevertheless the goals of our culture rest on a credo of
the sanctity of human individuality But how do we assay for man to demarcate
him from his isolated or scrambled tissues and organs, on one side, from
experimental karyotypic [i.e., genetic] hybrids on another. Pragmatically, the
legal privileges of humanity will remain with objects that look enough like men to
grip their consciences, and whose nurture does not cost too much. Rather than
superficial appearance of face or chromosomes, a more rational criterion of
human identity might be the potential for communication with the species, which
is the foundation on which the unique glory of man is built
But Lederberg disclaims this last assertion in a footnote "On further reflection I would
attack any insistence on this suggestion (which I have made before) as another example
of the intellectual arrogance that I decry a few sentences before - a human foible by no
means egregious" (ibid , p 530).
Ramsey ( 1970) takes Lederberg to task for his "muddled moral reasoning"
regarding a criterion for humanity. Lederberg, in the just-quoted passage from the earlier
paper, suggests that the ability to communicate with other humans would be a suitable
criterion, and then immediately rejects his having made the suggestion as "intellectual
arrogance." With this rejection, Ramsey says, all we are left with is a decision as to
whether an offspring looks human. Thus, "mishaps do not constitute a moral problem"
(ibid., p. 96)
Lederberg stumbles into the same inconsistency in his later paper on
he says that the
contraception and abortion ( 1967). In that paper, as noted above,
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developing human being becomes morally significant at about age one, when it begins to
engage in meaningful communication with other humans. Then he says he does not
advocate infanticide because of our intense emotional involvement with infants Ramsey
comments: "Lederberg has therefore provided himself with no intellectual foundation for
the immediately following dictum 'To discuss the fetus during prenatal life as if he were
a human being is merely to reflect the emotional involvement of that observer ' Surely
he had just appealed to the same sort of emotional involvement with another life during
that part of the continuum from birth to age one as the only ground for not practicing
infanticide" (I 970, pp 97-98)
So, if we aren't to rely on the degree of emotional involvement as a criterion for
"humanity" or personhood, and we aren't to rely on ability to communicate within the
species, what would Lederberg have us rely on?
Lederberg's protracted ambivalence on this point captures perfectly the feelings
of moral ambivalence that have characterized our policy positions on human GE. On the
one hand, there is the pull of the psychological view of personhood, which assumes that
a) it is in virtue of being persons that we are morally important, and b) personhood is
essentially psychological. On this view, fetuses are not included as part of humanity, and
opinions to the contrary are the product of mere emotionalism
On the other hand, there is an appeal to emotional attachments to justify our
ethical prohibition against infanticide, a practice that - much to Lederberg's chagrin suggests itself given the elevation of the psychological view and the assumption that our
emotional attachments to fetuses are morally irrelevant. And when the incompatibility of
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these competing ethical inclinations leaps into full view, demanding resolution, then any
attempt to give criteria for "humanity" is dismissed as "intellectual arrogance."
Given the difficult intellectual terrain through which we have traveled in the
preceding chapters, one cannot feel wholly unsympathetic to the latter assertion.
Nevertheless, as the Lederberg-Ramsey debate so capably demonstrates, much of ethical
significance hangs in the balance The fact that the ferocity of abortion politics has not
abated over the course of the ensuing three decades is further testimony to the importance
of these questions And to the extent that we find the notion of human being-ness
plausible, the ambivalence captured by Lederberg's views may be alleviated, at least in
part.
In what ways does human being-ness help to resolve the moral ambivalence that
we feel about abortion ? On the view Cockburn and Diamond defend, emotions, attitudes,
and values are of primary ethical importance. They are not disparaged as just so much
static interference getting in the way of a clear signal - the facts of the matter - that
would indicate the proper moral response. The fact that we instantaneously and viscerally
respond to human fetuses and infants is the moral response. Thus, on this view, the
charge that our attachment to fetuses and infants is "mere emotionalism" misses the
point. They are human beings, and our "emotionalism" is a morally important
recognition of our shared humanity.
The psychological view of personhood, which serves us well in many cases, has
its shortcomings, and it is those shortcomings upon which Lederberg stumbles. Attempts
to give defining criteria for (morally significant) persons by looking to certain features of
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human beings inevitably seem inadequate As we noted in the previous chapter, such
attempts have the result that "not all human beings will emerge as beings who are not to
be killed" (Cockburn, 1990, p. 112-113) We now have a case in point- infants.
On the psychological view, why is it morally wrong to painlessly kill infants
when their future prospects look bleak? Think of the circumstances in which some give
serious consideration to abortion. Maybe the infant has Down syndrome. The range of
disability in Down syndrome children is great. The degree of mental retardation in some
cases is severe, but in other cases is comparatively mild In some cases, there are
extensive problems with internal organs, such as the heart, and in other cases not For
parents considering abortion who would not abort in mild cases of Down syndrome,
would it not make more sense to wait until the child is born so that a thorough assessment
of the disability can be made ? If the child is mildly disabled then its life is spared; and if
it is severely disabled, then its life is terminated. In contrast, abortion looks like a poor
option, for one takes the chance of terminating the life of a fetus with mild Down
syndrome. It might be objected that we do not terminate the lives of even profoundly
retarded infants because the level of psychological functioning is still high enough to
qualify such infants as persons But, as discussed earlier, relying solely on psychological
criteria leaves us in the apparently inconsistent position of killing higher animals and
sparing infants even when the former possess greater psychological capacities than the
latter either do or will in the future.
Others might opt for abortion even in circumstances in which the future child is
not expected to be disabled Consider a case in which the expectant mother is diagnosed
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with a terminal disease. The mother may consider the future prospects for her unborn
child to be quite bleak. Perhaps other things make her expectation reasonable - the
absence or limited availability of a father, the absence or unwillingness of siblings or
others who might provide a loving home, and so on. For those who consider an abortion
morally justifiable in this case, would it not also be morally justifiable for the mother to
terminate the life of her newborn child if the mother's diagnosis came shortly after
delivery?
The suggestion that in cases such as these we might be justif ed in killing infants
strikes most of us as either sheer lunacy or simple barbarism. But the point here is not to
call this into question The point is, if we accept the patent immorality of killing infants,
why is it so difficult to give the reasons ?
On the human being-centered view, infants are just recognized as human beings
The claim that one's status as a human being must be controversial unless the category
human being can be reduced to certain defining features is rejected. As it was expressed
above, our attitude towards the infant is "an attitude towards a soul;" we are not "of the
opinion that he has a soul" (Wittgenstein, quoted in Cockburn, 1990, p. 6) When a
newborn is in distress - for one of the many mysterious reasons that newborns become
distressed - the effect that this can have on a roomful of adults is dramatic. Initially,
there may be some sympathetic laughter and general clucking from the wise and
experienced ones But as the episode goes on and one after another technique fails to
comfort, the tension in the room becomes palpable. A great scurrying may ensue as all
and sundry try their hand. Or alternatively, the child may be whisked into another room
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by the stressed parents for some intensive intervention. The desire to console an
inconsolable newborn can, like nothing else, arouse pity in us. We respond
instantaneously to the cries, the flushed and contorted face And we do so even when we
are convinced that the source of distress is nothing more than a temporary gastrointestinal
imbalance.
The human form, as has already been noted, is important here, especially the eyes
and face. And just as we are moved by the sight of a newborn, its gestures and
expressions, so are we moved by the sight of a fetus Of course, our opportunities for
viewing fetuses are normally quite limited. But even the blurry image of the sonogram,
in which the limbs and other physical features can be distinguished, carries with it a
deeper significance than would an image of an internal organ or an embryo in utero.
Among animal biologists, emb,yo refers to all stages from the single fertilized egg cell
through about six to eight weeks gestational age, when recognizable features of the adult
organism begin to appear, at which point fetus is used (Silver, 1997, p. 39) On the
psychological view, there is no ethical significance attached to the appearance of these
physical features On the human being-centered view, these features are ethically
significant, and thus the distinction between embryo and fetus is ethically important.
Dworkin's insights into abortion and the nature of human "sacredness," though
insightful, seemed to leave no room for the ethical significance of human form On
Dworkin's view (see Chapter 4), there are two kinds of intrinsic human value at play in
our reasoning about abortion. We called the two "natural sacredness" and "human
sacredness " Natural sacredness is inherent in the biological creation. That is, the
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embryo or fetus, in virtue of the biological creative investment embodied in them,
possesses a non-incremental intrinsic value, or sacredness. Children and adults, in
addition to natural sacredness, also possess "human sacredness" in virtue of the life
commitments, projects, plans, and so forth, that are central to their lives as social
creatures. What was not implied by Dworkin's theory of the natural sacredness of
embryos and fetuses was that human fetuses were deserving of special ethical
significance. If it is the "natural investment" - the creative act of biological development
and its product - that grounds natural sacredness, then it seems we should have the same
feelings of reverence and awe for the developing mouse or goat fetus as we have for the
developing human fetus And while we may be struck by the magnificence of fetal
development generally, there is a heightened responsiveness in the case of the human
fetus. We are especially moved by the developing human form.
None of this is to say, by ascribing human being-ness to fetuses, that this ought to
be the overriding moral consideration in the abortion debate. How much weight it should
carry is a subject for another day. What is being claimed here is that human being-ness
is, as it was put earlier, "not nothing." Our (Wittgensteinian) attitude towards human
fetuses is ethically significant, and therefore deserves to be taken seriously as one of
several important considerations that have a legitimate place in our arguments about
abortion.
Thus far we have discussed the possible implications of our human beingcentered ethics for human genetic engineering and for abortion. The f nal area that might
be influenced by human being-ness is the treatment of disabled persons
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Treatment of the disabled

It has been noted several times that the psychological view seems to imply that at
least some of the mentally disabled do not qualify as persons according to that view.
Since it is in virtue of our personhood that we are morally important beings, it follows
that the intellectually disabled are morally diminished as well
In contrast, the human being-centered view does not conceive of human beings as
minds-plus-bodies It not only does not accept the skimming off of the mental or
psychological as morally significant; by the same token it also does not accept the
abandoning of the bodily as morally insignificant The extended, tangible human being rather than mind and body - deserves a fundamental place in our ontology By rejecting
the exclusively psychological criteria for personhood, the human being-centered view
avoids any implication that the intellectually disabled might properly be classified as
human "non-persons>'
We have spoken quite a bit of the psychological view and its influence. But this
is not to say that all or even most people adhere to an unqualified view of persons as
morally important only in virtue of their psychological capacities Humanitarian
impulses towards others - disabled and non-disabled, human and non-human - are well
represented in society Thus, policies having to do with the treatment of, for example, the
institutionalized mentally disabled can be expected to have appropriate protections for
human rights.
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On the other hand, the actual treatment of the institutionalized mentally disabled
varies from place to place. In spite of the expression of a proper moral regard in policy
statements, the implementation of policy may not faithfully reflect that moral regard. We
are a society that, arguably, has become indifferent about caring for the mentally
disabled. The policies of deinstitutionalization that were implemented by states
beginning in the 1970s were often well intentioned. The idea was to put an end to the
warehousing of the mentally ill; to provide care in the least restrictive setting; and to
acknowledge their civil rights In implementation, however, thousands were released
from institutions with nowhere to go. It is for this reason that so many of today's
homeless are persons with mental disabilities
What does this have to do with the human being-centered view ? Although many
causes may contribute to our sometimes negligent or indifferent treatment of the mentally
disabled, the influence of the mind-body dichotomy in Western thought should not be
dismissed out of hand. Perhaps we as a society would be more inclined to be responsive
to persons with mental disabilities if the psychological view were not such a pervasive
part of our way of thinking Perhaps an ethical view that emphasizes an "imaginative
understanding" of others would serve us better. If we became more open to the idea that
our instantaneous moral responsiveness towards other human beings was important, then
our treatment of the mentally disabled - our implementation of our admirably worded
policies - might be significantly improved And more generally, our openness to the
human being-centered view might rejuvenate our ethics by adding breadth to our moral
community and depth to our moral regard for those in it.
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